Author: Torin Alter
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198038305
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 360
Book Description
Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for the view that the mind is physical. This volume collects thirteen new papers on this problem by leading philosophers including Torin Alter, Ned Block, David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, John Hawthorne, Frank Jackson, Janet Levin, Joseph Levine, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Laurence Nemirow, Knut Nordby, David Papineau, and Stephen White.
Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge
Author: Torin Alter
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198038305
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 360
Book Description
Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for the view that the mind is physical. This volume collects thirteen new papers on this problem by leading philosophers including Torin Alter, Ned Block, David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, John Hawthorne, Frank Jackson, Janet Levin, Joseph Levine, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Laurence Nemirow, Knut Nordby, David Papineau, and Stephen White.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198038305
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 360
Book Description
Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for the view that the mind is physical. This volume collects thirteen new papers on this problem by leading philosophers including Torin Alter, Ned Block, David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, John Hawthorne, Frank Jackson, Janet Levin, Joseph Levine, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Laurence Nemirow, Knut Nordby, David Papineau, and Stephen White.
The Knowledge Argument
Author: Sam Coleman
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107141990
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 313
Book Description
A cutting-edge and groundbreaking set of new essays by top philosophers on key topics related to the ever-influential knowledge argument.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107141990
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 313
Book Description
A cutting-edge and groundbreaking set of new essays by top philosophers on key topics related to the ever-influential knowledge argument.
Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness
Author: John Perry
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262661355
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 244
Book Description
Physicalism is the idea that if everything that goes on is physical, our consciousness and feelings must also be physical. This book defends a view called antecedent physicalism.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262661355
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 244
Book Description
Physicalism is the idea that if everything that goes on is physical, our consciousness and feelings must also be physical. This book defends a view called antecedent physicalism.
There's Something About Mary
Author: Peter Ludlow
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262621892
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 488
Book Description
In Frank Jackson's famous thought experiment, Mary is confined to a black-and-white room and educated through black-and-white books and lectures on a black-and-white television. In this way, she learns everything there is to know about the physical world. If physicalism—the doctrine that everything is physical—is true, then Mary seems to know all there is to know. What happens, then, when she emerges from her black-and-white room and sees the color red for the first time? Jackson's knowledge argument says that Mary comes to know a new fact about color, and that, therefore, physicalism is false. The knowledge argument remains one of the most controversial and important arguments in contemporary philosophy.There's Something About Mary—the first book devoted solely to the argument—collects the main essays in which Jackson presents (and later rejects) his argument along with key responses by other philosophers. These responses are organized around a series of questions: Does Mary learn anything new? Does she gain only know-how (the ability hypothesis), or merely get acquainted with something she knew previously (the acquaintance hypothesis)? Does she learn a genuinely new fact or an old fact in disguise? And finally, does she really know all the physical facts before her release, or is this a "misdescription"? The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262621892
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 488
Book Description
In Frank Jackson's famous thought experiment, Mary is confined to a black-and-white room and educated through black-and-white books and lectures on a black-and-white television. In this way, she learns everything there is to know about the physical world. If physicalism—the doctrine that everything is physical—is true, then Mary seems to know all there is to know. What happens, then, when she emerges from her black-and-white room and sees the color red for the first time? Jackson's knowledge argument says that Mary comes to know a new fact about color, and that, therefore, physicalism is false. The knowledge argument remains one of the most controversial and important arguments in contemporary philosophy.There's Something About Mary—the first book devoted solely to the argument—collects the main essays in which Jackson presents (and later rejects) his argument along with key responses by other philosophers. These responses are organized around a series of questions: Does Mary learn anything new? Does she gain only know-how (the ability hypothesis), or merely get acquainted with something she knew previously (the acquaintance hypothesis)? Does she learn a genuinely new fact or an old fact in disguise? And finally, does she really know all the physical facts before her release, or is this a "misdescription"? The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness.
From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance
Author: Howard Robinson
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107087260
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 285
Book Description
This book offers a comprehensive defense of the knowledge argument, arguing that materialism cannot accommodate or explain consciousness and offering an original defense of conceptualism for the non-basic. It will be a valuable resource for scholars and advanced students of philosophy of mind, studying consciousness, dualism and the mind-body problem.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107087260
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 285
Book Description
This book offers a comprehensive defense of the knowledge argument, arguing that materialism cannot accommodate or explain consciousness and offering an original defense of conceptualism for the non-basic. It will be a valuable resource for scholars and advanced students of philosophy of mind, studying consciousness, dualism and the mind-body problem.
God and Phenomenal Consciousness
Author: Yujin Nagasawa
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9781107407862
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
In God and Phenomenal Consciousness, Yujin Nagasawa bridges debates in two distinct areas of philosophy: the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion. He proposes novel objections to Thomas Nagel's and Frank Jackson's well-known 'knowledge arguments' against the physicalist approach to phenomenal consciousness by utilizing his own objections to arguments against the existence of God. From the failure of these arguments, Nagasawa derives a unique metaphysical thesis, 'nontheoretical physicalism,' according to which although this world is entirely physical, there are physical facts that cannot be captured even by complete theories of the physical sciences.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9781107407862
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
In God and Phenomenal Consciousness, Yujin Nagasawa bridges debates in two distinct areas of philosophy: the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion. He proposes novel objections to Thomas Nagel's and Frank Jackson's well-known 'knowledge arguments' against the physicalist approach to phenomenal consciousness by utilizing his own objections to arguments against the existence of God. From the failure of these arguments, Nagasawa derives a unique metaphysical thesis, 'nontheoretical physicalism,' according to which although this world is entirely physical, there are physical facts that cannot be captured even by complete theories of the physical sciences.
Consciousness and Fundamental Reality
Author: Philip Goff
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190677023
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 305
Book Description
A core philosophical project is the attempt to uncover the fundamental nature of reality, the limited set of facts upon which all other facts depend. Perhaps the most popular theory of fundamental reality in contemporary analytic philosophy is physicalism, the view that the world is fundamentally physical in nature. The first half of this book argues that physicalist views cannot account for the evident reality of conscious experience, and hence that physicalism cannot be true. Unusually for an opponent of physicalism, Goff argues that there are big problems with the most well-known arguments against physicalismChalmers' zombie conceivability argument and Jackson's knowledge argumentand proposes significant modifications. The second half of the book explores and defends a recently rediscovered theory of fundamental realityor perhaps rather a grouping of such theoriesknown as 'Russellian monism.' Russellian monists draw inspiration from a couple of theses defended by Bertrand Russell in The Analysis of Matter in 1927. Russell argued that physics, for all its virtues, gives us a radically incomplete picture of the world. It tells us only about the extrinsic, mathematical features of material entities, and leaves us in the dark about their intrinsic nature, about how they are in and of themselves. Following Russell, Russellian monists suppose that it is this 'hidden' intrinsic nature of matter that explains human and animal consciousness. Some Russellian monists adopt panpsychism, the view that the intrinsic natures of basic material entities involve consciousness; others hold that basic material entities are proto-conscious rather than conscious. Throughout the second half of the book various forms of Russellian monism are surveyed, and the key challenges facing it are discussed. The penultimate chapter defends a cosmopsychist form of Russellian monism, according to which all facts are grounded in facts about the conscious universe.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190677023
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 305
Book Description
A core philosophical project is the attempt to uncover the fundamental nature of reality, the limited set of facts upon which all other facts depend. Perhaps the most popular theory of fundamental reality in contemporary analytic philosophy is physicalism, the view that the world is fundamentally physical in nature. The first half of this book argues that physicalist views cannot account for the evident reality of conscious experience, and hence that physicalism cannot be true. Unusually for an opponent of physicalism, Goff argues that there are big problems with the most well-known arguments against physicalismChalmers' zombie conceivability argument and Jackson's knowledge argumentand proposes significant modifications. The second half of the book explores and defends a recently rediscovered theory of fundamental realityor perhaps rather a grouping of such theoriesknown as 'Russellian monism.' Russellian monists draw inspiration from a couple of theses defended by Bertrand Russell in The Analysis of Matter in 1927. Russell argued that physics, for all its virtues, gives us a radically incomplete picture of the world. It tells us only about the extrinsic, mathematical features of material entities, and leaves us in the dark about their intrinsic nature, about how they are in and of themselves. Following Russell, Russellian monists suppose that it is this 'hidden' intrinsic nature of matter that explains human and animal consciousness. Some Russellian monists adopt panpsychism, the view that the intrinsic natures of basic material entities involve consciousness; others hold that basic material entities are proto-conscious rather than conscious. Throughout the second half of the book various forms of Russellian monism are surveyed, and the key challenges facing it are discussed. The penultimate chapter defends a cosmopsychist form of Russellian monism, according to which all facts are grounded in facts about the conscious universe.
Thinking about Consciousness
Author: David Papineau
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199243824
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 281
Book Description
Thinking About Consciousness is a discussion of recent physicalist ideas about consciousness, written in an accessible style by David Papineau.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199243824
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 281
Book Description
Thinking About Consciousness is a discussion of recent physicalist ideas about consciousness, written in an accessible style by David Papineau.
Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity
Author: Robert J. Howell
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0199654662
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 201
Book Description
Robert J. Howell offers a new account of the relationship between conscious experience and the physical world, based on a neo-Cartesian notion of the physical and careful consideration of three anti-materialist arguments. His theory of subjective physicalism reconciles the data of consciousness with the advantages of a monistic, physical ontology.
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0199654662
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 201
Book Description
Robert J. Howell offers a new account of the relationship between conscious experience and the physical world, based on a neo-Cartesian notion of the physical and careful consideration of three anti-materialist arguments. His theory of subjective physicalism reconciles the data of consciousness with the advantages of a monistic, physical ontology.
Consciousness and Physicalism
Author: Andreas Elpidorou
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317402073
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 216
Book Description
Consciousness and Physicalism: A Defense of a Research Program explores the nature of consciousness and its place in the world, offering a revisionist account of what it means to say that consciousness is nothing over and above the physical. By synthesizing work in the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophy of science from the last twenty years and forging a dialogue with contemporary research in the empirical sciences of the mind, Andreas Elpidorou and Guy Dove advance and defend a novel formulation of physicalism. Although physicalism has been traditionally understood to be a metaphysical thesis, Elpidorou and Dove argue that there is an alternative and indeed preferable understanding of physicalism that both renders physicalism a scientifically informed explanatory project and allows us to make important progress in addressing the ontological problem of consciousness. Physicalism, Elpidorou and Dove hold, is best viewed not as a thesis (metaphysical or otherwise) but as an interdisciplinary research program that aims to compositionally explain all natural phenomena that are central to our understanding of our place in nature. Consciousness and Physicalism is replete with philosophical arguments and informed, through and through, by findings in many areas of scientific research. It advances the debate regarding the ontological status of consciousness. It will interest students and scholars in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, philosophy of cognitive science, and philosophy of science. And it will challenge both foes and friends of physicalism.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317402073
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 216
Book Description
Consciousness and Physicalism: A Defense of a Research Program explores the nature of consciousness and its place in the world, offering a revisionist account of what it means to say that consciousness is nothing over and above the physical. By synthesizing work in the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophy of science from the last twenty years and forging a dialogue with contemporary research in the empirical sciences of the mind, Andreas Elpidorou and Guy Dove advance and defend a novel formulation of physicalism. Although physicalism has been traditionally understood to be a metaphysical thesis, Elpidorou and Dove argue that there is an alternative and indeed preferable understanding of physicalism that both renders physicalism a scientifically informed explanatory project and allows us to make important progress in addressing the ontological problem of consciousness. Physicalism, Elpidorou and Dove hold, is best viewed not as a thesis (metaphysical or otherwise) but as an interdisciplinary research program that aims to compositionally explain all natural phenomena that are central to our understanding of our place in nature. Consciousness and Physicalism is replete with philosophical arguments and informed, through and through, by findings in many areas of scientific research. It advances the debate regarding the ontological status of consciousness. It will interest students and scholars in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, philosophy of cognitive science, and philosophy of science. And it will challenge both foes and friends of physicalism.