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Author: Charles D. Bailey Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 13
Book Description
Accountants are concerned about the impact of incentive contracts on performance. Monetary incentives improve overall performance, but their effects on the components of performance are not well known. Performance on a repetitive task includes initial performance, subsequent improvement rate, and performance after learning ceases. Monetary incentives can affect any of these factors. This study examines the impact of piece-rate and goal-contingent incentives, versus fixed-pay, on initial performance and subsequent improvement rate in an assembly task. Previous literature has not simultaneously examined these components, which are homologous with the components of the industrial learning curve model. We find that both overall and initial performance, but not improvement rate, are higher in the incentive-pay groups. Two factors may explain the lack of differential improvement rates: subjects? effort allocation, since improving initial performance may be easier than improving subsequent performance; and the nature of these typical incentive-pay plans, which do not reward improvement directly.
Author: Charles D. Bailey Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 13
Book Description
Accountants are concerned about the impact of incentive contracts on performance. Monetary incentives improve overall performance, but their effects on the components of performance are not well known. Performance on a repetitive task includes initial performance, subsequent improvement rate, and performance after learning ceases. Monetary incentives can affect any of these factors. This study examines the impact of piece-rate and goal-contingent incentives, versus fixed-pay, on initial performance and subsequent improvement rate in an assembly task. Previous literature has not simultaneously examined these components, which are homologous with the components of the industrial learning curve model. We find that both overall and initial performance, but not improvement rate, are higher in the incentive-pay groups. Two factors may explain the lack of differential improvement rates: subjects? effort allocation, since improving initial performance may be easier than improving subsequent performance; and the nature of these typical incentive-pay plans, which do not reward improvement directly.
Author: Anna Faust Publisher: Springer Nature ISBN: 3658351950 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 195
Book Description
In this book, Anna Faust examines the effects of gamification as a non-monetary incentive scheme on motivation and performance. A primary concern of managerial accounting are systems and practices that increase motivation, effort, and performance. However, in the field of management accounting and management control, previous research has focused on the effects of monetary incentives at the expense of non-monetary incentives. Gamification, as a non-monetary incentive scheme, has received little to no attention so far in the field of management accounting and management control. To address this gap, the author conducts three studies to investigate the influence of gamification on motivation and performance. Overall, this book offers new insights into the complexity of gamification as an incentive scheme.
Author: Christopher S. Chapman Publisher: Elsevier ISBN: 0080879306 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 1584
Book Description
Winner of the Management Accounting section of the American Accounting Association notable contribution to Management Accounting Literature AwardVolume One of the Handbook of Management Accounting Research series sets the context for the Handbooks, with three chapters outlining the historical development of management accounting as a discipline and as a practice in three broad geographic settings.Volume Two provides insights into research on different management accounting practices. Volume Three features contributions from some of the most influential researchers in various areas of management accounting research, consolidates the content of volumes one and two, and concludes with examples of management accounting research from around the world.Volumes 1, 2 and 3 are also available as individual product. * ISBN Volume 1: 978-0-08-044564-9* ISBN Volume 2: 978-0-08-044754-4* ISBN Volume 3: 978-0-08-055450-1 Three volumes of the popular Handbooks of Management Accounting Research series now available in one complete set Examines particular management accounting practices and specific organizational contexts Adopts a global perspective of management accounting practice Award: "Winner of the Management Accounting section of the American Accounting Association notable contribution to Management Accounting Literature Award."
Author: George Lee Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 184
Book Description
When employees work hard, they exert more effort on job tasks (task effort); and when employees learn hard, they exert more effort to learn (learning effort). Task effort and learning effort are important causes of improved performance. This thesis investigates whether the use of tournament schemes motivates employees to work harder and learn harder, and also whether providing performance feedback in tournament schemes has any impact on task effort and learning effort.This thesis has three goals. The first is to investigate the relationship between incentives, learning, and performance. The literature on whether learning interacts with incentives to improve performance is inconclusive, because no prior research has provided a good test of this question (as noted by Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Bailey and Fessler 2011; Bailey et al. 1998, and as remains true today). The second goal is to investigate the motivational effect of tournament schemes on effort. The literature suggests that effort is difficult to observe directly or to quantify; as a result, it is hard to verify whether tournament schemes motivate employees' task effort and learning effort. This thesis uses an eye-tracking device to measure effort, by measuring eye position, eye movements, and pupil size. The third goal is to investigate the effect of performance feedback on task effort, learning effort, and performance in the tournament setting.I posit and show evidence that both task effort and learning effort are higher in multiple-winner schemes than in either winner-takes-all schemes or piece-rate schemes. Task effort is directly positively associated with performance, while learning effort causes learning transfer to a job task, also yielding a positive effect on performance. I find that providing relative performance feedback in the tournament setting has no significant impact on task effort or learning effort.These findings have practical value for many corporations, which are constantly re-evaluating the effectiveness of their incentive schemes and reporting systems while investing in learning initiatives to help employees transfer learned skills to job tasks. Organizations may use the insights of this thesis to help them design learning initiatives and motivate employees to transfer learned skills to their job tasks.
Author: Charles D. Bailey
Author: Charles D. Bailey
Author: Anna Faust
Author: Bonnie Miller Kind
Author: Judy Lynn Agnew
Author: Christopher S. Chapman
Author: 
Author: Horngren
Author: Sheila F. McNeill
Author: George Lee
Author: Kun Huo