Author: Juuso Valimaki
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 274
Book Description
Three Essays on Learning and Strategic Interaction
Understanding Strategic Interaction
Author: Wulf Albers
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642604951
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 526
Book Description
Strategic interaction occurs whenever it depends on others what one finally obtains: on markets, in firms, in politics etc. Game theorists analyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take into account cognitive limitations of human decision makers. In the animal kingdom one usually refers to evolutionary forces when explaining social interaction. The volume contains innovative contributions, surveys of previous work and two interviews which shed new light on these important topics of the research agenda. The contributions come from highly regarded researchers from all over the world who like to express in this way their intellectual inspiration by the Nobel-laureate Reinhard Selten.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642604951
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 526
Book Description
Strategic interaction occurs whenever it depends on others what one finally obtains: on markets, in firms, in politics etc. Game theorists analyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take into account cognitive limitations of human decision makers. In the animal kingdom one usually refers to evolutionary forces when explaining social interaction. The volume contains innovative contributions, surveys of previous work and two interviews which shed new light on these important topics of the research agenda. The contributions come from highly regarded researchers from all over the world who like to express in this way their intellectual inspiration by the Nobel-laureate Reinhard Selten.
Three Essays on Firm Learning
Author: William Martín Tracy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 320
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 320
Book Description
Three Essays on Market Design Experiments Using Computational Learning Agents
Author: Deddy Priatmodjo Koesrindartoto
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 346
Book Description
Three papers in this dissertation are entirely self-contained. The papers are linked both through the methodologies used and through the issues addressed. Each of the paper seeks to understand the complexity effects of market design issues by using agent-based computational economic approach. The first essay addresses the question of which auction pricing rule should Treasury use that yields the highest revenue, especially whether the Treasury should use a discriminatory-price rule or a uniform-price one. Computational experiments are carefully designed based on four treatment factors: (1) the buyers' learning representation; (2) the number of buyers participating in the auction; (3) the total security demand capacity of buyers relative to the Treasury offered security supply (4) volatility of security prices in the secondary market. Key findings in this study show that Treasury revenue varies systematically with changes of treatments factor. The second essay tries to answer the question of what is the best bidding rule for multi-unit sealed-bid double auctions. Extending the earlier theoretical work which suggested that submitting supply offers in the form of price-quantity supply functions P(Q) will benefit the seller under one-sided auction with uncertain demand. However, this study results show that under double-sided multi-unit auction in which seller face a similar uncertain demand, submitting P(Q) supply offers not necessarily benefited sellers. Moreover, strategic interaction effects among players using P(Q) rules can lower sellers profit and overall market efficiency. Such insights are critical, especially to market designers who are concerned about the detailed aspects of market design implementation. The third essay addresses the experimental testing of the recently proposed wholesale power market design by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. This Wholesale Power Market Platform (WPMP) is a complex market that requires market participants to simultaneously bid into real-time, day-ahead, ancillary, and transmission rights markets. The study main goals are to gain understanding the nature of this complex market design, at the same time to test whether WPMP design results in efficient, fair, robust market operations overtime, especially under conditions in which participants' strive to gain market power through strategic pricing, capacity withholding, and any other imaginable strategies.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 346
Book Description
Three papers in this dissertation are entirely self-contained. The papers are linked both through the methodologies used and through the issues addressed. Each of the paper seeks to understand the complexity effects of market design issues by using agent-based computational economic approach. The first essay addresses the question of which auction pricing rule should Treasury use that yields the highest revenue, especially whether the Treasury should use a discriminatory-price rule or a uniform-price one. Computational experiments are carefully designed based on four treatment factors: (1) the buyers' learning representation; (2) the number of buyers participating in the auction; (3) the total security demand capacity of buyers relative to the Treasury offered security supply (4) volatility of security prices in the secondary market. Key findings in this study show that Treasury revenue varies systematically with changes of treatments factor. The second essay tries to answer the question of what is the best bidding rule for multi-unit sealed-bid double auctions. Extending the earlier theoretical work which suggested that submitting supply offers in the form of price-quantity supply functions P(Q) will benefit the seller under one-sided auction with uncertain demand. However, this study results show that under double-sided multi-unit auction in which seller face a similar uncertain demand, submitting P(Q) supply offers not necessarily benefited sellers. Moreover, strategic interaction effects among players using P(Q) rules can lower sellers profit and overall market efficiency. Such insights are critical, especially to market designers who are concerned about the detailed aspects of market design implementation. The third essay addresses the experimental testing of the recently proposed wholesale power market design by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. This Wholesale Power Market Platform (WPMP) is a complex market that requires market participants to simultaneously bid into real-time, day-ahead, ancillary, and transmission rights markets. The study main goals are to gain understanding the nature of this complex market design, at the same time to test whether WPMP design results in efficient, fair, robust market operations overtime, especially under conditions in which participants' strive to gain market power through strategic pricing, capacity withholding, and any other imaginable strategies.
Three Essays on Learning and Information in Games
Author: Robert Stuart Gazzale
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 334
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 334
Book Description
American Doctoral Dissertations
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertation abstracts
Languages : en
Pages : 776
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertation abstracts
Languages : en
Pages : 776
Book Description
Fieldwork, Participation and Practice
Author: Marlene de Laine
Publisher: SAGE
ISBN: 9780761954873
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 244
Book Description
This timely and topical look at the role of ethics in fieldwork takes into account some of the major issues confronting qualitative researchers. The main purposes of this book are twofold: to promote an understanding of the harmful possibilities of fieldwork; and to provide ways of dealing with ethical problems and dilemmas. To these ends, examples of actual fieldwork are provided that address ethical problems and dilemmas, and posit ways of dealing with them.
Publisher: SAGE
ISBN: 9780761954873
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 244
Book Description
This timely and topical look at the role of ethics in fieldwork takes into account some of the major issues confronting qualitative researchers. The main purposes of this book are twofold: to promote an understanding of the harmful possibilities of fieldwork; and to provide ways of dealing with ethical problems and dilemmas. To these ends, examples of actual fieldwork are provided that address ethical problems and dilemmas, and posit ways of dealing with them.
The Strategic Role of Information in Markets and Games
Author: Andreas G. B. Ziegler
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
"This thesis consists of three essays that study how the public revelation of information affects strategic interaction across three different environments. Using laboratory experiments to test theoretical conjectures, the essays analyze how humans process information, reason about how others process information, and what their choices reveal about the information they privately hold. The first chapter compares auction formats that differ in the degree of information revealed to bidders during the auction. Bidders in the laboratory are not able to learn about the value of the item for sale from revealed information, and popular open auction formats trigger behavioral biases, which increases the auctioneer’s revenues. The second chapter studies how interacting in markets affects the participants’ concern about causing externalities. Markets overall decrease our concern for damages to third parties. However, markets that allow each participant to trade repeatedly while not being pivotal for aggregate outcomes most strongly erode such concerns. The third chapter studies how to best persuade a strategically interacting audience by using public or private communication. Empirically, public communication is particularly effective. In line with theoretical predictions, senders also benefit from adjusting their persuasion to the presence of coordination motives in the strategic interaction of the audience."--
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
"This thesis consists of three essays that study how the public revelation of information affects strategic interaction across three different environments. Using laboratory experiments to test theoretical conjectures, the essays analyze how humans process information, reason about how others process information, and what their choices reveal about the information they privately hold. The first chapter compares auction formats that differ in the degree of information revealed to bidders during the auction. Bidders in the laboratory are not able to learn about the value of the item for sale from revealed information, and popular open auction formats trigger behavioral biases, which increases the auctioneer’s revenues. The second chapter studies how interacting in markets affects the participants’ concern about causing externalities. Markets overall decrease our concern for damages to third parties. However, markets that allow each participant to trade repeatedly while not being pivotal for aggregate outcomes most strongly erode such concerns. The third chapter studies how to best persuade a strategically interacting audience by using public or private communication. Empirically, public communication is particularly effective. In line with theoretical predictions, senders also benefit from adjusting their persuasion to the presence of coordination motives in the strategic interaction of the audience."--