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Author: Jiaxi Li (Economist) Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 145
Book Description
This dissertation consists of three chapters on personnel economics in public education. The first chapter uses a simulation framework to examine the efficiency implications of using proportional evaluation systems. We find that proportionality can be imposed with very limited or no efficiency costs compared to a global system. Our results suggest that given the other benefits offered by a proportional policy, it can be regarded as a viable alternative when educational administrators are developing and designing teacher evaluation systems. The second chapter uses a regression discontinuity design to examine the impacts of the performance ratings under a new and rigorous evaluation system in Tennessee on teacher job satisfaction. The results indicate that the rigorous evaluation and rating system can cause differential job satisfaction between more and less effective teachers such that the assignment of a higher rating makes teachers more satisfied with their jobs. The impact is the strongest at the threshold of the highest rating in the system. The third chapter uses a reduced-form regression discontinuity approach to isolate and identify the "intention to treat" effect of assigning differentiated evaluation ratings on teachers' professional development choices. I find that the assignment of a higher performance rating alone does not affect how teachers would behave in professional development.
Author: Jiaxi Li (Economist) Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 145
Book Description
This dissertation consists of three chapters on personnel economics in public education. The first chapter uses a simulation framework to examine the efficiency implications of using proportional evaluation systems. We find that proportionality can be imposed with very limited or no efficiency costs compared to a global system. Our results suggest that given the other benefits offered by a proportional policy, it can be regarded as a viable alternative when educational administrators are developing and designing teacher evaluation systems. The second chapter uses a regression discontinuity design to examine the impacts of the performance ratings under a new and rigorous evaluation system in Tennessee on teacher job satisfaction. The results indicate that the rigorous evaluation and rating system can cause differential job satisfaction between more and less effective teachers such that the assignment of a higher rating makes teachers more satisfied with their jobs. The impact is the strongest at the threshold of the highest rating in the system. The third chapter uses a reduced-form regression discontinuity approach to isolate and identify the "intention to treat" effect of assigning differentiated evaluation ratings on teachers' professional development choices. I find that the assignment of a higher performance rating alone does not affect how teachers would behave in professional development.
Author: Pierre Edward Mouganie Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This dissertation introduces three essays on the short and long run consequences of educational choices. In the first essay "Conscription and the Returns to Education: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity" we use a regression discontinuity design to first identify the effect of peacetime conscription on education and labor market outcomes. Results indicate that conscription eligibility induces a significant increase in years of education, which is consistent with conscription avoidance behavior. However, this increased education does not result in either an increase in graduation rates, or in employment and wages. Additional evidence shows conscription has no direct effect on earnings, suggesting that the returns to education induced by this policy was zero. In the second essay "Quality of Higher Education and Earnings: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from the French Baccalaureate", we use a regression discontinuity design to examine the returns to quality of postsecondary education. We compare the outcomes of students who marginally pass and fail the first round exams of the French Baccalaureate, a degree that students must earn to graduate from secondary school. Marginally passing increases the likelihood of attending a higher quality university and a STEM major. Threshold crossing also increases earnings by 13.6 percent at the age of 27 to 29. After ruling out other channels that could affect earnings, we conclude that increased access to higher quality postsecondary education leads to a significant earnings premium. In the third and final essay "Better or Best? High School Quality and Academic Performance" we look at the effects of attending a higher quality high school on the academic performance and college outcomes of young Chinese students. Specifically, in our analysis, we draw a distinction between going to a better school, regardless of tier, and going to a top-tier school. We find that college entrance exam test score gains and improved college outcomes are only realized for individuals attending the most elite set of high schools. These results are mainly driven by males as we find no significant effects on academic performance for females. Finally, we provide evidence suggesting that these academic gains are mostly due to variation in teacher quality. The electronic version of this dissertation is accessible from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/155600.
Author: Sacha Kapoor Publisher: ISBN: 9780494782323 Category : Languages : en Pages : 258
Book Description
My dissertation focuses on the role of incentives in the workplace. In Chapter 1, I study peer effects in pay-for-individual-performance jobs. Specifically, I explore whether, how, and why coworker performance matters when rewards are based on individual performance. When teamed with high-performing peers, I find that workers are more productive overall. I also find that workers who resign are unaffected by coworker performance in the period after they hand in their resignation notice. The findings suggest peer effects in pay-for-individual-performance jobs reflect reputational concerns about relative performance rather than competitive preferences.In Chapter 2, I present field evidence that sheds new light on incentive provision in multitask jobs. Specifically, I design and conduct a field experiment at a large-scale restaurant, where the pre-existing wage contract encourages workers to carry out their tasks in a way that is not perfectly aligned with the firm's preferences. The experimental treatment pays bonuses to waiters for the number of customers they serve, in addition to their tips for customer service and hourly wages. I compare worker performance under the treatment to that under the pre-existing contract, where workers are rewarded for overemphasizing customer service, to evaluate the effect of a wage contract that encourages undesirable behavior. I find that the average worker earns more, is more productive, and generates higher short-run profits for the firm when paid bonuses for customer volume. Overall, the findings suggest that sharpening wage contracts to deal with incentive problems in multitask jobs has benefits for workers as well as the firm.In Chapter 3, I present joint work (with Arvind N. Magesan at the University of Calgary) on the beauty premium's role in the workplace. Specifically, we investigate whether, how, and why the beauty premium can be explained by the behaviour of workers after they are hired. We find that attractive workers earn more because they transfer effort from tasks that reward looks to tasks that reward effort. We also provide evidence against favorable treatment by customers and the employer as sources for the beauty premium. We conclude that the premium is largely driven by the worker's on-the-job behavior.
Author: Jiaxi Li (Economist)
Author: Jiaxi Li (Economist)
Author: David Jonathan Brlan
Author: Xuejuan Su
Author: Brian Stacy
Author: Darío Maldonado
Author: Pierre Edward Mouganie
Author: Cristóbal Huneeus
Author: Jordan Dmitri Matsudaira
Author: Sacha Kapoor
Author: Matthew Kim