Author: John Earman
Publisher: Bradford Books
ISBN: 9780262050463
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 272
Book Description
There is currently no viable alternative to the Bayesian analysis of scientific inference, yet the available versions of Bayesianism fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirmation of scientific hypotheses. Bayes or Bust? provides the first balanced treatment of the complex set of issues involved in this nagging conundrum in the philosophy of science. Both Bayesians and anti-Bayesians will find a wealth of new insights on topics ranging from Bayes's original paper to contemporary formal learning theory. In a paper published posthumously in 1763, the Reverend Thomas Bayes made a seminal contribution to the understanding of "analogical or inductive reasoning." Building on his insights, modem Bayesians have developed an account of scientific inference that has attracted numerous champions as well as numerous detractors. Earman argues that Bayesianism provides the best hope for a comprehensive and unified account of scientific inference, yet the presently available versions of Bayesianisin fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirming of scientific theories and hypotheses. By focusing on the need for a resolution to this impasse, Earman sharpens the issues on which a resolution turns. John Earman is Professor of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh.
Bayes Or Bust?
Author: John Earman
Publisher: Bradford Books
ISBN: 9780262050463
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 272
Book Description
There is currently no viable alternative to the Bayesian analysis of scientific inference, yet the available versions of Bayesianism fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirmation of scientific hypotheses. Bayes or Bust? provides the first balanced treatment of the complex set of issues involved in this nagging conundrum in the philosophy of science. Both Bayesians and anti-Bayesians will find a wealth of new insights on topics ranging from Bayes's original paper to contemporary formal learning theory. In a paper published posthumously in 1763, the Reverend Thomas Bayes made a seminal contribution to the understanding of "analogical or inductive reasoning." Building on his insights, modem Bayesians have developed an account of scientific inference that has attracted numerous champions as well as numerous detractors. Earman argues that Bayesianism provides the best hope for a comprehensive and unified account of scientific inference, yet the presently available versions of Bayesianisin fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirming of scientific theories and hypotheses. By focusing on the need for a resolution to this impasse, Earman sharpens the issues on which a resolution turns. John Earman is Professor of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh.
Publisher: Bradford Books
ISBN: 9780262050463
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 272
Book Description
There is currently no viable alternative to the Bayesian analysis of scientific inference, yet the available versions of Bayesianism fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirmation of scientific hypotheses. Bayes or Bust? provides the first balanced treatment of the complex set of issues involved in this nagging conundrum in the philosophy of science. Both Bayesians and anti-Bayesians will find a wealth of new insights on topics ranging from Bayes's original paper to contemporary formal learning theory. In a paper published posthumously in 1763, the Reverend Thomas Bayes made a seminal contribution to the understanding of "analogical or inductive reasoning." Building on his insights, modem Bayesians have developed an account of scientific inference that has attracted numerous champions as well as numerous detractors. Earman argues that Bayesianism provides the best hope for a comprehensive and unified account of scientific inference, yet the presently available versions of Bayesianisin fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirming of scientific theories and hypotheses. By focusing on the need for a resolution to this impasse, Earman sharpens the issues on which a resolution turns. John Earman is Professor of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh.
Induction, Probability, and Confirmation
Author: Grover Maxwell
Publisher: U of Minnesota Press
ISBN: 1452907773
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 560
Book Description
Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session.
Publisher: U of Minnesota Press
ISBN: 1452907773
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 560
Book Description
Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session.
Belief and Counterfactuals
Author: Franz Huber
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199976112
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 205
Book Description
"This book is the first of two volumes on belief and counterfactuals. It consists of six of a total of eleven chapters. The first volume is concerned primarily with questions in epistemology and is expository in parts. Among others, it provides an accessible introduction to belief revision and ranking theory. Ranking theory specifies how conditional beliefs should behave. It does not tell us why they should do so nor what they are. This book fills these two gaps. The consistency argument tells us why conditional beliefs should obey the laws of ranking theory by showing them to be the means to attaining the end of holding true and informative beliefs. The conditional theory of conditional belief tells us what conditional beliefs are by specifying their nature in terms of non-conditional belief and counterfactuals. In addition, the book contains several novel arguments, accounts, and applications. These include an argument for the thesis that there are only hypothetical imperatives and no categorical imperatives; an account of the instrumentalist understanding of normativity, or rationality, according to which one ought to take the means to one's ends; as well as solutions to the problems of conceptual belief change, logical learning, and learning conditionals. A distinctive feature of the book is its unifying methodological approach: means-end philosophy. Means-end philosophy takes serious that philosophy is a normative discipline, and that philosophical problems are entangled with each other. It also explains the importance of logic to philosophy, without being a technical theory itself"--
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199976112
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 205
Book Description
"This book is the first of two volumes on belief and counterfactuals. It consists of six of a total of eleven chapters. The first volume is concerned primarily with questions in epistemology and is expository in parts. Among others, it provides an accessible introduction to belief revision and ranking theory. Ranking theory specifies how conditional beliefs should behave. It does not tell us why they should do so nor what they are. This book fills these two gaps. The consistency argument tells us why conditional beliefs should obey the laws of ranking theory by showing them to be the means to attaining the end of holding true and informative beliefs. The conditional theory of conditional belief tells us what conditional beliefs are by specifying their nature in terms of non-conditional belief and counterfactuals. In addition, the book contains several novel arguments, accounts, and applications. These include an argument for the thesis that there are only hypothetical imperatives and no categorical imperatives; an account of the instrumentalist understanding of normativity, or rationality, according to which one ought to take the means to one's ends; as well as solutions to the problems of conceptual belief change, logical learning, and learning conditionals. A distinctive feature of the book is its unifying methodological approach: means-end philosophy. Means-end philosophy takes serious that philosophy is a normative discipline, and that philosophical problems are entangled with each other. It also explains the importance of logic to philosophy, without being a technical theory itself"--
Introduction to the Philosophy of Science
Author: Merrilee H. Salmon
Publisher: Hackett Publishing
ISBN: 9780872204508
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 474
Book Description
Originally published: Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, c1992.
Publisher: Hackett Publishing
ISBN: 9780872204508
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 474
Book Description
Originally published: Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, c1992.
An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic
Author: Ian Hacking
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521775014
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 326
Book Description
An introductory 2001 textbook on probability and induction written by a foremost philosopher of science.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521775014
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 326
Book Description
An introductory 2001 textbook on probability and induction written by a foremost philosopher of science.
Logical Foundations of Probability
Author: Rudolf Carnap
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Induction (Logic)
Languages : en
Pages : 636
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Induction (Logic)
Languages : en
Pages : 636
Book Description
The Logica Yearbook
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Logic, Symbolic and mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 302
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Logic, Symbolic and mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 302
Book Description
Theory and Reality
Author: Peter Godfrey-Smith
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 022677113X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 412
Book Description
How does science work? Does it tell us what the world is “really” like? What makes it different from other ways of understanding the universe? In Theory and Reality, Peter Godfrey-Smith addresses these questions by taking the reader on a grand tour of more than a hundred years of debate about science. The result is a completely accessible introduction to the main themes of the philosophy of science. Examples and asides engage the beginning student, a glossary of terms explains key concepts, and suggestions for further reading are included at the end of each chapter. Like no other text in this field, Theory and Reality combines a survey of recent history of the philosophy of science with current key debates that any beginning scholar or critical reader can follow. The second edition is thoroughly updated and expanded by the author with a new chapter on truth, simplicity, and models in science.
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 022677113X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 412
Book Description
How does science work? Does it tell us what the world is “really” like? What makes it different from other ways of understanding the universe? In Theory and Reality, Peter Godfrey-Smith addresses these questions by taking the reader on a grand tour of more than a hundred years of debate about science. The result is a completely accessible introduction to the main themes of the philosophy of science. Examples and asides engage the beginning student, a glossary of terms explains key concepts, and suggestions for further reading are included at the end of each chapter. Like no other text in this field, Theory and Reality combines a survey of recent history of the philosophy of science with current key debates that any beginning scholar or critical reader can follow. The second edition is thoroughly updated and expanded by the author with a new chapter on truth, simplicity, and models in science.
PSA 1974
Author: Robert S. Cohen
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401014493
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 724
Book Description
For this book, we have selected papers from symposia and contributed sessions at the fourth biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, held at the University of Notre Dame on November 1-3, 1974. The meeting was lively and well-attended, and we regret that there was no way to record here the many stimulating discussions after the papers and during the informal hours. We also regret that we had in sufficient space for all the contributed papers. Even more, some of the symposia were not available: those on systems and decision theory (c. W. Churchman, P. Suppes, I. Levi), and on the Marxist philosophy of science (M. W. Wartofsky, R. S. Cohen, E. N. Hiebert). Unhappily several individual contributions to other symposia were likewise not available: I. Velikovsky in the session on his own work and the politics of science, D. Finkelstein in the session on quantum logic. Memorial minutes were read for Alan Ross Anderson (prepared by Nuel Belnap) and for Imre Lakatos (prepared by Paul Feyerabend). They initiate this volume of philosophy of science in the mid-seventies.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401014493
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 724
Book Description
For this book, we have selected papers from symposia and contributed sessions at the fourth biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, held at the University of Notre Dame on November 1-3, 1974. The meeting was lively and well-attended, and we regret that there was no way to record here the many stimulating discussions after the papers and during the informal hours. We also regret that we had in sufficient space for all the contributed papers. Even more, some of the symposia were not available: those on systems and decision theory (c. W. Churchman, P. Suppes, I. Levi), and on the Marxist philosophy of science (M. W. Wartofsky, R. S. Cohen, E. N. Hiebert). Unhappily several individual contributions to other symposia were likewise not available: I. Velikovsky in the session on his own work and the politics of science, D. Finkelstein in the session on quantum logic. Memorial minutes were read for Alan Ross Anderson (prepared by Nuel Belnap) and for Imre Lakatos (prepared by Paul Feyerabend). They initiate this volume of philosophy of science in the mid-seventies.
Statistical Inference as Severe Testing
Author: Deborah G. Mayo
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108563309
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 503
Book Description
Mounting failures of replication in social and biological sciences give a new urgency to critically appraising proposed reforms. This book pulls back the cover on disagreements between experts charged with restoring integrity to science. It denies two pervasive views of the role of probability in inference: to assign degrees of belief, and to control error rates in a long run. If statistical consumers are unaware of assumptions behind rival evidence reforms, they can't scrutinize the consequences that affect them (in personalized medicine, psychology, etc.). The book sets sail with a simple tool: if little has been done to rule out flaws in inferring a claim, then it has not passed a severe test. Many methods advocated by data experts do not stand up to severe scrutiny and are in tension with successful strategies for blocking or accounting for cherry picking and selective reporting. Through a series of excursions and exhibits, the philosophy and history of inductive inference come alive. Philosophical tools are put to work to solve problems about science and pseudoscience, induction and falsification.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108563309
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 503
Book Description
Mounting failures of replication in social and biological sciences give a new urgency to critically appraising proposed reforms. This book pulls back the cover on disagreements between experts charged with restoring integrity to science. It denies two pervasive views of the role of probability in inference: to assign degrees of belief, and to control error rates in a long run. If statistical consumers are unaware of assumptions behind rival evidence reforms, they can't scrutinize the consequences that affect them (in personalized medicine, psychology, etc.). The book sets sail with a simple tool: if little has been done to rule out flaws in inferring a claim, then it has not passed a severe test. Many methods advocated by data experts do not stand up to severe scrutiny and are in tension with successful strategies for blocking or accounting for cherry picking and selective reporting. Through a series of excursions and exhibits, the philosophy and history of inductive inference come alive. Philosophical tools are put to work to solve problems about science and pseudoscience, induction and falsification.