Author: Manuel Salas-Velasco
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper uses both a geometrical and mathematical analysis to explain monopolistic third-degree price discrimination, and it also shows how price discrimination affects society. A frequent policy question in the price discrimination literature is whether to allow third-degree price discrimination or to enforce uniform pricing. A key feature to understanding this issue in the context of imperfectly competitive markets is the impact of price discrimination on output. The article shows that a monopoly facing downward sloping linear demands, and constant marginal costs, will obtain higher profits under price discrimination than under a single-price strategy, but price discrimination lowers welfare if total output does not change. When price discrimination causes total output to increase, then this practice will have a beneficial effect on overall welfare.
Teaching Third-Degree Price Discrimination by a Monopolist With Linear Demands
Author: Manuel Salas-Velasco
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper uses both a geometrical and mathematical analysis to explain monopolistic third-degree price discrimination, and it also shows how price discrimination affects society. A frequent policy question in the price discrimination literature is whether to allow third-degree price discrimination or to enforce uniform pricing. A key feature to understanding this issue in the context of imperfectly competitive markets is the impact of price discrimination on output. The article shows that a monopoly facing downward sloping linear demands, and constant marginal costs, will obtain higher profits under price discrimination than under a single-price strategy, but price discrimination lowers welfare if total output does not change. When price discrimination causes total output to increase, then this practice will have a beneficial effect on overall welfare.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper uses both a geometrical and mathematical analysis to explain monopolistic third-degree price discrimination, and it also shows how price discrimination affects society. A frequent policy question in the price discrimination literature is whether to allow third-degree price discrimination or to enforce uniform pricing. A key feature to understanding this issue in the context of imperfectly competitive markets is the impact of price discrimination on output. The article shows that a monopoly facing downward sloping linear demands, and constant marginal costs, will obtain higher profits under price discrimination than under a single-price strategy, but price discrimination lowers welfare if total output does not change. When price discrimination causes total output to increase, then this practice will have a beneficial effect on overall welfare.
Third-Degree Price Discrimination Revisited
Author: Youngsun Kwon
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper solves a simple model of third-degree price discrimination assuming two independent linear demands and discusses the effects of price discrimination on monopoly profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. In addition, using a simple model, this paper shows that the probability that price discrimination raises social welfare increases as the preferences or incomes of consumer groups become more heterogeneous. The virtual aggregated demand curve of the price-discriminating monopoly, corresponding to its aggregated marginal revenue curve, is derived. The curve is non-linear and lies above the aggregated demand curve of simple monopoly. The results of this paper may be used to explain to students the effects of third-degree price discrimination on market outcomes.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper solves a simple model of third-degree price discrimination assuming two independent linear demands and discusses the effects of price discrimination on monopoly profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. In addition, using a simple model, this paper shows that the probability that price discrimination raises social welfare increases as the preferences or incomes of consumer groups become more heterogeneous. The virtual aggregated demand curve of the price-discriminating monopoly, corresponding to its aggregated marginal revenue curve, is derived. The curve is non-linear and lies above the aggregated demand curve of simple monopoly. The results of this paper may be used to explain to students the effects of third-degree price discrimination on market outcomes.
Commercial Agreements
Author: Jeremy Leong
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1786432978
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 589
Book Description
Presenting a unique conceptual framework for interpreting and improving commercial agreements, this book marries a sound theoretical foundation with practical strategies for negotiating, drafting, advising on, and litigating such agreements.
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1786432978
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 589
Book Description
Presenting a unique conceptual framework for interpreting and improving commercial agreements, this book marries a sound theoretical foundation with practical strategies for negotiating, drafting, advising on, and litigating such agreements.
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
Author: Edward J. Lopez
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Applied work in price discrimination often treats demand curves among multiple market segments as algebraically additive. Yet the welfare effects of multi-market (third degree) price discrimination depend on the method by which demand segments are added. Treating demands as geometrically additive yields the well known result that discrimination absent an increase in production diminishes Marshallian surplus. But if demands are treated as algebraically additive then discrimination increases welfare relative to uniform pricing. Quantity is identical in the three cases, so the effect is not due to market opening. Nor is the effect due to scale economies since marginal cost is assumed constant. Profit is always greater under discrimination, so the effect is due to distributional changes in consumer surplus. The model is restricted to linear demands and constant marginal cost but can be generalized for future work and policy analysis.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Applied work in price discrimination often treats demand curves among multiple market segments as algebraically additive. Yet the welfare effects of multi-market (third degree) price discrimination depend on the method by which demand segments are added. Treating demands as geometrically additive yields the well known result that discrimination absent an increase in production diminishes Marshallian surplus. But if demands are treated as algebraically additive then discrimination increases welfare relative to uniform pricing. Quantity is identical in the three cases, so the effect is not due to market opening. Nor is the effect due to scale economies since marginal cost is assumed constant. Profit is always greater under discrimination, so the effect is due to distributional changes in consumer surplus. The model is restricted to linear demands and constant marginal cost but can be generalized for future work and policy analysis.
Intermediate Microeconomics
Author: Patrick M. Emerson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Third Degree Price Discrimination and Price Elasticities
Author: Thomas D. Jeitschko
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
According to conventional wisdom, if a monopolist operates in two separate markets whose respective demand functions can be ordered by elasticity, he will charge more on the market with the less elastic demand. In this paper we debunk the widespread canard that this follows from the first order profit maximization conditions. It is shown that, on the other hand, an inverse relationship between price and elasticity follows--with some qualifications--from the properties of the star partial ordering applied to the two demand functions. A number of related results are also given.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
According to conventional wisdom, if a monopolist operates in two separate markets whose respective demand functions can be ordered by elasticity, he will charge more on the market with the less elastic demand. In this paper we debunk the widespread canard that this follows from the first order profit maximization conditions. It is shown that, on the other hand, an inverse relationship between price and elasticity follows--with some qualifications--from the properties of the star partial ordering applied to the two demand functions. A number of related results are also given.
A Note on Third Degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Good Markets
Author: Youping Li
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This note studies third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets. I show that whether a more efficient downstream firm is charged a higher or lower price than a less efficient firm depends on the shape of the demand function. Different from the case in which final market demand is linear, the usual assumption in the literature, constant elasticity demand, for example, results in a more efficient firm's receiving a discount.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This note studies third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets. I show that whether a more efficient downstream firm is charged a higher or lower price than a less efficient firm depends on the shape of the demand function. Different from the case in which final market demand is linear, the usual assumption in the literature, constant elasticity demand, for example, results in a more efficient firm's receiving a discount.
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
Author: Sylvain Weber
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 14
Book Description
The objective of this paper is to assess how the marginal revenue of a monopoly should be plotted when the market is segmented between consumers with different demands, both in the discriminating and non-discriminating cases. The presentations offered by industrial organization textbooks concerning third-degree price discrimination are not always clear, and we believe this is due to the fact that the marginal revenue is different for both types of monopolies, even though the demands they face are absolutely identical. The quantity produced in equilibrium can therefore diverge significantly if price discrimination is feasible or not. Under certain circumstances, price discrimination may improve the situation of every market agent, producer as well as consumers.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 14
Book Description
The objective of this paper is to assess how the marginal revenue of a monopoly should be plotted when the market is segmented between consumers with different demands, both in the discriminating and non-discriminating cases. The presentations offered by industrial organization textbooks concerning third-degree price discrimination are not always clear, and we believe this is due to the fact that the marginal revenue is different for both types of monopolies, even though the demands they face are absolutely identical. The quantity produced in equilibrium can therefore diverge significantly if price discrimination is feasible or not. Under certain circumstances, price discrimination may improve the situation of every market agent, producer as well as consumers.
A Note on Pricing With Market Power
Author: Charles Adams
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 7
Book Description
The paper points up limitations in the standard undergraduate treatment of third-degree price discrimination by monopolists. While such treatments allude to qualitative distinctions between higher and lower priced alternatives, failure to capture those distinctions in underlying cost and demand structures can result in only partial and possibly misleading conclusions about the nature and consequences of price discrimination. Building on earlier work in the derivation of quality-differentiated demand (see SSRN 'https://ssrn.com/abstract=2576773' https://ssrn.com/abstract=2576773 and 'https://ssrn.com/abstract=3107103' https://ssrn.com/abstract=3107103), the paper compares the standard analysis of price discrimination with one that explicitly accounts for monopoly power in manipulating quality choices. The example provided illustrates the potential for substantially greater profits and greater efficiency losses by forcing some groups of consumers into suboptimal quality choices once quality variations are explicitly accounted for.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 7
Book Description
The paper points up limitations in the standard undergraduate treatment of third-degree price discrimination by monopolists. While such treatments allude to qualitative distinctions between higher and lower priced alternatives, failure to capture those distinctions in underlying cost and demand structures can result in only partial and possibly misleading conclusions about the nature and consequences of price discrimination. Building on earlier work in the derivation of quality-differentiated demand (see SSRN 'https://ssrn.com/abstract=2576773' https://ssrn.com/abstract=2576773 and 'https://ssrn.com/abstract=3107103' https://ssrn.com/abstract=3107103), the paper compares the standard analysis of price discrimination with one that explicitly accounts for monopoly power in manipulating quality choices. The example provided illustrates the potential for substantially greater profits and greater efficiency losses by forcing some groups of consumers into suboptimal quality choices once quality variations are explicitly accounted for.
Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Two-sided Markets
Author: Alexandre de Cornière
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We investigate the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a two-sided platform that enables interaction between buyers and sellers. Sellers are heterogenous with respect to their per-interaction benefit, and, under price discrimination, the platform can condition its fee on sellers' type. In a model with linear demand on each side, we show that price discrimination: (i) increases participation on both sides; (ii) enhances total welfare; (iii) may result in a strict Pareto improvement, with both seller types being better-off than under uniform pricing. These results, which are in stark contrast to the traditional analysis of price discrimination, are driven by the existence of cross-group network effects. By improving the firm's ability to monetize seller participation, price discrimination induces the platform to attract more buyers, which then increases seller participation. The Pareto improvement result means that even those sellers who pay a higher price under discrimination can be better-off, due to the increased buyer participation.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We investigate the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a two-sided platform that enables interaction between buyers and sellers. Sellers are heterogenous with respect to their per-interaction benefit, and, under price discrimination, the platform can condition its fee on sellers' type. In a model with linear demand on each side, we show that price discrimination: (i) increases participation on both sides; (ii) enhances total welfare; (iii) may result in a strict Pareto improvement, with both seller types being better-off than under uniform pricing. These results, which are in stark contrast to the traditional analysis of price discrimination, are driven by the existence of cross-group network effects. By improving the firm's ability to monetize seller participation, price discrimination induces the platform to attract more buyers, which then increases seller participation. The Pareto improvement result means that even those sellers who pay a higher price under discrimination can be better-off, due to the increased buyer participation.