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Author: Mark Quentin Gardiner Publisher: University of Toronto Press ISBN: 9780802047717 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 286
Book Description
Although many philosophers espouse anti-realism, the only sustained arguments for the position are due to Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam. Gardiner's unpretentious style and lucid organization make sense of Dummett's and Putnam's discourse.
Author: Mark Quentin Gardiner Publisher: University of Toronto Press ISBN: 9780802047717 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 286
Book Description
Although many philosophers espouse anti-realism, the only sustained arguments for the position are due to Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam. Gardiner's unpretentious style and lucid organization make sense of Dummett's and Putnam's discourse.
Author: Frederick Suppe Publisher: University of Illinois Press ISBN: 9780252016059 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 508
Book Description
"An authoritative account of the semantic conception of theories by one of its chief developers. Suppe has always seen the semantic conception as providing a way of moving beyond empiricist philosophies of science. This book provides the definitive account of his views not only on the issue of realism, but also on a variety of other issues central to the philosophy of science." -- Ronald N. Giere, author of Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach
Author: Tim Button Publisher: ISBN: 0199672172 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 277
Book Description
Tim Button explores the relationship between minds, words, and world. He argues that the two main strands of scepticism are deeply related and can be overcome, but that there is a limit to how much we can show. We must position ourselves somewhere between internal realism and external realism, and we cannot hope to say exactly where.
Author: Terence E. Horgan Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 0262263203 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 231
Book Description
A provocative ontological-cum-semantic position asserting that the right ontology is austere in its exclusion of numerous common-sense and scientific posits and that many statements employing such posits are nonetheless true. The authors of Austere Realism describe and defend a provocative ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous common-sense posits, and that statements employing such posits are nonetheless true, when truth is understood to be semantic correctness under contextually operative semantic standards. Terence Horgan and Matjaz Potrc argue that austere realism emerges naturally from consideration of the deep problems within the naive common-sense approach to truth and ontology. They offer an account of truth that confronts these deep internal problems and is independently plausible: contextual semantics, which asserts that truth is semantically correct affirmability. Under contextual semantics, much ordinary and scientific thought and discourse is true because its truth is indirect correspondence to the world. After offering further arguments for austere realism and addressing objections to it, Horgan and Potrc consider various alternative austere ontologies. They advance a specific version they call “blobjectivism”—the view that the right ontology includes only one concrete particular, the entire cosmos (“the blobject”), which, although it has enormous local spatiotemporal variability, does not have any proper parts. The arguments in Austere Realism are powerfully made and concisely and lucidly set out. The authors' contentions and their methodological approach—products of a decade-long collaboration—will generate lively debate among scholars in metaphysics, ontology, and philosophy.
Author: Jerrold J. Katz Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 9780262263290 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 268
Book Description
Jerrold Katz develops a new philosophical position integrating realism and rationalism. In Realistic Rationalism, Jerrold J. Katz develops a new philosophical position integrating realism and rationalism. Realism here means that the objects of study in mathematics and other formal sciences are abstract; rationalism means that our knowledge of them is not empirical. Katz uses this position to meet the principal challenges to realism. In exposing the flaws in criticisms of the antirealists, he shows that realists can explain knowledge of abstract objects without supposing we have causal contact with them, that numbers are determinate objects, and that the standard counterexamples to the abstract/concrete distinction have no force. Generalizing the account of knowledge used to meet the challenges to realism, he develops a rationalist and non-naturalist account of philosophical knowledge and argues that it is preferable to contemporary naturalist and empiricist accounts. The book illuminates a wide range of philosophical issues, including the nature of necessity, the distinction between the formal and natural sciences, empiricist holism, the structure of ontology, and philosophical skepticism. Philosophers will use this fresh treatment of realism and rationalism as a starting point for new directions in their own research.
Author: Jan Woleński Publisher: Springer Nature ISBN: 3030245365 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 392
Book Description
The book provides a historical (with an outline of the history of the concept of truth from antiquity to our time) and systematic exposition of the semantic theory of truth formulated by Alfred Tarski in the 1930s. This theory became famous very soon and inspired logicians and philosophers. It has two different, but interconnected aspects: formal-logical and philosophical. The book deals with both, but it is intended mostly as a philosophical monograph. It explains Tarski’s motivation and presents discussions about his ideas (pro and contra) as well as points out various applications of the semantic theory of truth to philosophical problems (truth-criteria, realism and anti-realism, future contingents or the concept of correspondence between language and reality).
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
According to the philosophical position known as moral realism, morality is a robustly objective domain of fact about which many of us have justified beliefs. This dissertation consists of three papers, each of which presents an independent line of argument against this position. In the first paper, I examine Sharon Street's "Darwinian Dilemma," which claims that realists can give no adequate account of the relation between the (supposed) objective moral truths and the evolutionary pressures that have influenced our moral judgments. I develop a general strategy for constructing a realist response that avoids both horns of Street's dilemma. Then, I argue that while such a response escapes the specific critique presented by Street, it fails to adequately rescue moral realism from the epistemological challenges raised by the (putative) fact of widespread evolutionary influence. In the second paper, I consider whether widespread, intractable moral disagreement raises an additional epistemological challenge for moral realists. First, I isolate exactly what sort of disagreement would pose the most serious threat to justified beliefs about objective moral truths, and develop an account of such fundamental disagreements. Next, I examine several popular anti-realist arguments from disagreement, and argue that they fail to undermine the realist position. Finally, I develop a novel argument for the claim that moral disagreement of a particular sort would undermine our ability to attain justified beliefs about objective moral facts. In the final paper, I once again explore the implications of widespread ethical disagreement, but this time through the lens of moral semantics. Realists hold that moral terms such as "good" and "right" refer to objective moral properties, and that different parties to serious moral disputes refer to the same properties as one another when they use these words. I argue that we have excellent reason to doubt that co-reference obtains in cases of fundamental disagreement. The semantic challenge, if successful, undermines the realist's contention that there is a distinct moral reality that we are all attempting to accurately describe when we engage in moral thought and discourse.
Author: John P. O’Callaghan Publisher: University of Notre Dame Pess ISBN: 0268158142 Category : Science Languages : en Pages : 368
Book Description
Philosophers will be richly rewarded by reading John O’Callaghan’s new book, Thomistic Realism and the Linguistic Turn. Based on his broad knowledge of Aristotle and Aquinas, O’Callaghan provides not only an excellent treatment of Aquinas’s epistemology but also a superb demonstration of just how Aquinas might contribute to contemporary debates. Traditionally, the camps of realism and idealism fiercely engaged one another in the field of epistemology. Thomists participated in confronting idealism from their unique realist position. Post-Wittgenstein, the conflict has been dominated by a form of epistemology that grounds all knowledge in linguistic practice. Since Thomists work in a textual and historical mode, their response to the technical approach of the analytic philosophy in which most of the linguistic epistemologists write has been slow in coming. O’Callaghan expertly closes that gap by successfully bringing together these fields.
Author: Mark Quentin Gardiner
Author: Mark Quentin Gardiner
Author: Carsten Martin Hansen
Author: Frederick Suppe
Author: Tim Button
Author: Terence E. Horgan
Author: Jerrold J. Katz
Author: Jan Woleński
Author: Folke Tersman
Author: 
Author: John P. O’Callaghan