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Author: Miguel Garza Casado Publisher: ISBN: Category : Electoral coalitions Languages : en Pages : 166
Book Description
Pre-electoral coalitions have been largely ignored in Presidential systems. In this dissertation I study the case of Mexico where since 1991 a pre-electoral coalition has been formed by two non-contiguous parties; the far-right party (PAN) and the far-left party (PRD). Despite dramatic differences in policy agendas, they have won important elections at the state and municipal level. The creation of this coalition creates a puzzle that is not addressed by existing theories such as spatial models, party alignment, incumbency advantage, federalism, electoral budget cycles and ideological expenditures. The first chapter of this dissertation answers the following questions: Will voters support their preferred party despite the non-contiguous coalition? Will voters punish coalition members if it breaks while in office? Will coalitions stay together through multiple electoral cycles? This chapter develops a Game Theoretical Bayesian model to analyze voters' electoral behavior. The main finding is a separating equilibrium in the multiple-period game. Reputation effects will lead to a long-term collaboration while in the short-term the coalition will break. Voters support these coalitions if they stay together once in office and implement a policy platform that maximizes their payoffs. The second chapter introduces the concept of "Partial Alignment'', created by a pre-electoral coalition in power, and its effects on resource allocation. Do municipalities where pre-electoral coalition governments win an election receive significantly more or fewer resources from the federal and state level governments than those where the coalition loses? The theoretical answer is ambiguous: Partial alignment could lead to more resources in an effort to keep the party in power - even as part of a coalition - or fewer resource due to the desire to stop sharing power in order to govern alone. Analysis uses a Regression Discontinuity Design with a matched dataset that combines data on municipality level income with municipal election results between 1989 and 2016. Results show that municipalities where the pre-electoral coalition barely won received fewer federal resources in the year of the election and the year before. The third chapter looks at how the pre-electoral coalition spend their resources. Do pre-electoral coalitions spend differently than single party governments? Will pre-electoral coalition governments increase expenditure after the election or wait until the next electoral cycle? Will they strategically pick between short and long-term expenditures to signal voters their competence? Analysis uses a Regression Discontinuity Design and a Fixed Effects Panel Model with a matched dataset that combines data on municipality level expenditures with municipal election results between 1989 and 2016. Results show that municipalities where the pre-electoral coalition barely won create a new electoral budget cycle by increasing expenditures during their first year in office. It is also shown that these governments are not strategic when selecting between short and long-term expenditures to signal voters their competence in office.
Author: Miguel Garza Casado Publisher: ISBN: Category : Electoral coalitions Languages : en Pages : 166
Book Description
Pre-electoral coalitions have been largely ignored in Presidential systems. In this dissertation I study the case of Mexico where since 1991 a pre-electoral coalition has been formed by two non-contiguous parties; the far-right party (PAN) and the far-left party (PRD). Despite dramatic differences in policy agendas, they have won important elections at the state and municipal level. The creation of this coalition creates a puzzle that is not addressed by existing theories such as spatial models, party alignment, incumbency advantage, federalism, electoral budget cycles and ideological expenditures. The first chapter of this dissertation answers the following questions: Will voters support their preferred party despite the non-contiguous coalition? Will voters punish coalition members if it breaks while in office? Will coalitions stay together through multiple electoral cycles? This chapter develops a Game Theoretical Bayesian model to analyze voters' electoral behavior. The main finding is a separating equilibrium in the multiple-period game. Reputation effects will lead to a long-term collaboration while in the short-term the coalition will break. Voters support these coalitions if they stay together once in office and implement a policy platform that maximizes their payoffs. The second chapter introduces the concept of "Partial Alignment'', created by a pre-electoral coalition in power, and its effects on resource allocation. Do municipalities where pre-electoral coalition governments win an election receive significantly more or fewer resources from the federal and state level governments than those where the coalition loses? The theoretical answer is ambiguous: Partial alignment could lead to more resources in an effort to keep the party in power - even as part of a coalition - or fewer resource due to the desire to stop sharing power in order to govern alone. Analysis uses a Regression Discontinuity Design with a matched dataset that combines data on municipality level income with municipal election results between 1989 and 2016. Results show that municipalities where the pre-electoral coalition barely won received fewer federal resources in the year of the election and the year before. The third chapter looks at how the pre-electoral coalition spend their resources. Do pre-electoral coalitions spend differently than single party governments? Will pre-electoral coalition governments increase expenditure after the election or wait until the next electoral cycle? Will they strategically pick between short and long-term expenditures to signal voters their competence? Analysis uses a Regression Discontinuity Design and a Fixed Effects Panel Model with a matched dataset that combines data on municipality level expenditures with municipal election results between 1989 and 2016. Results show that municipalities where the pre-electoral coalition barely won create a new electoral budget cycle by increasing expenditures during their first year in office. It is also shown that these governments are not strategic when selecting between short and long-term expenditures to signal voters their competence in office.
Author: Hideko Magara Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1315408406 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 288
Book Description
Since the global financial crisis of 2008, advanced economies have been making various efforts to overcome the economic impasse. While the contrast between the countries that have escaped from the crisis relatively quickly and those still suffering from serious problems is becoming clearer, a new economic crisis stemming from newly emerging economies has again impacted advanced economies. In retrospect, both leftist and rightist governments in advanced economies pursued expansive macroeconomic and welfare policies from the post-WWII period to the oil shocks of the 1970s. While we recognise that the particular policy regime in this ‘Golden Decades’ during which the left and the right implemented similar policies cross-nationally, were characterised by outstanding economic growth in each country, the specific growth patterns varied across countries. Different social coalitions underpinned different growth models. This book is premised on tentative conclusions that Magara and her research collaborators have reached as a result of three years of study related to our previous project on economic crises and policy regimes. Recognising the need to analyse fluid and unstable situations, we have set up a new research design in which we emphasise political variables—whether political leaders and citizens can overcome the various weaknesses inherent in democracy and escape from an economic crisis by establishing an effective social coalition. A new policy regime can be stable only if it is supported by a sufficiently large coalition of social groups whose most important policy demands are satisfied within the new policy regime.
Author: Marc Debus Publisher: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft ISBN: Category : Political Science Languages : de Pages : 250
Book Description
Governing in coalitions is a central research field in comparative political science. This book explores how pre-electoral alliances and rejections of potential coalitions influence party competition and coalition politics in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands. The study shows that in contrast to the classical perspective, coalition politics is determined not only by ideological diversity, but also by institutional and behavioralist factors. Beside a descriptive analysis of the policy-area specific positions of each party and an evaluation of the determinants of coalition formation, the payoff structure in coalition governments is under consideration. The analysis reveals that "key parties" receive a surpassing share of both office and policy payoffs.
Author: Sona Nadenichek Golder Publisher: Ohio State University Press ISBN: 0814210295 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 232
Book Description
Why do some parties coordinate their electoral strategies as part of a pre-electoral coalition, while others choose to compete independently at election time? Scholars have long ignored pre-electoral coalitions in favor of focusing on the government coalitions that form after parliamentary elections. Yet electoral coalitions are common, they affect electoral outcomes, and they have important implications for democratic policy-making itself. The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation by Sona Nadenichek Golder includes a combination of methodological approaches (game theoretic, statistical, and historical) to explain why pre-electoral coalitions form in some instances but not in others. The results indicate that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form between ideologically compatible parties. They are also more likely to form when the expected coalition size is large (but not too large) and when the potential coalition partners are similar in size. Ideologically polarized party systems and disproportional electoral rules in combination also increase the likelihood of electoral coalition formation. Golder links the analysis of pre-electoral coalition formation to the larger government coalition literature by showing that pre-electoral agreements increase (a) the likelihood that a party will enter government, (b) the ideological compatibility of governments, and (c) the speed with which governments take office. In addition, pre-electoral coalitions provide an opportunity for combining the best elements of the majoritarian vision of democracy with the best elements of the proportional vision of democracy.
Author: Sona Nadenichek Golder Publisher: ISBN: 9780814257210 Category : Languages : en Pages : 232
Book Description
Why do some parties coordinate their electoral strategies as part of a pre-electoral coalition, while others choose to compete independently at election time? Scholars have long ignored pre-electoral coalitions in favor of focusing on the government coalitions that form after parliamentary elections. Yet electoral coalitions are common, they affect electoral outcomes, and they have important implications for democratic policy-making itself. The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation by Sona Nadenichek Golder includes a combination of methodological approaches (game theoretic, statistical, and historical) to explain why pre-electoral coalitions form in some instances but not in others. The results indicate that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form between ideologically compatible parties. They are also more likely to form when the expected coalition size is large (but not too large) and when the potential coalition partners are similar in size. Ideologically polarized party systems and disproportional electoral rules in combination also increase the likelihood of electoral coalition formation. Golder links the analysis of pre-electoral coalition formation to the larger government coalition literature by showing that pre-electoral agreements increase (a) the likelihood that a party will enter government, (b) the ideological compatibility of governments, and (c) the speed with which governments take office. In addition, pre-electoral coalitions provide an opportunity for combining the best elements of the majoritarian vision of democracy with the best elements of the proportional vision of democracy.
Author: B. Kittel Publisher: Springer ISBN: 1137016647 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 288
Book Description
An exploration of core problems in experimental research on voting behaviour and political institutions, ranging from design and data analysis to inferences with respect to constructs, constituencies and causal claims. The focus of is on the implementation of principles in experimental political science and the reflection of actual practices.
Author: Thorsten Beck Publisher: World Bank Publications ISBN: Category : Comparative government Languages : en Pages : 52
Book Description
"Some say that democracy is more likely to survive under parliamentary governments. That result is not robust to the use of different variables from the Database of Political Institutions, a large new cross-country database that may illuminate many other issues affecting and affected by political institutions"--Cover.
Author: Miguel Garza Casado
Author: Miguel Garza Casado
Author: Rafael Hortala Vallve
Author: Hideko Magara
Author: Marc Debus
Author: Sona Nadenichek Golder
Author: Sona Nadenichek Golder
Author: Terence C. Brennan
Author: B. Kittel
Author: Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay
Author: Thorsten Beck