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Author: Andrew Mumford Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 0415667453 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 218
Book Description
This book examines the complex practice of counter-insurgency warfare through the prism of the British experiences of irregular war in the post-war era, from Malaya up to the current Iraq war.
Author: Andrew Mumford Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1136649387 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 218
Book Description
This book examines the complex practice of counter-insurgency warfare through the prism of British military experiences in the post-war era and endeavours to unpack their performance. During the twentieth century counter-insurgency assumed the status of one of the British military’s fortes. A wealth of asymmetric warfare experience was accumulated after the Second World War as the small wars of decolonisation offered the army of a fading imperial power many opportunities to deploy against an irregular enemy. However, this quantity of experience does not translate into quality. This book argues that the British, far from being exemplars of counter-insurgency, have in fact consistently proved to be slow learners in counter-insurgency warfare. This book presents an analysis of the most significant British counter-insurgency campaigns of the past 60 years: Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-60), South Arabia (1962-67), the first decade of the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ (1969-79), and the recent British counter-insurgency campaign in southern Iraq (2003-09). Colonial history is used to contextualise the contemporary performance in Iraq and undermine the commonly held confidence in British counter-insurgency. Blending historical research with critical analysis, this book seeks to establish a new paradigm through which to interpret and analyse the British approach to counter-insurgency, as well as considering the mythology of inherent British competence in the realm of irregular warfare. It will be of interest to students of counter-insurgency, military history, strategic studies, security studies, and IR in general.
Author: Andrew Mumford Publisher: ISBN: 9781298046246 Category : Languages : en Pages : 42
Book Description
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Author: Andrew Mumford Publisher: Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College ISBN: Category : History Languages : en Pages : 40
Book Description
This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as an effective learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force.
Author: Allan Orr Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 231
Book Description
Counter-Insurgency is the most political form of warfare. Unlike other forms of war the political or ideological proclivities of entire populations are at stake. Counter-Insurgency has, due this, confounded and bewildered practitioners, academics and policy makers alike for the longest time. Only in the latter quarter of the 20th century, after the visceral war fought for South-Vietnam's soul, did military officers, academics and government officials feel they had broken the code of counter-insurgency. The problem was, it was determined, that counter-insurgency's code was primarily political and not military or a combination of both, as previously thought. The key to waging counter-insurgency then lay on the political plane, through a plan revolving around compelling one's adversary to negotiate and reach a political accord as an end to the conflict. As such the popular understanding of counter-insurgency has become that to be successful a plan of action to quell insurrection must be more politically than militarily based. But is this correct, has the code truly been cracked? The following thesis aims to examine this claim, proffer a counter-point, analyse supporting evidence to the riposte and draw conclusions based on this evidence. The following thesis then is less thesis and more anti-thesis, aiming to undercut the popular thesis of the field by positing a radical assertion for the field of counter-insurgency analysis, particularly in today's political climate. That assertion can be summed thusly - counter-insurgency wars can indeed be resolved favourably for counter-insurgent practitioners by nought but military means alone, without support from or regard for political considerations vis a vis insurgent elements. To accomplish this the thesis will examine the current literature and schools of thought in the field within the introduction, conduct two case studies on the American Civil War and Chechen Wars to illuminate insurrectionary conflicts resolved by military might, and finally posit conclusions based on the analysis this approach permits. The drive train for the following theoretical enquiry thus is the review of the field's very core, an analysis of its most basest nature and the questioning of the current understanding of the phenomena to better understand this most complex form of warfare and political/ideologically driven violence.
Author: Hannah Gurman Publisher: New Press, The ISBN: 1595588256 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 306
Book Description
The first book of its kind, Hearts and Minds is a scathing response to the grand narrative of U.S. counterinsurgency, in which warfare is defined not by military might alone but by winning the "hearts and minds" of civilians. Dormant as a tactic since the days of the Vietnam War, in 2006 the U.S. Army drafted a new field manual heralding the resurrection of counterinsurgency as a primary military engagement strategy; counterinsurgency campaigns followed in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the fact that counterinsurgency had utterly failed to account for the actual lived experiences of the people whose hearts and minds America had sought to win. Drawing on leading thinkers in the field and using key examples from Malaya, the Philippines, Vietnam, El Salvador, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Hearts and Minds brings a long-overdue focus on the many civilians caught up in these conflicts. Both urgent and timely, this important book challenges the idea of a neat divide between insurgents and the populations from which they emerge—and should be required reading for anyone engaged in the most important contemporary debates over U.S. military policy.
Author: Andrew Mumford Publisher: Georgetown University Press ISBN: 1626164932 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 252
Book Description
Andrew Mumford challenges the notion of a “special relationship” between the United States and United Kingdom in diplomatic and military affairs, the most vaunted and, he says, exaggerated of associations in the post-1945 era. Though they are allies to be sure, national self-interest and domestic politics have often undercut their relationship. This is the first book to combine a history of US-UK interaction during major counterinsurgency campaigns since 1945, from Palestine to Iraq and Afghanistan, with a critical examination of the so called special relationship that has been tested during these difficult, protracted, and costly conflicts. Mumford’s assessment of each nation’s internal political discussions and diplomatic exchanges reveals that in actuality there is only a thin layer of specialness at work in the wars that shaped the postcolonial balance of power, the fight against Communism in the Cold War, and the twenty-first-century “war on terror.” This book is especially timely given that the US-UK relationship is once again under scrutiny because of the Trump administration’s “America First” rhetoric and Britain's changing international relations as a result of Brexit. Counterinsurgency Wars and the Anglo-American Alliance will interest scholars and students of history, international relations, and security studies as well as policy practitioners in the field.
Author: Gian Gentile Publisher: New Press, The ISBN: 1595588965 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 142
Book Description
A searing indictment of US strategy in Afghanistan from a distinguished military leader and West Point military historian—“A remarkable book” (National Review). In 2008, Col. Gian Gentile exposed a growing rift among military intellectuals with an article titled “Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army’s Conventional Capabilities,” that appeared in World Politics Review. While the years of US strategy in Afghanistan had been dominated by the doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN), Gentile and a small group of dissident officers and defense analysts began to question the necessity and efficacy of COIN—essentially armed nation-building—in achieving the United States’ limited core policy objective in Afghanistan: the destruction of Al Qaeda. Drawing both on the author’s experiences as a combat battalion commander in the Iraq War and his research into the application of counterinsurgency in a variety of historical contexts, Wrong Turn is a brilliant summation of Gentile’s views of the failures of COIN, as well as a trenchant reevaluation of US operations in Afghanistan. “Gentile is convinced that Obama’s ‘surge’ in Afghanistan can’t work. . . . And, if Afghanistan doesn’t turn around soon, the Democrats . . . who have come to embrace the Petraeus-Nagl view of modern warfare . . . may find themselves wondering whether it’s time to go back to the drawing board.” —The New Republic
Author: D. Michael Shafer Publisher: Princeton University Press ISBN: 140086058X Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 347
Book Description
Michael Shafer argues that American policymakers have fundamentally misperceived the political context of revolutionary wars directed against American clients and that because American attempts at counterinsurgency were based on faulty premises, these efforts have failed in virtually every instance. Originally published in 1988. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.