Author: Niklas BlümkePublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Three Essays on the Earnings Forecast Accuracy of Sell-side Analysts
Author: Niklas BlümkeThree Essays on the Accuracy and Timing of Sell-side Analysts' Annual Earnings Forecasts
Author: Alexander StolzThree Essays on the Accuracy and Timing of Sell-side Analysts' Annual Earnings Forecast
Author: Alexander StolzThree Essays on Analyst Earnings Forecast
Author: Wenjuan XieThree Essays on the Accuracy and Timing of Sell-side Analysts' Annual Earning Forecasts
Author: Alexander StolzThree Essays on Financial Analysts' Stock Price Forecasts
Author: Quoc Tuan Quoc HoPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
In this thesis, I study three aspects of sell-side analysts' stock price forecasts, henceforth target prices: analyst teams' target price forecast characteristics, analysts' use of information to revise target prices, and determinants of target price disagreement between analysts. The first essay studies the target price forecast performance of team analysts in the UK and finds that teams issue timelier but not less accurate target prices. Unlike evidence from previous studies, my findings suggest that analyst teamwork may improve forecast timeliness without sacrificing forecast accuracy. However, market reactions to team target price revisions are not significantly different from those to individual analyst target price revisions, suggesting that although target prices issued by analyst teams are timelier and not less accurate than those of individual analysts, investors do not consider analyst team target prices more informative. I conjecture that analysts may work in teams to meet the demand to cover more companies while maintaining the quality of research by individual team members rather than to issue more informative reports. In the second essay, I study how analysts revise their target prices in response to new information implicit in recent market returns, stock excess returns and other analysts' target price revisions. The results suggest that analysts' target price revisions are significantly influenced by market returns, stock excess return and other analysts' target price revisions. I also find that the correlation between target price revisions and stock excess returns is significantly higher when the news implicit in these returns is bad rather than good. I conjecture that analysts discover more bad news from the information in stock excess returns because firms tend to withhold bad news, disclosing it only when it becomes inevitable, while they disclose good news early. Using a new measure of bad to good news concentration, I show that the asymmetric responsiveness of target price revisions to positive and negative stock excess returns is significant for firms with the highest concentration of bad news but is insignificant for firms with the lowest concentration of bad news. I argue that firms with the highest concentration of bad news are more likely to withhold and accumulate bad news. The findings, therefore, support my hypothesis that analysts discover more bad news than good news from stock returns because firms tend to withhold bad news, disclosing it only when it is inevitable. The third essay examines the determinants of analyst target price disagreement. I find that while disagreement in short-term earnings and in long-term earnings growth forecasts are significant determinants, recent 12-month idiosyncratic return volatility has the strongest explanatory power for target price disagreement. The findings suggest that target price disagreement is driven not only by analyst disagreement about short-term earnings and long-term earnings growth, but also by differences in analysts' opinions about the impact of recent firm-specific events on value drivers beyond short-term future earnings and long-term growth, which are eventually reflected in past idiosyncratic return volatility.
Three Essays on Analysts' Earnings Forecast Dispersion and Stock Returns
Author: Jorida PapakroniPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Financial risk
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Predicting Sell-Side Analysts' Relative Earnings Forecast Accuracy When It Matters Most
Author: Niklas BlümkePublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 37
Book Description
We introduce a novel framework to predict the relative accuracy of sell-side analysts' annual earnings forecasts out-of-sample. Prior studies only evaluate forecasts shortly before the corresponding earnings release. In contrast, our study is the first to provide long-term predictions which are of particular value for both investors and academics. Overall, we show that analysts classified as superior outperform their inferior counterparts by 8.4 percent, on average. The prediction performance is even more pronounced for longer-term forecasts and for firms with high dispersion of analysts' forecasts, that is, when the identification of superior forecasts matters most. Moreover, we challenge the conclusion of existing literature that characteristics reflecting an analyst's skill set are not helpful to obtain better predictions. In particular, when evaluating forecasts which draw on similar information sets, we find that a model based on analyst characteristics outperforms a model focusing simply on the forecast horizon, for example.
Determinants of Earnings Forecast Error, Earnings Forecast Revision and Earnings Forecast Accuracy
Author: Sebastian GellPublisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3834939374
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 144
Book Description
Earnings forecasts are ubiquitous in today’s financial markets. They are essential indicators of future firm performance and a starting point for firm valuation. Extremely inaccurate and overoptimistic forecasts during the most recent financial crisis have raised serious doubts regarding the reliability of such forecasts. This thesis therefore investigates new determinants of forecast errors and accuracy. In addition, new determinants of forecast revisions are examined. More specifically, the thesis answers the following questions: 1) How do analyst incentives lead to forecast errors? 2) How do changes in analyst incentives lead to forecast revisions?, and 3) What factors drive differences in forecast accuracy?
Essays on Sell-Side Analysts
Author: Sang-Mook LeePublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 98
Book Description
Broadly, this study focuses on roles of sell-side analysts and examines the determinants and consequences of information discovery and stock timing roles by sell-side analysts. We also re-examine reiterations of prior recommendations by sell-side analysts. In Chapter 1, the contribution is to document that analysts add value by engaging in discovery of private information and this value addition is greater than that due to interpretation of public news or stock timing. The innovation in this Chapter is to read over 3,700 analyst reports from Investext and explicitly identify whether the report contains discovery, interpretation, and/or timing. Analysts discover new information by talking to management sources (personal meetings, investor meetings, and conference calls) or non-management sources (such as channel checks). We find that information discovery is prevalent in 17% of the reports. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for reports containing discovery are 6.3% for upgrades and -10.6% for downgrades. The CARs are higher for reports containing discovery relative to those containing interpretation or timing. We find that economic determinants predict whether a report will contain discovery. Discovery from management sources is more likely for reports in the pre-Reg FD period and for reports by optimistic analysts. Discovery from non-management sources is more likely for reports written by All-Star analysts, and for firms that have high information asymmetry and those that are followed by more analysts. In Chapter 2, the contribution is to introduce and document a third role that analysts play that is also valuable to investors, which we term "stock timing." Specifically, we define a timing report as one where the analyst revises his recommendation but does not revise the Price Target or any of the 23 fundamental drivers of stock price (such as EPS, FCF) tracked by I/B/E/S. Because the analyst maintains the same price target as in his prior report but still revises his recommendation, such timing calls are contrarian valuation calls. Analysts issue timing downgrades (upgrades) in response to price increases (declines) since the release of their prior report on the firm. 30% of all revisions are timing reports, indicating the importance of the timing role played by analysts. If analysts have timing ability, then markets should react to the release of the timing report and we should observe that economic determinants explain the cross-sectional variation in timing ability. We find the 3-day announcement return is over 2% in magnitude, 62% of the reports are winners (have announcement returns that have the correct sign), 10% of the reports are large enough to be considered influential, and 37% of the reports are persistent winners. These results suggest that analysts have timing ability. The ability to time is similar is magnitude to information interpretation but smaller compared to information discovery. We find considerable cross-sectional and time-series variation in timing ability. We find that the probability of issuing a timing report is positively related to the opportunities to time the stock provided by potential mispricing. Conditional on issuing a timing report, the probability of issuing a winner, an influential winner, or a persistent winner is positively related to analyst experience and negatively related to the costs associated with issuing a timing report. In Chapter 3, we document that recommendation reiterations are not homogeneous and there is a large subset of reiterations that are as much valued by investors as recommendation revisions. We combine Detail History file containing the measures tracked by I/B/E/S (Price Target, EPS, etc.) and Recommendation file to create the full time series of recommendations (initiations, reiterations, and revisions) made by each analyst for each firm for 14 years from 1999 to 2012. By adopting a modified version of "filling in the holes" method, we find that recommendation reiterations are prevalent, consisting of about 80% of recommendations for our 14-year sample period. Second, market response to recommendation reiterations increases monotonically from Reiteration: Strong Sell to Reiteration: Strong Buy. Third, reiterations coupled with contemporary changes in price targets and/or earning forecasts bring substantial absolute abnormal stock returns to investors. Lastly, when we replicate what Loh and Stulz (2011), we find that the number of reiterations which are influential is more than twice that of recommendation revisions that are influential.