The Art of Blitzkrieg PDF Download

Author: Charles Messenger
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 300

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Author: Rick S. Richardson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Germany
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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"The objective of this study is to determine if the German "blitzkrieg" and Fall Gelb of 1940 were an expression of operational art. Despite the mythology surrounding Fall Gelb, the campaign does not constitute a major breakthrough in operational art by the Germans. Fall Gelb was not an expression of operational art. This conclusion is based upon an analysis using the approaches posed by U.S. Army and joint doctrine, Dr. James Schneider and Dr. Shimon Naveh. The purpose of this study is to examine more closely what is meant by "operational art" and to use those contemporary insights to reexamine German military operations in France in May 1940, Fall Gelb. Fall Gelb was chosen because it is a campaign that is frequently studied and often used and abused to illustrate various points relating to military operations. The study of the Fall Gelb campaign offers a glimpse of past operations through the lens of contemporary thought. That study provides the contemporary military professional an opportunity to improve his understanding of operational art through the study of a historical campaign. Fall Gelb must be analyzed using criteria derived from a modern understanding of operational art to objectively assess the significance of Fall Gelb. There are three distinctive approaches to operational art. One way to approach the problem is to use contemporary doctrine as a yardstick. Contemporary doctrine approaches the issue by using simple definitions and lists to describe the essential elements of operational art. Another approach is that taken by Dr. James Schneider from the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. Schneider's approach seeks to describe the phenomena associated with the practice of Operation Art. Schneider breaks down operational art into key attributes necessary for the practice of Operational Art. A third approach to the issue is that used by Dr. Shimon Naveh, an Israeli military theorist."--Abstract

Author: Tony George
Publisher: Createspace Independent Pub
ISBN: 9781441493682
Category : Religion
Languages : en
Pages : 192

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In this day and age we as Christains can no longer afford to be ignorant of satans devises.There are area's of our lives that remain in bondage because we are praying in general , but not really hitting the bullseye . These prayers were birthed out through the furnance of Affliction . We are in a dispensation where we can no longer not adress satanic forces that are reaping havoc on our lives strategically. So we must rise up in the stragies of Heaven and the Word of God to Combat the host of hell, and defeat them through prayer and the word of God.The Kingdom suffereth violence and the violent take it by force!!!

Author: Major Rick S. Richardson
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786250772
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 69

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The objective of this study is to determine if the German “blitzkrieg” and Fall Gelb of 1940 were an expression of operational art. Despite the mythology surrounding Fall Gelb, the campaign does not constitute a major breakthrough in operational art by the Germans. Fall Gelb was not an expression of operational art. This conclusion is based upon an analysis using the approaches posed by U.S. Army and joint doctrine, Dr. James Schneider and Dr. Shimon Naveh. The purpose of this study is to examine more closely what is meant by “operational art” and to use those contemporary insights to re-examine German military operations in France in May 1940, Fall Gelb. Fall Gelb was chosen because it is a campaign that is frequently studied and often used and abused to illustrate various points relating to military operations. The study of the Fall Gelb campaign offers a glimpse of past operations through the lens of contemporary thought. That study provides the contemporary military professional an opportunity to improve his understanding of operational art through the study of a historical campaign.

Author: Rick S. Richardson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Germany
Languages : en
Pages : 51

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Author: Charles K. Pickar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Lightning war
Languages : en
Pages : 50

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Author: Robert Michael Citino
Publisher: Modern War Studies
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 440

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When Germany launched its blitzkrieg invasion of France in 1940, it forever changed the way the world waged war. Although the Wehrmacht ultimately succumbed to superior Allied firepower in a two-front war, its stunning operational achievement left a lasting impression on military commanders throughout the world, even if their own operations were rarely executed as effectively. Robert Citino analyzes military campaigns from the second half of the twentieth century to further demonstrate the difficulty of achieving decisive results at the operational level. Offering detailed operational analyses of actual campaigns, Citino describes how UN forces in Korea enjoyed technological and air superiority but found the enemy unbeatable; provides analyses of Israeli operational victories in successive wars until the Arab states finally grasped the realities of operational-level warfare in 1973; and tells how the Vietnam debacle continued to shape U.S. doctrine in surprising ways. Looking beyond major-power conflicts, he also reveals the lessons of India's blitzkrieg-like drive into Pakistan in 1971 and of the senseless bloodletting of the Iran-Iraq War. Citino especially considers the evolution of U.S. doctrine and assesses the success of Desert Storm in dismantling an entrenched defending force with virtually no friendly casualties. He also provides one of the first scholarly analyses of Operation Iraqi Freedom, showing that its plan was curiously divorced from the realities of military history, grounded instead on nebulous theories about expected enemy behavior. Throughout Citino points to the importance of mobility—especially mobilized armor—in modern operational warfare and assesses the respective roles of firepower, training, doctrine, and command and control mechanisms. Brimming with new insights, Citino's study shows why technical superiority is no guarantee of victory and why a thorough grounding in the history of past campaigns is essential to anyone who wishes to understand modern warfare. Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm provides that grounding as it addresses the future of operational-level warfare in the post-9/11 era.

Author: Charles K. Pickar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Lightning war
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Blitzkrieg has been variously described as strategy, tactics, and even operational art. This ambiguity, coupled with a misinterpretation of this form of offensive combat, can cause false conclusions when studying the history of World War II and trying to relate this history to modern practice. Blitzkrieg was the tactical means the Germans used so pursue their strategy in World War 2. Applied against an enemy that was temporarily inferior in doctrine and technology, it was a great success and led to the aura which surrounds the word. This paper examines Blitzkrieg from a tactical and operational perspective. The result is an appreciation of where Blitzkrieg falls in the conceptual and theoretical realm of warfare. The first section examines Blitzkrieg from a theoretical perspective. The German practice of this form of maneuver warfare concentrated on battles of encirclement which would annihilate enemy forces. This analysis compares the German practice with the theoretical basis of radical deep battle. The result is a redefinition of Blitzkrieg as a tactical form of maneuver. The second section is an introduction of the characteristics of operational art. Blitzkrieg, rather than an expression of operational art, was instead a characteristic. Finally, two events, the German invasion of France in 1940, and the plans for the Summer offensive of 1942 are examined to determine the validity of the claim that Blitzkrieg is a tactical rather than operational action.

Author: Bruce Condell
Publisher: Stackpole Books
ISBN: 1461751403
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 320

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English translation of the military manual that guided the German Army in World War II This book was carried into battle by officers and NCOs and had been classified by the U.S. Army until the year 2000 Topics include command, attack, defense, tanks, chemical warfare, logistics, and more Truppenführung ("unit command") served as the basic manual for the German Army from 1934 until the end of World War II and laid the doctrinal groundwork for blitzkrieg and the early victories of Hitler's armies. Reading it is as close to getting inside the minds behind the Third Reich's war machine as you are likely to get.

Author: Karl-Heinz Frieser
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1612513581
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 594

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Here, for the first time in English, is an illuminating German perspective on the decisive blitzkrieg campaign. The account, written by the German historian Karl-Heinz Frieser and edited by American historian John T. Greenwood, provides the definitive explanation for Germany’s startling success and the equally surprising military collapse of France and Britain on the European continent in 1940. In a little over a month, Germany defeated the Allies in battle, a task that had not been achieved in four years of brutal fighting during World War I. First published in 1995 as the official German history of the 1940 campaign, this book goes beyond standard explanations to show that the German victory was not inevitable and that French defeat was not preordained. Contrary to most accounts of the campaign, Frieser’s illustrates that the military systems of both Germany and France were solid and that their campaign plans were sound. The key to victory or defeat, Frieser argues, was the execution of operational plans—both preplanned and ad hoc—amid the eternal Clausewitzian combat factors of friction and the fog of war. He shows why, on the eve of the campaign, the British and French leaders had good cause to be confident and why many German generals were understandably concerned that disaster was looming for them. This study explodes many of the myths concerning German blitzkrieg warfare and the planning for the 1940 campaign. Frieser’s groundbreaking interpretation of the topic has been the subject of discussion since the German edition first appeared. This English translation is published in cooperation with the Association of the United States Army.