Two Essays on Corporate Decisions, Liquidity and Investment Efficiencies PDF Download

Author: Xiaoyun Yu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 222

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Author: Lin William Cong
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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This thesis consists of two essays that examine several problems in corporate finance and mechanism design. The central theme is endogenous agency conflicts and their impact on dynamic investment decisions. The first essay features auctions of assets and projects with embedded real options, and subsequent exercises of these investment options. The essay shows timing and security choice of auctions endogenously misalign incentives among agents and derives the optimal auction design and exercise strategy. The second essay studies implications of endogenous learning on irreversible investment decisions, in particular, how learning gives rise to asymmetric information between managers and shareholders in decentralized firms. Depending on the quality of the project, the optimal contract between principal and agent distorts investments in ways that has not been examined in the literature. Specifically, in Chapter 1 of the dissertation, I study how governments and corporations auction real investment options using both cash and contingent bids. Examples include sales of natural resource leases, real estate, patents and licenses, and start-up firms with growth options. I incorporate both endogenous auction initiation and post-auction option exercise into the traditional auctions framework, and show that common security bids create moral hazard because the winning bidder's real option differs from the seller's. Consequently, investment could be either accelerated or delayed depending on the security design. Strategic auction timing affects auction initiation, security ranking, equilibrium bidding, and investment; it should be considered jointly with security design and the seller's commitment level. Optimal auction design aligns investment incentives using a combination of down payment and royalty payment, but inefficiently delays sale and investment. I also characterize informal negotiations as timing and signaling games in which bidders can initiate an auction and determine the forms of bids. I show that post-auction investments are efficient and bidding equilibria are equivalent to those of cash auctions. However, in this setting, bidders always initiate the informal auctions inefficiently early. In addition, I provide suggestive evidence for model predictions using data from the leasing and exploration of oil and gas tracts, which leads to several ongoing empirical studies. Altogether, these results reconcile theory with several empirical puzzles and imply novel predictions with policy relevance. In Chapter 2, I examine learning as an important source of managerial flexibility and how it naturally induces information asymmetry in decentralized firms. Timing of learning is crucial for investment decisions, and optimal strategies involve sequential thresholds for learning and investing. Incentive contracts are needed for learning and truthful reporting. The inherent agency conflicts alter investment behavior significantly, and are costly to investors and welfare. But contracting on learning restores efficiency with low future uncertainty or sufficient liquidity. Unlike prior studies, the moral hazard of learning accelerates good projects and delays bad projects. Even the best type's investment is distorted, and only when learning is contractible can adverse selection dominate learning.

Author: Chang Liu (Writer on finance)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 115

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My dissertation contains two essays regarding corporate liquidity management. In the first essay, we find that personal connections between borrowers and lenders have a significant impact on the choice of corporate liquidity. Connected firms tend to obtain larger credit lines and hold less cash. Closer personal ties result in easier access to credit lines during economic shocks, such as financial crisis and negative news of credit quality. In addition, connections help firms with tighter financial constraints or higher risk obtain larger amount of credit lines. Connections also increase the amount of credit lines of borrowers with less public debt. Overall, our findings suggest that reduced asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders can improve corporate liquidity management. In the second essay, we study the relationship between corporate liquidity choice and market value by using the market-to-book decomposition of Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005). We find that sector overvaluation or long-run growth usually increase the portion of cash in the total corporate liquidity. The effect is stronger in firms with larger growth opportunities, better corporate governance, or longer investor horizons. Moreover, the choice between cash and credit lines for firms without credit ratings are more sensitive to the sector overvaluation or long-run growth. In addition, we find sector error and long-run growth have stronger effects on corporate liquidity in the long horizons.

Author: G. Constantinides
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 9780444513632
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 698

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Arbitrage, State Prices and Portfolio Theory / Philip h. Dybvig and Stephen a. Ross / - Intertemporal Asset Pricing Theory / Darrell Duffle / - Tests of Multifactor Pricing Models, Volatility Bounds and Portfolio Performance / Wayne E. Ferson / - Consumption-Based Asset Pricing / John y Campbell / - The Equity Premium in Retrospect / Rainish Mehra and Edward c. Prescott / - Anomalies and Market Efficiency / William Schwert / - Are Financial Assets Priced Locally or Globally? / G. Andrew Karolyi and Rene M. Stuli / - Microstructure and Asset Pricing / David Easley and Maureen O'hara / - A Survey of Behavioral Finance / Nicholas Barberis and Richard Thaler / - Derivatives / Robert E. Whaley / - Fixed-Income Pricing / Qiang Dai and Kenneth J. Singleton.

Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertation abstracts
Languages : en
Pages : 776

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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertations, Academic
Languages : en
Pages : 620

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Author: Pil-Seng Lee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Culture
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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This dissertation has two essays covering hedge fund activism and family firm. In the first essay of my dissertation, I investigate how hedge fund activism reengineer corporate culture of targeted firms. By using culture measures based on the Q&A section of earnings conference calls, I find that target firms emphasize building organizational culture with better quality, more innovation, higher integrity, and growing respect after activism. However, teamwork culture does not change. I also find that these positive effects of activism on corporate culture are mainly driven by CEO turnover, especially if incumbent CEOs are replaced by outsiders, not insiders. New outside CEOs are recruited from firms with better culture and higher asset sales. Activist-appointed directors also influence corporate culture by promoting outside CEO turnover. Target firms with positive cultural change improve their firm performance. Additionally, employees of target firms perceive their firms’ culture as improved after activism. Overall, this study provides evidence of the importance of corporate culture as a source of gains from hedge fund activism. The second essay examines the extent to which founder-CEOs pay attention to stock market signals in making their investment decisions. We find that founder-CEOs, on average, place significantly less weight on market signals than professional CEOs, without compromising investment efficiency and firm performance. We employ decimalization as an exogenous shock to show that the market premium due to enhanced liquidity is lower for founder-CEO firms, consistent with founder-CEOs underweighting the incremental information provided by a more liquid market. Further, we find that the weaker learning behavior is more prominent if founder-CEOs possess more specialized skills and operate firms with higher R&D intensity and greater operating cash flow volatility. We argue that founder-CEOs’ superior skills and longer-term investment horizons drive this result. Price informativeness, CEO power, external monitoring, financing constraints, and overconfidence do not seem to drive our findings.

Author: Aswath Damodaran
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1118808932
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 663

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Aswath Damodaran, distinguished author, Professor of Finance, and David Margolis, Teaching Fellow at the NYU Stern School of Business, has delivered the newest edition of Applied Corporate Finance. This readable text provides the practical advice students and practitioners need rather than a sole concentration on debate theory, assumptions, or models. Like no other text of its kind, Applied Corporate Finance, 4th Edition applies corporate finance to real companies. It now contains six real-world core companies to study and follow. Business decisions are classified for students into three groups: investment, financing, and dividend decisions.

Author: OECD
Publisher: OECD Publishing
ISBN: 9264852395
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 94

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This edition of the OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook reviews developments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic for government borrowing needs, funding conditions and funding strategies in the OECD area.

Author: El Bachir Boukherouaa
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1589063953
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 35

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This paper discusses the impact of the rapid adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) in the financial sector. It highlights the benefits these technologies bring in terms of financial deepening and efficiency, while raising concerns about its potential in widening the digital divide between advanced and developing economies. The paper advances the discussion on the impact of this technology by distilling and categorizing the unique risks that it could pose to the integrity and stability of the financial system, policy challenges, and potential regulatory approaches. The evolving nature of this technology and its application in finance means that the full extent of its strengths and weaknesses is yet to be fully understood. Given the risk of unexpected pitfalls, countries will need to strengthen prudential oversight.