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Author: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Publisher: Food & Agriculture Org. ISBN: 9789251046296 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 108
Book Description
Contents: Dirt poor: poverty, farmers and soil resource investment/ by Leslie Lipper; Methodological issues in analysing the linkages between socio-eocnomic and environmental systems/ by Dan Osgood and Leslie Lipper. Includes 1-page abstracts in French, Spanish and Arabic
Author: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Publisher: Food & Agriculture Org. ISBN: 9789251046296 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 108
Book Description
Contents: Dirt poor: poverty, farmers and soil resource investment/ by Leslie Lipper; Methodological issues in analysing the linkages between socio-eocnomic and environmental systems/ by Dan Osgood and Leslie Lipper. Includes 1-page abstracts in French, Spanish and Arabic
Author: Thomas B. Fomby Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing ISBN: 1784411825 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 772
Book Description
This volume honors Professor Peter C.B. Phillips' many contributions to the field of econometrics. The topics include non-stationary time series, panel models, financial econometrics, predictive tests, IV estimation and inference, difference-in-difference regressions, stochastic dominance techniques, and information matrix testing.
Author: Alessandro Citanna Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3540271929 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 278
Book Description
In the area of dynamic economics, David Cass’s work has spawned a number of important lines of research, including the study of dynamic general equilibrium theory, the concept of sunspot equilibria, and general equilibrium theory when markets are incomplete. Based on these contributions, this volume contains new developments in the field, written by Cass's students and co-authors.
Author: Mr. Gaizka Ormazabal Sanchez Publisher: Stanford University ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 185
Book Description
This dissertation comprises three papers on the governance of corporate risk: 1. The first paper investigates the role of organizational structures aimed at monitoring corporate risk. Proponents of risk-related governance structures, such as risk committees or Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) programs, assert that risk monitoring adds value by ensuring that corporate risks are managed. An alternative view is that such governance structures are nothing more than window-dressing created in response to regulatory or public pressure. Consistent with the former view, I find that, in the period between 2000 and 2006, firms with more observable risk oversight structures exhibit lower equity and credit risk than firms with fewer or no observable risk oversight structures. I also provide evidence that firms with more observable risk oversight structures experienced higher returns during the worst days of the 2007-2008 financial crisis and were less susceptible to market fluctuations than firms with fewer or no observable risk oversight structures. Finally, I find that firms without observable risk oversight structures experienced higher abnormal returns to recent legislative events relating to risk management than firms with observable risk oversight structures. 2. The most common empirical measure of managerial risk-taking incentives is equity portfolio vega (Vega), which is measured as the dollar change in a manager's equity portfolio for a 0.01 change in the standard deviation of stock returns. However, Vega exhibits at least three undesirable features. First, Vega is expressed as a dollar change. This implicitly assumes that managers with identical Vega have the same incentives regardless of differences in their total equity and other wealth. Second, the small change in the standard deviation of returns used to calculate Vega (i.e., 0.01) yields a very local approximation of managerial risk-taking incentives. If an executive's expected payoff is highly nonlinear over the range of potential stock price and volatility outcomes, a local measure of incentives is unlikely to provide a valid assessment of managerial incentives. Third, Vega is measured as the partial derivative of the manager's equity portfolio with respect to return volatility. This computation does not consider that this partial derivative also varies with changes in stock price. The second paper develops and tests a new measure of managerial risk-taking equity incentives that adjusts for differences in managerial wealth, considers more global changes in price and volatility, and explicitly considers the impact of stock price and volatility changes. We find that our new measure exhibits higher explanatory power and is more robust to model specification than Vegafor explaining a wide range of measures of risk-taking behavior. 3. The third paper examines the relation between shareholder monitoring and managerial risk-taking incentives. We develop a stylized model to show that shareholder monitoring mitigates the effect of contractual risk-taking incentives on the manager's actions. Consistent with the model, we find empirically that the positive association between the CEO's contractual risk-taking incentives and risk-taking behavior decreases with the level of shareholder monitoring. Furthermore, consistent with the board anticipating and optimally responding to shareholder monitoring, boards of firms exposed to more intense monitoring design compensation contracts that provide higher incentives to take risks. Overall, our results suggest that, when evaluating risk-taking incentives provided by a compensation contract, it is important to account for the firm's monitoring environment.
Author: Walter P. Heller Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 9780521327046 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 316
Book Description
The third in a series of volumes published in honour of Professor Kenneth J. Arrow, each covering a different area of economic theory.
Author: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Author: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Author: Thomas B. Fomby
Author: Nadejda Vozlioublennaia
Author: Xinghua Yu
Author: Hitomi Iizaka
Author: Alessandro Citanna
Author: Tse-Chun Lin
Author: 
Author: Mr. Gaizka Ormazabal Sanchez
Author: Walter P. Heller