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What's Wrong With Microphysicalism?

What's Wrong With Microphysicalism? PDF Author: Andreas Huttemann
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1134336241
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 271

Book Description
'Microphysicalism', the view that whole objects behave the way they do in virtue of the behaviour of their constituent parts, is an influential contemporary view with a long philosophical and scientific heritage. In What's Wrong With Microphysicalism? Andreas Hüttemann offers a fresh challenge to this view. Hüttemann agrees with the microphysicalists that we can explain compound systems by explaining their parts, but claims that this does not entail a fundamentalism that gives hegemony to the micro-level. At most, it shows that there is a relationship of determination between parts and wholes, but there is no justification for taking this relationship to be asymmetrical rather than one of mutual dependence. Hüttemann argues that if this is the case, then microphysicalists have no right to claim that the micro-level is the ultimate agent: neither the parts nor the whole have 'ontological priority'. Hüttemann advocates a pragmatic pluralism, allowing for different ways to describe nature. What's Wrong With Microphysicalism? is a convincing and original contribution to central issues in contemporary philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and metaphysics.

What's Wrong With Microphysicalism?

What's Wrong With Microphysicalism? PDF Author: Andreas Huttemann
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1134336241
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 271

Book Description
'Microphysicalism', the view that whole objects behave the way they do in virtue of the behaviour of their constituent parts, is an influential contemporary view with a long philosophical and scientific heritage. In What's Wrong With Microphysicalism? Andreas Hüttemann offers a fresh challenge to this view. Hüttemann agrees with the microphysicalists that we can explain compound systems by explaining their parts, but claims that this does not entail a fundamentalism that gives hegemony to the micro-level. At most, it shows that there is a relationship of determination between parts and wholes, but there is no justification for taking this relationship to be asymmetrical rather than one of mutual dependence. Hüttemann argues that if this is the case, then microphysicalists have no right to claim that the micro-level is the ultimate agent: neither the parts nor the whole have 'ontological priority'. Hüttemann advocates a pragmatic pluralism, allowing for different ways to describe nature. What's Wrong With Microphysicalism? is a convincing and original contribution to central issues in contemporary philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and metaphysics.

The Substance of Consciousness

The Substance of Consciousness PDF Author: Brandon Rickabaugh
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1394195494
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 438

Book Description
A singularly powerful and rigorous argument in favor of modern substance dualism In The Substance of Consciousness: A Comprehensive Defense of Contemporary Substance Dualism, two distinguished philosophers deliver a unique and powerful defense of contemporary substance dualism, which makes the claim that the human person is an embodied fundamental, immaterial, and unifying substance. Multidisciplinary in scope, the book explores areas of philosophy, cognitive science, neuroscience, and the sociology of mind-body beliefs. The authors present the most comprehensive, up-to-date, and rigorous non-edited work on substance dualism in the field, as well as a detailed history of how property and substance dualism have been presented and evaluated over the last 150 years. Alongside developing new and updated positive arguments for substance dualism, they also discuss key metaphysical notions and distinctions that inform the examination of substance dualism and its alternatives. Readers will also find: A thorough examination of the recent shift away from standard physicalism and the renaissance of substance dualism Comprehensive explorations of the likely future of substance dualism in the twenty-first century, including an exhaustive list of proposed research projects for substance dualists Practical discussion of new and rigorous critiques of significant physicality alternatives, including emergentism and panpsychism. Extensive treatments of philosophy of mind debates about the roles played by staunch/faint-hearted naturalism and theism in establishing or presuming methodology, epistemic priorities, and prior metaphysical commitments Perfect for professional philosophers, The Substance of Consciousness will also earn a place in the libraries of consciousness researchers, philosophical theologians, and religious studies scholars.

Physicalism

Physicalism PDF Author: Daniel Stoljar
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1135149224
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 265

Book Description
Physicalism, the thesis that everything is physical, is one of the most important yet divisive problems in philosophy. In this superb introduction to the problem Daniel Stoljar focuses on three fundamental questions: the interpretation, truth and philosophical significance of physicalism.

American Book Publishing Record

American Book Publishing Record PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : American literature
Languages : en
Pages : 784

Book Description


Mind

Mind PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 864

Book Description
Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society.

South African Journal of Philosophy

South African Journal of Philosophy PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 398

Book Description


Empty Ideas

Empty Ideas PDF Author: Peter Unger
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019069601X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 273

Book Description
During the middle of the twentieth century, philosophers generally agreed that, by contrast with science, philosophy should offer no substantial thoughts about the general nature of concrete reality. Instead, philosophers offered conceptual truths. It is widely assumed that, since 1970, things have changed greatly. This book argues that's an illusion that prevails because of the failure to differentiate between "concretely substantial" and "concretely empty" ideas.

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics PDF Author: Dean W. Zimmerman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Metaphysics
Languages : en
Pages : 340

Book Description
" ... dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed.".

The Universe As We Find It

The Universe As We Find It PDF Author: John Heil
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199596204
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 326

Book Description
In this book the author what it means to be physical, mental, or abstract entity, and how they relate to the concept of reality. His answers are framed in terms of a comprehensive ontology of substances, and properties inspired by Descartes, Locke, their successors, and their latter day exemplars.

Substance and the Fundamentality of the Familiar

Substance and the Fundamentality of the Familiar PDF Author: Ross D. Inman
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351660047
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 447

Book Description
Substance and the Fundamentality of the Familiar explicates and defends a novel neo-Aristotelian account of the structure of material objects. While there have been numerous treatments of properties, laws, causation, and modality in the neo-Aristotelian metaphysics literature, this book is one of the first full-length treatments of wholes and their parts. Another aim of the book is to further develop the newly revived area concerning the question of fundamental mereology, the question of whether wholes are metaphysically prior to their parts or vice versa. Inman develops a fundamental mereology with a grounding-based conception of the structure and unity of substances at its core, what he calls substantial priority, one that distinctively allows for the fundamentality of ordinary, medium-sized composite objects. He offers both empirical and philosophical considerations against the view that the parts of every composite object are metaphysically prior, in particular the view that ascribes ontological pride of place to the smallest microphysical parts of composite objects, which currently dominates debates in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind. Ultimately, he demonstrates that substantial priority is well-motivated in virtue of its offering a unified solution to a host of metaphysical problems involving material objects.