Author: Yeon-Koo ChePublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Three Essays on Economic Incentive Mechanisms
Author: Yeon-Koo CheThree Essays on Economics and Incentives
Author: D.R.D. DellerEssays on Financial Incentive Mechanisms Under Repetition on Economics Experiments
Author: Essays on Economic Incentives in Environmental Policy
Author: Isla Rose Globus-HarrisPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 134
Book Description
This dissertation explores environmental economics, focusing on the interaction between incentives and environmental policies. I use microeconomic theory, mechanism design, and empirical economic techniques to examine the importance of considering incentives and adverse selection when formulating environmental policy. Chapter 1 uses microeconomic theory to demonstrate the importance of considering adverse selection and perverse incentives when formulating environmental policy, with a particular focus on environmental trade ratios. Chapter 2 use mechanism design to demonstrate how heterogeneous outside options can be exploited to enhance screening in an environmental subsidy program setting. Chapter 3 uses both economic theory and empirics to measure the extent of an adverse selection problem in an environmental subsidy program.
Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms
Author: Theodore GrovesPublisher: U of Minnesota Press
ISBN: 1452908044
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 410
Book Description
Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session
Policy Incentives and Economic Outcomes
Author: Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Microeconomics
Languages : en
Pages : 99
Book Description
This thesis contributes to the understanding of how policy making shapes economic outcomes, and the role of individual decision and incentives in this process. It consists of three chapters, which focus on aspects of this general topic from an applied microeconomic perspective: (i) market mechanisms for environmental policy and their implications for firm investment, (ii) political incentives of pork barrel environmental expenditures, and (iii) strategic interaction in decision making among decentralized levels of government. In the first chapter, entitled Policy Uncertainty and Investment in Low-Carbon Technology, which is joint work with Silvia Albrizio, we investigate how uncertainty over environmental policy affects firms' investment in low-carbon technology in the context of an emission trading scheme. We develop a three period sequential model combining the industry and electricity sectors and encompassing both irreversible and reversible investment possibilities for firms. Additionally, we explicitly model policy uncertainty in the regulator's objective function as well as the market interactions giving rise to an endogenous permit price. We find that uncertainty reduces irreversible investment and that the availability of both reversible and irreversible technologies partially eliminates the positive effect of policy uncertainty on reversible technology found in previous literature. In the second chapter, entitled Pork Barrel as a Signaling Tool: The Case of US Environmental Policy, I investigate whether signaling is a driving force of pre-electoral pork barrel policies. I develop a two-period model of electoral competition where politicians use current policies to signal their preferences to rational, forward-looking voters. There exists an equilibrium where incumbents use pork barrel spending for signaling in majoritarian systems. Results show that pork spending is directed towards ideologically homogeneous groups and is mitigated if the incumbent is a "lame duck" or has a high discount rate. The predictions of the model are tested using data on US State level environmental expenditures. The results support the signaling motive as a central mechanism in generating pork barrel towards the environment. In the third chapter, entitled Interaction in Local Governments' Spending Decisions: Evidence from Portugal, which is joint with Linda Veiga and Miguel Portela, we analyze the sources and the degree of interaction among Portuguese municipalities' expenditure levels by estimating a dynamic panel model, based on jurisdictional reaction functions. The analysis is performed for all 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities from 1986 to 2006, using alternative ways to measure neighborhood. Results indicate that local governments' spending decisions are significantly, and positively, influenced by the actions of neighboring municipalities. Attempts to identify the sources of interaction allow us to conclude that they are due to spillovers that require coordination in expenditure items and to mimicking behavior possibly to attract households and firms.
Three Essays on Economic Theory
Author: Junrok ParkPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 155
Book Description
This dissertation contributes to the field of mechanism design and, in particular, to the study of robust mechanisms, which concerns the construction of allocation mechanisms that perform well across a wide range of environments. It consists of two parts. The first part--- Chapters 1 and 2---studies zero-sum games between a profit-maximizing mechanism designer and an information designer with the opposite goal in public good provision setups. They consider distinct yet related setups, yielding distinct economic implications. The second part---Chapter 3---concerns the construction of a double clock auction that implements various designer objectives other than exact efficiency in an exchange environment Chapter 1 studies an informational remedy to a well-known example of market failure: a public good sold by a profit-seeking enterprise. A monopolist sells a public good to a group of buyers who privately observe a signal about their valuation. The public good is sold through an optimal mechanism subject to the ex-post incentive constraints. This paper studies an information design problem, characterizing the regulator's solution, a signal distribution that maximizes the buyers' expected payoffs in an optimal mechanism. It limits the impact of free-riding while imposing indifference on the monopolist so that the public good is always sold with any number of agents. Such desirable properties are achieved through a carefully chosen negative correlation between signals and a lower bound on the total value of trade. Moreover, the monopolist earns a finite expected profit even with infinitely many buyers, thereby completely losing his market power. Chapter 2 devises a robustly optimal mechanism for public good sales. A monopolist seller has a public good to sell to a group of buyers. He has limited knowledge of the buyers' private information: Only the maximal, minimal, and expected valuation of each buyer is known to the seller. We characterize a strong maximin mechanism of public good provision. The maximin mechanism qualitatively depends on the number of agents and the common expected valuation. Buyers report the quantity demanded to the monopolist. If the expected valuation is high relative to the number of buyers, then the veto mechanism, which supplies the public good by the maximal demand, is optimal. In other words, each buyer cannot enjoy more than their own demand report. Buyers are charged an exponential price in their quantity demand. Otherwise, the capped proportional mechanism is optimal. It supplies the public good by the sum of demand reports and each buyer can demand at most some portion of the public good. Chapter 3 (Co-authored with Pavel Andreyanov (HSE) and Tomasz Sadzik (UCLA)) constructs a clock implementation of optimal mechanisms for exchange economies, which are a marketplace where traders enter an initial position for some asset and may end up being a buyer or a seller after the trade. In our clock implementation, the auctioneer runs two clocks simultaneously to each side of the market and traders make a quantity report to each clock separately. Moreover, the auctioneer charges personalized prices, which are a sum of the common clock state and individual taxation, to implement mechanisms whose objective is other than exact efficiencies, such as profit maximization.
Three Essays in Environmental and Development Economics
Author: Solène MassonPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Deforestation in Brazil has been a growing phenomenon since the 1970s', whose acceleration is mainly due to the agricultural expansion and infrastructure development such as roads. In order to reduce incentive to deforest, authorities promoted several sets of environmental conservation programs.Understanding the effects of such policy interventions both on environmental (intensity of deforestation, economic mechanisms) and socio-economic issues (effect on poverty, effect on local population development) is essential if public policies are to be put in place in an efficient way.Nevertheless, access to spatial, economic and social data due to the size of the Brazilian Amazon makes impact evaluation challenging. This thesis is organized around two themes: spatial analysis, impact evaluation analysis. The creation of an original database at an aggregation level that is, as far as we know, very little studied allows us to extend research on both environmental and socio-economic analyses of environmental public policies.
Essays in Information Economics
Author: Agathe Alysse PernoudPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This dissertation comprises three essays in information economics. Each essay employs tools from mechanism design and game theory to examine individuals' incentives when acquiring information and when sharing that information with others. The first chapter considers a mechanism design setting in which agents can obtain costly information about their own preferences and those of others. A mechanism is informationally simple if agents have no incentive to learn about others' preferences. This property is of interest for two reasons: First, it is a necessary condition for the existence of dominant strategy equilibria in the extended game. Second, it endogenizes an "independent private value" property of the interim information structure. We show that, generically, a mechanism is informationally simple if and only if it satisfies a separability condition which rules out most economically meaningful mechanisms. The second chapter examines auctions in which buyers can acquire costly information about their own valuations and those of others, and investigates how competition among buyers shapes their learning incentives. In equilibrium, buyers find it cost-efficient to acquire some information about their competitors so as to only learn their valuations when they have a fair chance of winning. We show that such learning incentives make competition between buyers less effective: losing buyers often fail to learn their valuations precisely and, as a result, compete less aggressively for the good. The third chapter deviates from the preceding two by focusing on how individuals communicate with each other. It seeks to understand how individuals' subjective models of the world, or worldviews, affect communication.
Enterprise Networks and Courts - Three Essays in Development Economics
Author: Mattea SteinPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Social networks affect economic decision-making in all socio-economic contexts, influencing many aspects of social and economic life. They may play a particularly central role in the developing economy where formal institutions, which facilitate anonymous, arm's length transactions, tend to function less well. For example, when commercial courts are inefficient, or are inaccessible to a large share of the entrepreneur population, the social capital inherent in networks may be used to sustain contracting and collaboration. This thesis explores two facets of this thematic cluster. Two of its chapters investigate the mechanisms at work in horizontal business networks between small-scale entrepreneurs in Uganda. Using experimental variation from a randomized training and panel network data, I show that these networks can be endogenous to a public policy intervention, and that observed changes indicate strategic network formation behavior. A third chapter is concerned with how the efficiency of formal commercial dispute resolution can be enhanced, unpacking the mechanisms of institutional reform. Analyzing a reform in Senegal using high-frequency case-level data, it shows that procedural tweaks can have a large effects on speed without jeopardizing quality when judges' incentives are aligned.