Author: Jonathan Alexander Daigle
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 322
Book Description
he first study addresses why insurers, whom traditionally invest in relatively safe assets, choose to invest in private equity (PE). Using insurer financial disclosures, we test theories relating how risk shifting, managerial discretion, underinvestment, asset liability matching, regulation, home bias, and reaching for yield affect PE investment. Results indicate risk¬ shifting and managerial discretion by stock insurers does not factor into the PE investment decision. In addition, results confirm home bias positively influences PE investment while underinvestment, asset liability matching, and regulation deter PE investment. Finally, insurers have not increased their PE allocation due to low-yield interest rate environments. The second study directly tests the economies of scope hypothesis of Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013) using the data envelopment analysis (DEA) methodology of Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013). I find private firms with less than $50 million in sales are more likely to be acquired than to offer an IPO when their industry has high economies of scope. I do not find evidence that 3-year buy-and-hold returns for IPOs are associated with economies of scope levels. I also find economies of scope are negatively related to firms adopting a dual tracking strategy, but does not explain sell-out premiums for acquired private firms. The third study examines whether private IPOs (PIPOs) decrease information asymmetry in firms that eventually engage in an IPO. Theoretically, PIPOs can mitigate problems of adverse selection and moral hazard because private investments can signal undervaluation and potentially provide more effective monitoring. Consequently, firms with larger, more recent, and frequent PIPOs should experience less underpricing and post IPO volatility relative to other IPOs due to increased monitoring, lower signal attenuation, and positive feedback with existing investor buy ins, respectively. Results indicate the percentage of PIPO investment compared to total equity at IPO is negatively associated with underpricing, thus suggesting PIPOs decrease information asymmetry. However, the longer the amount of time between the last PIPO and the IPO and the total number of PIPOs are positively related to underpricing.
Three Essays on Private Market Interactions
Author: Jonathan Alexander Daigle
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 322
Book Description
he first study addresses why insurers, whom traditionally invest in relatively safe assets, choose to invest in private equity (PE). Using insurer financial disclosures, we test theories relating how risk shifting, managerial discretion, underinvestment, asset liability matching, regulation, home bias, and reaching for yield affect PE investment. Results indicate risk¬ shifting and managerial discretion by stock insurers does not factor into the PE investment decision. In addition, results confirm home bias positively influences PE investment while underinvestment, asset liability matching, and regulation deter PE investment. Finally, insurers have not increased their PE allocation due to low-yield interest rate environments. The second study directly tests the economies of scope hypothesis of Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013) using the data envelopment analysis (DEA) methodology of Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013). I find private firms with less than $50 million in sales are more likely to be acquired than to offer an IPO when their industry has high economies of scope. I do not find evidence that 3-year buy-and-hold returns for IPOs are associated with economies of scope levels. I also find economies of scope are negatively related to firms adopting a dual tracking strategy, but does not explain sell-out premiums for acquired private firms. The third study examines whether private IPOs (PIPOs) decrease information asymmetry in firms that eventually engage in an IPO. Theoretically, PIPOs can mitigate problems of adverse selection and moral hazard because private investments can signal undervaluation and potentially provide more effective monitoring. Consequently, firms with larger, more recent, and frequent PIPOs should experience less underpricing and post IPO volatility relative to other IPOs due to increased monitoring, lower signal attenuation, and positive feedback with existing investor buy ins, respectively. Results indicate the percentage of PIPO investment compared to total equity at IPO is negatively associated with underpricing, thus suggesting PIPOs decrease information asymmetry. However, the longer the amount of time between the last PIPO and the IPO and the total number of PIPOs are positively related to underpricing.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 322
Book Description
he first study addresses why insurers, whom traditionally invest in relatively safe assets, choose to invest in private equity (PE). Using insurer financial disclosures, we test theories relating how risk shifting, managerial discretion, underinvestment, asset liability matching, regulation, home bias, and reaching for yield affect PE investment. Results indicate risk¬ shifting and managerial discretion by stock insurers does not factor into the PE investment decision. In addition, results confirm home bias positively influences PE investment while underinvestment, asset liability matching, and regulation deter PE investment. Finally, insurers have not increased their PE allocation due to low-yield interest rate environments. The second study directly tests the economies of scope hypothesis of Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013) using the data envelopment analysis (DEA) methodology of Demerjian et al. (2012, 2013). I find private firms with less than $50 million in sales are more likely to be acquired than to offer an IPO when their industry has high economies of scope. I do not find evidence that 3-year buy-and-hold returns for IPOs are associated with economies of scope levels. I also find economies of scope are negatively related to firms adopting a dual tracking strategy, but does not explain sell-out premiums for acquired private firms. The third study examines whether private IPOs (PIPOs) decrease information asymmetry in firms that eventually engage in an IPO. Theoretically, PIPOs can mitigate problems of adverse selection and moral hazard because private investments can signal undervaluation and potentially provide more effective monitoring. Consequently, firms with larger, more recent, and frequent PIPOs should experience less underpricing and post IPO volatility relative to other IPOs due to increased monitoring, lower signal attenuation, and positive feedback with existing investor buy ins, respectively. Results indicate the percentage of PIPO investment compared to total equity at IPO is negatively associated with underpricing, thus suggesting PIPOs decrease information asymmetry. However, the longer the amount of time between the last PIPO and the IPO and the total number of PIPOs are positively related to underpricing.
The Theory of Money and Financial Institutions
Author: Martin Shubik
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262693110
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 472
Book Description
This first volume in a three-volume exposition of Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics" explores a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. This is the first volume in a three-volume exposition of Martin Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics"--a term he coined in 1959 to describe the theoretical underpinnings needed for the construction of an economic dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and macroeconomics, using as a prime tool the theory of games in strategic and extensive form. The approach involves a search for minimal financial institutions that appear as a logical, technological, and institutional necessity, as part of the "rules of the game." Money and financial institutions are assumed to be the basic elements of the network that transmits the sociopolitical imperatives to the economy. Volume 1 deals with a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. Volume 2 explores the new economic features that arise when we consider multi-period finite and infinite horizon economies. Volume 3 will consider the specific role of financial institutions and government, and formulate the economic financial control problem linking micro- and macroeconomics.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262693110
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 472
Book Description
This first volume in a three-volume exposition of Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics" explores a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. This is the first volume in a three-volume exposition of Martin Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics"--a term he coined in 1959 to describe the theoretical underpinnings needed for the construction of an economic dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and macroeconomics, using as a prime tool the theory of games in strategic and extensive form. The approach involves a search for minimal financial institutions that appear as a logical, technological, and institutional necessity, as part of the "rules of the game." Money and financial institutions are assumed to be the basic elements of the network that transmits the sociopolitical imperatives to the economy. Volume 1 deals with a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. Volume 2 explores the new economic features that arise when we consider multi-period finite and infinite horizon economies. Volume 3 will consider the specific role of financial institutions and government, and formulate the economic financial control problem linking micro- and macroeconomics.
Three Essays in Market Channel Economics
Three Essays on Competition and Interactions
Author: Jaesoo Kim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 212
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 212
Book Description
Three Essays in Volatility Change and Private and Government Investment
Three Essays in Financial Markets. The Bright Side of Financial Derivatives: Options Trading and Firm Innovation
Author: Iván Blanco
Publisher: Ed. Universidad de Cantabria
ISBN: 8481028770
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 90
Book Description
Do financial derivatives enhance or impede innovation? We aim to answer this question by examining the relationship between equity options markets and standard measures of firm innovation. Our baseline results show that firms with more options trading activity generate more patents and patent citations per dollar of R&D invested. We then investigate how more active options markets affect firms' innovation strategy. Our results suggest that firms with greater trading activity pursue a more creative, diverse and risky innovation strategy. We discuss potential underlying mechanisms and show that options appear to mitigate managerial career concerns that would induce managers to take actions that boost short-term performance measures. Finally, using several econometric specifications that try to account for the potential endogeneity of options trading, we argue that the positive effect of options trading on firm innovation is causal.
Publisher: Ed. Universidad de Cantabria
ISBN: 8481028770
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 90
Book Description
Do financial derivatives enhance or impede innovation? We aim to answer this question by examining the relationship between equity options markets and standard measures of firm innovation. Our baseline results show that firms with more options trading activity generate more patents and patent citations per dollar of R&D invested. We then investigate how more active options markets affect firms' innovation strategy. Our results suggest that firms with greater trading activity pursue a more creative, diverse and risky innovation strategy. We discuss potential underlying mechanisms and show that options appear to mitigate managerial career concerns that would induce managers to take actions that boost short-term performance measures. Finally, using several econometric specifications that try to account for the potential endogeneity of options trading, we argue that the positive effect of options trading on firm innovation is causal.
Three Essays on the Economics of Two-sided Markets
Three essays on empirical finance
Author: Tse-Chun Lin
Publisher: Rozenberg Publishers
ISBN: 9036101514
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 146
Book Description
Publisher: Rozenberg Publishers
ISBN: 9036101514
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 146
Book Description
Three Essays in Applied Game Theory
Author: Kwok H. Cheung
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Collective bargaining
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Collective bargaining
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description