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Author: Matteo P. Arena Publisher: ISBN: Category : Corporate debt Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This dissertation examines the determinants of the corporate debt choice between different forms of debt financing and different countries. By examining the most extensive sample of U.S. debt issues to date, Essay 1 shows that firms that issue 144A debt are significantly different from firms that privately place non-bank debt without using the 144A rule. I also find that traditional private placements rather than bank loans are the favorite debt source for firms with good credit quality that cannot access the public market because of flotation costs and information asymmetry. Essay 2 examines how governance provisions that affect the cost of debt are related to the corporate debt choice. I find that firms with fewer takeover defenses and larger blockholder ownership are more likely to issue private debt. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that private debt claimants can reduce the expected negative impact of takeovers on debtholder value by enforcing stricter covenants or by renegotiating debt in case of takeover. Essay 3 examines the external debt financing choices of multinational firms by using a unique international dataset of firm-level debt offerings. I show that tax-based incentives, country-specific investor preferences, and difference in legal regimes across countries influence multinational firms in their debt location choice.
Author: Matteo P. Arena Publisher: ISBN: Category : Corporate debt Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This dissertation examines the determinants of the corporate debt choice between different forms of debt financing and different countries. By examining the most extensive sample of U.S. debt issues to date, Essay 1 shows that firms that issue 144A debt are significantly different from firms that privately place non-bank debt without using the 144A rule. I also find that traditional private placements rather than bank loans are the favorite debt source for firms with good credit quality that cannot access the public market because of flotation costs and information asymmetry. Essay 2 examines how governance provisions that affect the cost of debt are related to the corporate debt choice. I find that firms with fewer takeover defenses and larger blockholder ownership are more likely to issue private debt. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that private debt claimants can reduce the expected negative impact of takeovers on debtholder value by enforcing stricter covenants or by renegotiating debt in case of takeover. Essay 3 examines the external debt financing choices of multinational firms by using a unique international dataset of firm-level debt offerings. I show that tax-based incentives, country-specific investor preferences, and difference in legal regimes across countries influence multinational firms in their debt location choice.
Author: Mahsa Somayeh Kaviani Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 167
Book Description
In the first of three essays, we study the relationship between corporate debt structures and the strength of creditor rights. Firms use a more concentrated debt-type structure as a reaction mechanism to stronger creditor rights. We show that managers form more concentrated debt structures in response to stronger creditor rights in order to first, reduce bankruptcy costs and second, to provide more monitoring incentives for creditors. Across 46 countries, we document that firms have more concentrated debt-type structures in countries with stronger creditor rights. Based on an examination of the cross-sectional heterogeneity of firms to different creditor rights regimes, we confirm our two proposed mechanisms. This study extends the literature of debt structure to an international setting and is the first to document the effect of cross-country legal and institutional determinants on the choice of debt structures. In the second essay, we investigate how uncertainty about economic policies influence corporate credit spreads. We find a large and positive association between corporate credit spreads and a news-based index of policy uncertainty. We document that a one standard deviation increase in policy uncertainty results in 25 basis points increase in the credit spreads of corporate bonds controlling for bond, firm and macro-economic variables. We find that the influence of policy uncertainty on corporate credit spreads differs across firms and is more pronounced for firms with higher investment irreversibility and dependence on government spending. We also document a larger impact of policy uncertainty during economic recessions. Our results show that not only firm-level default probabilities, but also bond-CDS bases increase in response to elevated policy uncertainty. The third and final essay empirically measures the financial and economic costs (benefits) to firm value associated with deteriorations or improvements in the firm’s credit quality. We document that firms incur economically large and statistically significant costs to their values following credit-rating deteriorations. Consistent with an asymmetric effect, we find significant but smaller firm-value benefits associated with credit-rating upgrades. The financial costs to a firm’s market value associated with each notch downgrade to the investment and speculative grade categories are 7.1% and 14.8%, respectively, and these costs are generally larger than the economic costs to the firm value from credit rating downgrades. Using a continuous KMV distance to default model, we conclude that deteriorations (improvements) in a model-generated credit rating quality can also adversely (positively) affect firm value. Our findings have implications for corporate financing and leverage decisions, and for the unresolved underleverage puzzle (Graham, 2001).
Author: Hao Wang Publisher: ISBN: Category : Corporations Languages : en Pages : 276
Book Description
"In the third essay, we develop a valuation model that simultaneously captures credit risk and interest rate risk, and apply it to study the valuation of putable corporate bonds. We ask what risks put features provide insurance against in practice - credit risk, liquidity risk or interest rate risk - and to what degree? We find that they reduce the components of all three risks in bond spreads. The most important, perhaps surprisingly is default or spread risk, followed by term structure risk. The reduction in the liquidity component is present but rather small." --
Author: Katherine M. Upton Publisher: ISBN: Category : Electronic dissertations Languages : en Pages : 118
Book Description
Finance is a social science with quantitative cornerstones. Therefore, the study of behavior and choice is particularly important in finance. This dissertation examines behavioral choices' impact on quantitative outcomes of firms and funds. The first essay investigates the career choices of fund managers and their impact on future fund performance. Using a unique sample of fund managers who began their career in the hedge fund industry and subsequently switched to manage mutual funds exclusively or entered into a side by side arrangement to simultaneously manage mutual funds along with their hedge fund, I examine factors that impact their career moves. The second essay focuses on a firm's choice regarding its public and private debt mix. Using a new comprehensive database that contains U.S. firm-level debt information, I examine models which address how the costs of monitoring and collecting information for the borrowers, the value of being able to renegotiate, project quality, firm ownership, and market externalities affect firms' public versus private debt mix. The final essay examines firms' choices regarding credit line usage. Bank lines of credit, or revolving credit facilities, are a crucial financing option available to corporations. This essay addresses why firms use credit lines, how much they draw on them, and what causes changes to the drawn amount.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
The three essays constituting this thesis focus on financing and cash management policy. The first essay aims to shed light on why firms issue debt so conservatively. In particular, it examines the effects of shareholder and creditor protection on capital structure choices. It starts by building a contingent claims model where financing policy results from a trade-off between tax benefits, contracting costs and agency costs. In this setup, controlling shareholders can divert part of the firms' cash ows as private benefits at the expense of minority share- holders. In addition, shareholders as a class can behave strategically at the time of default leading to deviations from the absolute priority rule. The analysis demonstrates that investor protection is a first order determinant of firms' financing choices and that conflicts of interests between firm claimholders may help explain the level and cross-sectional variation of observed leverage ratios. The second essay focuses on the practical relevance of agency conflicts. De- spite the theoretical development of the literature on agency conflicts and firm policy choices, the magnitude of manager-shareholder conflicts is still an open question. This essay proposes a methodology for quantifying these agency conflicts. To do so, it examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on corporate financing decisions. It builds a dynamic contingent claims model in which managers do not act in the best interest of shareholders, but rather pursue private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Managers have discretion over financing and dividend policies. However, shareholders can remove the manager at a cost. The analysis demonstrates that entrenched managers restructure less frequently and issue less debt than optimal for shareholders. I take the model to the data and use observed financing choices to provide firm-specific estimates of the degree of managerial entrenchment. Using structural econometrics, I find costs of contro.
Author: Hosein Maleki Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 175
Book Description
The first essay studies the influence of credit ratings on the time-series evolution of corporate capital structures. We show that better rated firms have significantly more stable leverage ratios over time. By comparing firms across the investment-grade cut-off, we conclude using treatment effects estimation, that assignment to more stable rating classes leads to more stable capital structures over time. Extending this study across the whole range of ratings, we show that a one standard deviation improvement in credit-rating quality can reduce the leverage hazard ratio by more than 70%. In alternative investigations, rated firms tend to have largely more stable leverage ratios compared to not-rated firms. Matching firms based on their propensity to have credit ratings, rated firms take between 1.5 and 9 years longer to change their leverage ratios to the same levels as their not-rated counterparts. Our results are robust to the choice of different time frames and variety of controls. They extend the literature of the effects of credit ratings on capital structures by highlighting the importance of credit ratings on the long-run financing behaviors of firms. The second essay studies the stability of various debt-structure dimensions. Survival and long-run clustering analyses are used to assess the stability of debt-rank orderings, debt heterogeneity and main debt type(s). Firms only maintain stability in their main debt type, while frequently changing the weights and priorities of other debt types, heterogeneity indexes and rank orderings. While all debt structure metrics are less stable with the assignment of a credit rating, the effect on the stability of the main debt type is minor. Firms with higher tax rates, market leverages and cash flow volatilities exhibit higher stability in their debt structures. The final essay investigates how the optimal corporate debt maturity is influenced by the strength of creditor rights and the efficiencies of contract enforcement mechanisms. Using a correlated random effects specification, we find that across 42 countries stronger creditor rights are associated with shorter corporate debt maturities while greater contract enforcement leads to longer maturities. These empirical results are consistent with the differing effects of creditor rights and contract enforcement on the choice of corporate maturity predicted by our model. Our results are robust to using different measures of debt maturity, individual components of creditor rights and different measures of contract enforcement. Our results are mostly driven by developed country debt and hold with the inclusion of various controls.
Author: Matteo P. Arena
Author: Matteo P. Arena
Author: Mahsa Somayeh Kaviani
Author: Haekwon Lee
Author: Glenn E. Morgan
Author: Hao Wang
Author: Shage Zhang
Author: Katherine M. Upton
Author: Nam Hoang Nguyen
Author: 
Author: Hosein Maleki