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Author: Yang-Seung Lee Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 13
Book Description
Recently, strategic protective trade policies are emerging. The strategic choices are a result of asymmetric information on demand parameters and a firm's cost structure. In this paper, we will suggest the optimal policy of eliciting private information from domestic firms. The policy is a contract of menus, comprising a tariff and a production subsidy (henceforth, subsidy). When one domestic firm and another foreign firm compete in a duopolistic domestic market, we consider unilateral intervention of the domestic government. The domestic firm privately holds information on the industrial cost structure. The main findings are as follows. First, the two policies can be equivalent conditionally. We will provide conditions for equivalence. Second, the domestic firm has an incentive to misreport the industrial cost structure to the government. Using a menu of a tariff and a subsidy (in combination with a lump-sum transfer), the government can screen the domestic firm's marginal cost. That is, the menu leads the domestic firm to disclose private information.
Author: Yang-Seung Lee Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 13
Book Description
Recently, strategic protective trade policies are emerging. The strategic choices are a result of asymmetric information on demand parameters and a firm's cost structure. In this paper, we will suggest the optimal policy of eliciting private information from domestic firms. The policy is a contract of menus, comprising a tariff and a production subsidy (henceforth, subsidy). When one domestic firm and another foreign firm compete in a duopolistic domestic market, we consider unilateral intervention of the domestic government. The domestic firm privately holds information on the industrial cost structure. The main findings are as follows. First, the two policies can be equivalent conditionally. We will provide conditions for equivalence. Second, the domestic firm has an incentive to misreport the industrial cost structure to the government. Using a menu of a tariff and a subsidy (in combination with a lump-sum transfer), the government can screen the domestic firm's marginal cost. That is, the menu leads the domestic firm to disclose private information.
Author: Xenia Matschke Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 39
Book Description
This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on firms' cost reports, accompanied by a threat of auditing and implementing penalty duties. We show that the antidumping framework within GATT/WTO may not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but may also help overcome the informational problems with regard to determining the optimal strategic trade policy.
Author: Markus Konrad Brunnermeier Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA ISBN: 9780198296980 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 264
Book Description
The role of information is central to the academic debate on finance. This book provides a detailed, current survey of theoretical research into the effect on stock prices of the distribution of information, comparing and contrasting major models. It examines theoretical models that explain bubbles, technical analysis, and herding behavior. It also provides rational explanations for stock market crashes. Analyzing the implications of asymmetries in information is crucial in this area. This book provides a useful survey for graduate students.
Author: Antoine Bouët Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 48
Book Description
We consider a general equilibrium model of international trade with two identical countries, two commodities, a terms-of-trade externality, and two layers of informational asymmetries. First, domestic producers have private information on their technology. Such within-country informational asymmetry impacts on the design of “behind-the-border" policies which reflect the political influence of domestic producers. Those policies create a wedge between price and marginal costs so as to contract domestic supply in response to truth-telling constraints. This causes trade with an otherwise symmetric country and thus justifies the use of an import tariff at borders. Eliminating those barriers and reaching efficient trade agreements may become impossible once governments have also private information on the political influence of domestic producers: a second layer of informational asymmetry that now impacts negotiations across countries. We present conditions for free trade to remain implementable in those informationally-constrained contexts. Otherwise, we characterize second-best trade agreements and show that, under weak conditions, governments giving an excessive political weight to high-cost domestic producers might be reluctant to adopt free trade, possibly implementing tariffs still at their non-cooperative levels.
Author: Delia Ionascu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
In this paper, we analyze the following policy dilemma: strategic trade policy versus free trade when the domestic government is bound to intervene only after the domestic firm's strategic variable is chosen. This intervention allows the domestic firm to manipulate the domestic government and results in a socially inefficient choice of the strategic variable. However, commitment to free trade leads to forgoing the benefits from profit-shifting. Yet, from the social point of view, free trade may be optimal even under the assumption of symmetric information. Due to costly signaling, this result is reinforced in the case of asymmetric information.
Author: Ricardo N. Bebczuk Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 9780521797320 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 176
Book Description
Asymmetric information (the fact that borrowers have better information than their lenders) and its theoretical and practical evidence now forms part of the basic tool kit of every financial economist. It is a phenomenon that has major implications for a number of economic and financial issues ranging from both micro and macroeconomic level - corporate debt, investment and dividend policies, the depth and duration of business cycles, the rate of long term economic growth - to the origin of financial and international crises. Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets aims to explain this concept in an accessible way, without jargon and by reducing mathematical complexity. Using elementary algebra and statistics, graphs, and convincing real-world evidence, the author explores the foundations of the problems posed by asymmetries of information in a refreshingly accessible and intuitive way.
Author: Yang-Seung Lee
Author: Yang-Seung Lee
Author: Xenia Matschke
Author: Markus Konrad Brunnermeier
Author: Harvey Lapan
Author: Xenia Matschke
Author: Joseph Francois
Author: Frank Schuhmacher
Author: Antoine Bouët
Author: Delia Ionascu
Author: Ricardo N. Bebczuk