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The Decline of Takeovers and Disciplinary Managerial Turnover

The Decline of Takeovers and Disciplinary Managerial Turnover PDF Author: Wayne H. Mikkelson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Book Description
Among U.S. industrial companies that are not acquired we compare top management turnover between an active takeover period (1984-1988) and a less active period (1989-1993). For firms in the lowest quartile of performance, as measured by operating income scaled by assets, 33% subsequently experienced complete turnover of the holders of the top three offices in the active takeover period and 17% experienced complete turnover in the less active takeover period. A regression analysis that controls for various possible determinants of management turnover shows that turnover and performance are related only in the active takeover period. We conclude that managerial discipline is linked to takeover activity in the economy.

The Decline of Takeovers and Disciplinary Managerial Turnover

The Decline of Takeovers and Disciplinary Managerial Turnover PDF Author: Wayne H. Mikkelson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Book Description
Among U.S. industrial companies that are not acquired we compare top management turnover between an active takeover period (1984-1988) and a less active period (1989-1993). For firms in the lowest quartile of performance, as measured by operating income scaled by assets, 33% subsequently experienced complete turnover of the holders of the top three offices in the active takeover period and 17% experienced complete turnover in the less active takeover period. A regression analysis that controls for various possible determinants of management turnover shows that turnover and performance are related only in the active takeover period. We conclude that managerial discipline is linked to takeover activity in the economy.

Corporate Takeovers

Corporate Takeovers PDF Author: Alan J. Auerbach
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 0226032167
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 354

Book Description
The takeover boom that began in the mid-1980s has exhibited many phenomena not previously observed, such as hostile takeovers and takeover defenses, a widespread use of cash as a means of payment for targeted firms, and the acquisitions of companies ranking among the largest in the country. With the aim of more fully understanding the implications of such occurances, contributors to this volume consider a broad range of issues as they analyze mergers and acquisitions and study the takeoveer process itself.

Managerial Discipline and Corporate Restructuring Following Performance Declines

Managerial Discipline and Corporate Restructuring Following Performance Declines PDF Author: Timothy A. Kruse
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 43

Book Description
We examine the incidence of managerial control-reducing disciplinary events (e.g. takeovers, board dismissals, and shareholder activism) and corporate restructuring among firms experiencing a large decline in operating performance during an active takeover period (1985-1988) and a less active period (1989-1992). We document a significant decline in the disciplinary events from the active to the less active period that is driven by a significant decline in disciplinary takeovers (i.e. those takeovers that result in a top executive change). Following the performance decline, however, there is a substantial amount of corporate restructuring (e.g. asset sales, cost-cutting efforts, layoffs) and a significant improvement in operating performance during both the active and the less active takeover period. We conclude that, although some managerial disciplinary events are related to overall takeover activity, the decline in takeover activity has not precluded performance-enhancing resturcturings following performance declines.

Managerial turnover and leverage under a takeover threat

Managerial turnover and leverage under a takeover threat PDF Author: Walter Novaes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : es
Pages : 36

Book Description


Investment Decisions and Managerial Discipline

Investment Decisions and Managerial Discipline PDF Author: Ralph M. Scholten
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 45

Book Description
This paper focuses on the relative importance of board monitoring and the hostile takeover market in disciplining managers that make poor acquisition decisions. Contrary to Mitchell and Lehn (1990), there is little evidence that takeovers that are poorly received by capital markets result in a firm becoming the target of a hostile takeover. A forced turnover of a top executive is more likely, however, the more negative is the abnormal return associated with an acquisition announcement. The relationship between forced turnover and negative acquisition returns is stronger during periods of less intense hostile takeover activity. Hence, it appears that being disciplined for making a poor acquisition is more a function of internal discipline than the workings of the takeover market.

Managerial Turnover and Leverage Under a Takeover Threat

Managerial Turnover and Leverage Under a Takeover Threat PDF Author: Wakter Novaes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 36

Book Description


Corporate Takeover Law and Management Discipline

Corporate Takeover Law and Management Discipline PDF Author: Francis A Okanigbuan Jnr
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 042989578X
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 215

Book Description
This book examines the effectiveness of corporate takeovers. The dominant ideologies of corporate takeovers include synergistic gains and its managerial disciplinary role. These dominant themes are being undermined by the challenges of costly acquisitions. The UK Takeover Code is a regulatory response to the role of managers of target companies only. Also, the regulatory framework for takeovers in the United States is largely focused on target companies. The book demonstrates that managements can influence the role of takeovers, thereby undermining its synergistic and disciplinary values. Presenting an identification and evaluation of the limits of current regulatory and judicial control over the role of management during takeovers in the UK and the US -Delaware, it will identify the relevance of institutional control as an effective mechanism for addressing the challenges of managerial influence over takeover functions. It will also identify how the role of managements can be addressed with the complementary benefit to shareholder and employee interests; thereby challenging the shareholder/ stakeholder primacy debate in corporate law, particularly in relation to takeovers. This book will be essential reading for scholars and students interested in the market for corporate control, corporate law and company law.

The Disciplinary Role of Failed Takeover Attempts

The Disciplinary Role of Failed Takeover Attempts PDF Author: Baixiao Liu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 48

Book Description
This study provides evidence on the disciplinary role of failed takeover attempts. We find that the likelihood of CEO turnover in target firms following failed takeover attempts is 21% greater than non-target firms matched on the basis of industry, past stock returns, size, and market-to-book ratio. Further, CEO turnover in target firms is negatively correlated with the firms' stock returns during the period from the onset of the takeover attempt through its resolution and with the firms' stock price performance prior to the failed attempt. We also find that target firms are 14% more likely than non-target firms to initiate corporate restructurings during the failed attempt. Restructured target firms have more positive stock returns in this period and are less likely to experience subsequent CEO turnover. When restructurings do not occur, an active outside blockholder is more likely to emerge and to facilitate the ouster of the target CEO. Together these findings indicate that failed takeover attempts act as “wake-up calls” either to target managers to make potentially value-increasing improvements or to active investors to replace target managers who have underperformed prior to and/or during the failed attempt.

Does Takeover Activity Cause Managerial Discipline? Evidence from International M&A Laws

Does Takeover Activity Cause Managerial Discipline? Evidence from International M&A Laws PDF Author: Ugur Lel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 79

Book Description
This paper exploits the staggered initiation of takeover laws across countries to examine whether the threat of takeover enhances managerial discipline. We show that following the passage of takeover laws (1) poorly performing firms experience more frequent takeovers; (2) the propensity to replace poorly performing CEOs increases, especially in countries with weak investor protection; and (3) directors of targeted firms are more likely to lose board seats following corporate control events. Our findings suggest that the threat of takeover causes managerial discipline through the incentives that the market for corporate control provides to boards to monitor managers.

Employee Turnover in the Context of Mergers and Acquisitions Transactions

Employee Turnover in the Context of Mergers and Acquisitions Transactions PDF Author: Florian Jung
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783346543240
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 102

Book Description
Master's Thesis from the year 2021 in the subject Business economics - Business Management, Corporate Governance, grade: 2,0, FH Vienna, language: English, abstract: Which factors impact the likelihood and extent of employee turnover after M&A transactions? What measures can be taken during post-merger integration to retain key players? This master thesis gathered and evaluated knowledge of experts in the field of M&A regarding employee turnover and employee retention. The yearly number of worldwide M&A transactions increased from 1990 to 2019 by nearly five times. The yearly average increased steadily over the last decades. The 1990's averaged about 20.500 deals, the 2000's 37.000 deals and the 2010's 46.500 deals per year. (Thomson Financial, Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances [IMAA], 2020) Smith (2002) analyzed 49 studies regarding the success rates of organizational change. Among them were also 9 studies concerning M&A transactions. The median success rates for these transactions stated at 33%, while the median success rate for all analyzed studies in different forms of organizational change, ranging from strategy deployment to general culture change or software implementation, also was 33%. It should be mentioned that the measurements of success for most forms of organizational change are varying or sometimes not disclosed at all and therefore these results should be taken with caution. A valuable takeaway of Smith's analysis though definitely should be the assumption that change in organizations is very often accompanied by a myriad of hurdles and challenges. More recent academic work also backs that statement. Malmendier, Moretti, and Peters (2018) looked at stock performance of winning and losing bidders. They conclude that the entities that lost takeover bids on average outperform the winning bidders by 24 to 37% over the next 3 years. King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin (2004) come to the conclusion that on average M&