The Common External Tariff of a Customs Union PDF Download

Author: T. N. Srinivasan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Customs unions
Languages : en
Pages : 32

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Author: Thirukodikaval N. Srinivasan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Customs unions
Languages : en
Pages : 465

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Author: Samia Costa
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Missing from the analysis of customs unions has been a consideration of collective decision-making by countries regarding the union's common trade policy. In the case of the common European external tariff, how governments voted was not public information. This paper uses a unique dataset to derive member states' tariff preferences, which are then used to establish the decision rule before 1987, when individual governments had veto power. Results indicate a principle of unanimity, as well as the presence of logrolling. The political equilibrium for the common external tariff is also illustrated to have shifted as a result of union enlargements.

Author: C. J. Bliss
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Customs unions
Languages : en
Pages : 60

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Author: Mark Melatos
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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This paper investigates how customs union members select the common external tariff (CET) to levy on imports from nonmembers. A perfectly competitive, pure exchange, general-equilibrium model of world trade is simulated. Contrary to most previous work, countries have the freedom to share authority over CET choice and to select from a variety of possible coalition forms. The results confirm that when customs unions are observed in the core, members may wish to share responsibility for CET choice in a variety of ways. Generally, however, the member country that is relatively well-endowed or has relatively elastic consumer preferences tends to take the lead in CET choice.

Author: Marcelo Olarreaga
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Commercial policy
Languages : en
Pages : 48

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"Most researchers focus on the political economy (interest group pressures) approach to analyzing why customs unions are formed, but terms-of-trade effects were also important in formation of the common market of the Southern Cone (Mercosur). Terms-of-trade externalities among Mercosur's members have been internalized in the common external tariff--Cover.

Author: Commission of the European Communities
Publisher: Luxembourg : Office for Official Publications of the European Communities
ISBN:
Category : Customs unions
Languages : en
Pages : 36

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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Customs unions
Languages : en
Pages : 54

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Author: A. M. El-Agraa
Publisher: Philip Allan
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 152

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Author: Marcelo Olarreaga
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Most researchers focus on the political economy (interest group pressures) approach to analyzing why customs unions are formed, but terms-of-trade effects were also important in formation of the Common Market of the Southern Cone (Mercosur). Terms-of-trade externalities among Mercosur's members have been internalized in the common external tariff. The theoretical literature on trade follows two different approaches to explaining the endogenous formation of customs unions: (1) The terms-of-trade approach, in which integrating partners are willing to exploit terms-of-trade effects. Using the terms-of-trade approach, one concludes that tariffs on imports from the rest of the world should increase after the formation of a regional bloc, because the market power of the region increases and terms-of-trade externalities can be internalized in the custom union's common external tariff. As the union forms, the domestic market gets larger and members' international market power increases. (2) The interest group pressures (political economy) approach, in which, for example, the customs union may offer the potential for exchanging markets or protection within the enlarged market. Using this approach, one would usually conclude that tariffs for the rest of the world decline after the custom union`s formation - a rationale related to free-rider effects in larger lobbying groups. It is important to recognize the forces behind the formation of customs unions. Most researchers have focused on the second approach and neglected terms of trade as a possible explanatory variable. Both rationales explain a significant share of tariff information. Results, write Olarreaga, Soloaga, and Winters, suggest that both forces were important in formation of the Common Market of the Southern Cone (Mercosur). Terms-of-trade effects account for between 6 percent and 28 percent of the explained variation in the structure of protection. There is also evidence that the terms-of-trade externalities among Mercosur's members have been internalized in the common external tariff. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the political economy of trade protection.