Two Essays of the Effects of Corporate Governance on Capital Structure Dynamics PDF Download

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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Author: Yinghong Chen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate governance
Languages : en
Pages : 204

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Author: Erwan Morellec
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 58

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We develop a dynamic tradeoff model to examine the importance of manager-shareholder conflicts in capital structure choice. Using panel data on leverage choices and the model's predictions for different statistical moments of leverage, we show that while refinancing costs help explain the patterns observed in the data, their quantitative effects on debt choices are too small to explain financing decisions. We also show that by adding agency conflicts in the model and giving the manager control over the leverage decision, one can obtain capital structure dynamics consistent with the data. In particular, we find that the model needs an average agency cost of 1.5% of equity value to resolve the low-leverage puzzle and to explain the time series of observed leverage ratios. Our estimates also reveal that the variation in agency costs across firms is sizeable and that the levels of agency conflicts inferred from the data correlate with commonly used proxies for corporate governance.

Author: Markus Schmid
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 130

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Author: Abhishek Ganguly
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Chief executive officers
Languages : en
Pages : 183

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My dissertation comprises three essays that address several unanswered and unsettled questions on the role of institutional investors as external monitors. In the first chapter titled, "Media and Shareholder Activism," using more than twenty-five million firm-level media articles, I examine the role of media in shareholder activism events from 2002 to 2014. I find that conditioning on numerous observable firm-specific characteristics and unobservables, broader and negative ex-ante media coverage, is positively associated with the probability of a firm being a shareholder activist's target. I further document that media coverage also plays a crucial role in determining the outcomes of activism events. Target firms with ex-ante positive media coverage not only have significantly lower announcement returns but also have a higher likelihood of management winning. The second chapter titled, "CEO Overconfidence and Shareholder Activism," relies on extensive behavioral corporate finance theory and empirically explores whether managerial overconfidence is associated with hedge-fund activists' target selection and activism outcomes. Predictions from theoretical models point in different directions: activists mitigate overconfidence or activists avoid overconfident managers. We find evidence that hedge-fund activists are less likely to target firms with overconfident CEOs, after controlling for various firm and CEO characteristics and fixed effects. In the third chapter, "Hedge Fund Activism and Capital Structure," using a comprehensive sample of hedge-fund activism from 1994 to 2018 in the U.S., and closest propensity score-matched firms, we study whether hedge-fund activists influence the capital structures of targeted firms. We find that for over-levered firms, there is a significant positive association between firms' distance away from the target leverage and their likelihood of being targeted by an activist hedge-fund. However, rebalancing of leverage toward their target debt ratios post-hedge fund activist intervention is observed only among under-levered firms. Our findings are broadly consistent with the dynamic trade-off models of capital structure, where adjustment costs and agency benefits of leverage play a crucial role.

Author: Imran Khan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 15

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This study explores the relationship between corporate governance and ownership structure and capital structure of all non-financial firms listed in KSE 100 index, Pakistan. The time period is of 6 years from 2008 to 2013. The effect of corporate governance and ownership structure variables like board size, non-executive directors, average board meeting attendance, CEO/Chair duality, remuneration structure and managerial ownership and control variables like, return on assets (ROA) and firm size on leverage (Debt/Equity) has been observed using multivariate regression analysis under fixed effect approach. Results show that board size, NED, CEO/Chair duality, Remuneration Structure and ROA have negative impact on Debt/Equity ratio. However leverage is not found significantly influenced by Board size, NED and CEO/Chair duality. Board meeting attendance, managerial ownership and firm size have positive effect on leverage. Relationship of managerial ownership and leverage is not significant. Also, relationship between firm size and leverage is not significant. Significant variables are average board meetings attendance, remuneration structure and ROA, while board size, NED, CEO/Chair duality, managerial ownership and firm size are insignificant variables. Therefore results advocate that corporate governance variables like average board meeting attendance, Remuneration structure and Return on assets play essential role to determine of financial blend of the firms.

Author: Klaus Hammes
Publisher: Department of Economics School of Economics and Commercial Law Go
ISBN:
Category : Capital investments
Languages : en
Pages : 188

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Author: Anders Ersbak Bang Nielsen
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780549284901
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 404

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Is there a role for policy intervention in the determination of shareholder rights at the firm level? The following three chapters provide different angles on this question.

Author: Hamizah Hassan
Publisher: Nova Science Publishers
ISBN: 9781536126341
Category : BUSINESS & ECONOMICS
Languages : en
Pages : 251

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Introduction and context -- Corporate governance and firm value: issues-causality, interaction and non-linearity -- Econometric methods: data, summary statistics and models -- Empirical evidence 1: causality model results -- Empirical evidence 2: interaction model results -- Empirical evidence 3: non-linear model results -- Corporate governance and firm value: findings and conclusion

Author: Shuangshuang Ji
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 61

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This paper empirically examines how diversification influences the relation between corporate governance and capital structure. Consistent with the creditor alignment hypothesis, we find a positive relation between managerial entrenchment and leverage in diversified firms. In contrast, we find a negative relation between managerial entrenchment and leverage in focused firms, which supports the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. These effects are stronger or only exist in samples with low excess values, which supports the agency channel through which governance influences leverage decisions. The results are robust to different measures of leverage, diversification, and governance, and continue to hold when we correct for selection bias and account for the joint endogeneity of leverage, diversification, and governance. Our evidence shows that the conflict in the literature on the relation between leverage and managerial entrenchments is because earlier empirical studies do not condition on the diversification status of firms. Entrenched managers in focused firms eschew leverage, whereas entrenched managers in diversified firms take advantage of their better access to debt finance and use more financial leverage.