Author: Tim Roughgarden
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262264358
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 216
Book Description
An analysis of the loss in performance caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. Most of us prefer to commute by the shortest route available, without taking into account the traffic congestion that we cause for others. Many networks, including computer networks, suffer from some type of this "selfish routing." In Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy, Tim Roughgarden studies the loss of social welfare caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. He quantifies the price of anarchy—the worst-possible loss of social welfare from selfish routing—and also discusses several methods for improving the price of anarchy with centralized control. Roughgarden begins with a relatively nontechnical introduction to selfish routing, describing two important examples that motivate the problems that follow. The first, Pigou's Example, demonstrates that selfish behavior need not generate a socially optimal outcome. The second, the counterintiuitve Braess's Paradox, shows that network improvements can degrade network performance. He then develops techniques for quantifying the price of anarchy (with Pigou's Example playing a central role). Next, he analyzes Braess's Paradox and the computational complexity of detecting it algorithmically, and he describes Stackelberg routing, which improves the price of anarchy using a modest degree of central control. Finally, he defines several open problems that may inspire further research. Roughgarden's work will be of interest not only to researchers and graduate students in theoretical computer science and optimization but also to other computer scientists, as well as to economists, electrical engineers, and mathematicians.
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Author: Tim Roughgarden
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262264358
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 216
Book Description
An analysis of the loss in performance caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. Most of us prefer to commute by the shortest route available, without taking into account the traffic congestion that we cause for others. Many networks, including computer networks, suffer from some type of this "selfish routing." In Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy, Tim Roughgarden studies the loss of social welfare caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. He quantifies the price of anarchy—the worst-possible loss of social welfare from selfish routing—and also discusses several methods for improving the price of anarchy with centralized control. Roughgarden begins with a relatively nontechnical introduction to selfish routing, describing two important examples that motivate the problems that follow. The first, Pigou's Example, demonstrates that selfish behavior need not generate a socially optimal outcome. The second, the counterintiuitve Braess's Paradox, shows that network improvements can degrade network performance. He then develops techniques for quantifying the price of anarchy (with Pigou's Example playing a central role). Next, he analyzes Braess's Paradox and the computational complexity of detecting it algorithmically, and he describes Stackelberg routing, which improves the price of anarchy using a modest degree of central control. Finally, he defines several open problems that may inspire further research. Roughgarden's work will be of interest not only to researchers and graduate students in theoretical computer science and optimization but also to other computer scientists, as well as to economists, electrical engineers, and mathematicians.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262264358
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 216
Book Description
An analysis of the loss in performance caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. Most of us prefer to commute by the shortest route available, without taking into account the traffic congestion that we cause for others. Many networks, including computer networks, suffer from some type of this "selfish routing." In Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy, Tim Roughgarden studies the loss of social welfare caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. He quantifies the price of anarchy—the worst-possible loss of social welfare from selfish routing—and also discusses several methods for improving the price of anarchy with centralized control. Roughgarden begins with a relatively nontechnical introduction to selfish routing, describing two important examples that motivate the problems that follow. The first, Pigou's Example, demonstrates that selfish behavior need not generate a socially optimal outcome. The second, the counterintiuitve Braess's Paradox, shows that network improvements can degrade network performance. He then develops techniques for quantifying the price of anarchy (with Pigou's Example playing a central role). Next, he analyzes Braess's Paradox and the computational complexity of detecting it algorithmically, and he describes Stackelberg routing, which improves the price of anarchy using a modest degree of central control. Finally, he defines several open problems that may inspire further research. Roughgarden's work will be of interest not only to researchers and graduate students in theoretical computer science and optimization but also to other computer scientists, as well as to economists, electrical engineers, and mathematicians.
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Author: Tim Roughgarden
Publisher: National Geographic Books
ISBN: 0262182432
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
An analysis of the loss in performance caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. Most of us prefer to commute by the shortest route available, without taking into account the traffic congestion that we cause for others. Many networks, including computer networks, suffer from some type of this "selfish routing." In Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy, Tim Roughgarden studies the loss of social welfare caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. He quantifies the price of anarchy—the worst-possible loss of social welfare from selfish routing—and also discusses several methods for improving the price of anarchy with centralized control. Roughgarden begins with a relatively nontechnical introduction to selfish routing, describing two important examples that motivate the problems that follow. The first, Pigou's Example, demonstrates that selfish behavior need not generate a socially optimal outcome. The second, the counterintiuitve Braess's Paradox, shows that network improvements can degrade network performance. He then develops techniques for quantifying the price of anarchy (with Pigou's Example playing a central role). Next, he analyzes Braess's Paradox and the computational complexity of detecting it algorithmically, and he describes Stackelberg routing, which improves the price of anarchy using a modest degree of central control. Finally, he defines several open problems that may inspire further research. Roughgarden's work will be of interest not only to researchers and graduate students in theoretical computer science and optimization but also to other computer scientists, as well as to economists, electrical engineers, and mathematicians.
Publisher: National Geographic Books
ISBN: 0262182432
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
An analysis of the loss in performance caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. Most of us prefer to commute by the shortest route available, without taking into account the traffic congestion that we cause for others. Many networks, including computer networks, suffer from some type of this "selfish routing." In Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy, Tim Roughgarden studies the loss of social welfare caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. He quantifies the price of anarchy—the worst-possible loss of social welfare from selfish routing—and also discusses several methods for improving the price of anarchy with centralized control. Roughgarden begins with a relatively nontechnical introduction to selfish routing, describing two important examples that motivate the problems that follow. The first, Pigou's Example, demonstrates that selfish behavior need not generate a socially optimal outcome. The second, the counterintiuitve Braess's Paradox, shows that network improvements can degrade network performance. He then develops techniques for quantifying the price of anarchy (with Pigou's Example playing a central role). Next, he analyzes Braess's Paradox and the computational complexity of detecting it algorithmically, and he describes Stackelberg routing, which improves the price of anarchy using a modest degree of central control. Finally, he defines several open problems that may inspire further research. Roughgarden's work will be of interest not only to researchers and graduate students in theoretical computer science and optimization but also to other computer scientists, as well as to economists, electrical engineers, and mathematicians.
Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory
Author: Tim Roughgarden
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1316781178
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 356
Book Description
Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1316781178
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 356
Book Description
Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.
Algorithms -- ESA 2004
Author: Susanne Albers
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540230254
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 853
Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 12th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms, ESA 2004, held in Bergen, Norway, in September 2004. The 70 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed from 208 submissions. The scope of the papers spans the entire range of algorithmics from design and mathematical issues to real-world applications in various fields, and engineering and analysis of algorithms.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540230254
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 853
Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 12th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms, ESA 2004, held in Bergen, Norway, in September 2004. The 70 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed from 208 submissions. The scope of the papers spans the entire range of algorithmics from design and mathematical issues to real-world applications in various fields, and engineering and analysis of algorithms.
Encyclopedia of Algorithms
Author: Ming-Yang Kao
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 0387307702
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 1200
Book Description
One of Springer’s renowned Major Reference Works, this awesome achievement provides a comprehensive set of solutions to important algorithmic problems for students and researchers interested in quickly locating useful information. This first edition of the reference focuses on high-impact solutions from the most recent decade, while later editions will widen the scope of the work. All entries have been written by experts, while links to Internet sites that outline their research work are provided. The entries have all been peer-reviewed. This defining reference is published both in print and on line.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 0387307702
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 1200
Book Description
One of Springer’s renowned Major Reference Works, this awesome achievement provides a comprehensive set of solutions to important algorithmic problems for students and researchers interested in quickly locating useful information. This first edition of the reference focuses on high-impact solutions from the most recent decade, while later editions will widen the scope of the work. All entries have been written by experts, while links to Internet sites that outline their research work are provided. The entries have all been peer-reviewed. This defining reference is published both in print and on line.
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Author: Tim Roughgarden
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262549328
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 207
Book Description
An analysis of the loss in performance caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. Most of us prefer to commute by the shortest route available, without taking into account the traffic congestion that we cause for others. Many networks, including computer networks, suffer from some type of this "selfish routing." In Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy, Tim Roughgarden studies the loss of social welfare caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. He quantifies the price of anarchy—the worst-possible loss of social welfare from selfish routing—and also discusses several methods for improving the price of anarchy with centralized control. Roughgarden begins with a relatively nontechnical introduction to selfish routing, describing two important examples that motivate the problems that follow. The first, Pigou's Example, demonstrates that selfish behavior need not generate a socially optimal outcome. The second, the counterintiuitve Braess's Paradox, shows that network improvements can degrade network performance. He then develops techniques for quantifying the price of anarchy (with Pigou's Example playing a central role). Next, he analyzes Braess's Paradox and the computational complexity of detecting it algorithmically, and he describes Stackelberg routing, which improves the price of anarchy using a modest degree of central control. Finally, he defines several open problems that may inspire further research. Roughgarden's work will be of interest not only to researchers and graduate students in theoretical computer science and optimization but also to other computer scientists, as well as to economists, electrical engineers, and mathematicians.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262549328
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 207
Book Description
An analysis of the loss in performance caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. Most of us prefer to commute by the shortest route available, without taking into account the traffic congestion that we cause for others. Many networks, including computer networks, suffer from some type of this "selfish routing." In Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy, Tim Roughgarden studies the loss of social welfare caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. He quantifies the price of anarchy—the worst-possible loss of social welfare from selfish routing—and also discusses several methods for improving the price of anarchy with centralized control. Roughgarden begins with a relatively nontechnical introduction to selfish routing, describing two important examples that motivate the problems that follow. The first, Pigou's Example, demonstrates that selfish behavior need not generate a socially optimal outcome. The second, the counterintiuitve Braess's Paradox, shows that network improvements can degrade network performance. He then develops techniques for quantifying the price of anarchy (with Pigou's Example playing a central role). Next, he analyzes Braess's Paradox and the computational complexity of detecting it algorithmically, and he describes Stackelberg routing, which improves the price of anarchy using a modest degree of central control. Finally, he defines several open problems that may inspire further research. Roughgarden's work will be of interest not only to researchers and graduate students in theoretical computer science and optimization but also to other computer scientists, as well as to economists, electrical engineers, and mathematicians.
Game Theory, Alive
Author: Anna R. Karlin
Publisher: American Mathematical Soc.
ISBN: 1470419823
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 400
Book Description
We live in a highly connected world with multiple self-interested agents interacting and myriad opportunities for conflict and cooperation. The goal of game theory is to understand these opportunities. This book presents a rigorous introduction to the mathematics of game theory without losing sight of the joy of the subject. This is done by focusing on theoretical highlights (e.g., at least six Nobel Prize winning results are developed from scratch) and by presenting exciting connections of game theory to other fields such as computer science (algorithmic game theory), economics (auctions and matching markets), social choice (voting theory), biology (signaling and evolutionary stability), and learning theory. Both classical topics, such as zero-sum games, and modern topics, such as sponsored search auctions, are covered. Along the way, beautiful mathematical tools used in game theory are introduced, including convexity, fixed-point theorems, and probabilistic arguments. The book is appropriate for a first course in game theory at either the undergraduate or graduate level, whether in mathematics, economics, computer science, or statistics. The importance of game-theoretic thinking transcends the academic setting—for every action we take, we must consider not only its direct effects, but also how it influences the incentives of others.
Publisher: American Mathematical Soc.
ISBN: 1470419823
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 400
Book Description
We live in a highly connected world with multiple self-interested agents interacting and myriad opportunities for conflict and cooperation. The goal of game theory is to understand these opportunities. This book presents a rigorous introduction to the mathematics of game theory without losing sight of the joy of the subject. This is done by focusing on theoretical highlights (e.g., at least six Nobel Prize winning results are developed from scratch) and by presenting exciting connections of game theory to other fields such as computer science (algorithmic game theory), economics (auctions and matching markets), social choice (voting theory), biology (signaling and evolutionary stability), and learning theory. Both classical topics, such as zero-sum games, and modern topics, such as sponsored search auctions, are covered. Along the way, beautiful mathematical tools used in game theory are introduced, including convexity, fixed-point theorems, and probabilistic arguments. The book is appropriate for a first course in game theory at either the undergraduate or graduate level, whether in mathematics, economics, computer science, or statistics. The importance of game-theoretic thinking transcends the academic setting—for every action we take, we must consider not only its direct effects, but also how it influences the incentives of others.
Algorithms and Complexity
Author: Dimitris Fotakis
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319575864
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 499
Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed conference proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity, CIAC 2017, held in Athens, Greece, in May 2017. The 36 revised full papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 90 submissions and are presented together with 3 abstracts of invited talks and a paper to the 70th birthday of Stathis Zachos. The papers present original research in the theory and applications of algorithms and computational complexity.
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319575864
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 499
Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed conference proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity, CIAC 2017, held in Athens, Greece, in May 2017. The 36 revised full papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 90 submissions and are presented together with 3 abstracts of invited talks and a paper to the 70th birthday of Stathis Zachos. The papers present original research in the theory and applications of algorithms and computational complexity.
Automata, Languages and Programming
Author: Fernando Orejas
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540422870
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 1098
Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 28th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, ICALP 2001, held in Crete, Greece in July 2001. The 80 revised papers presented together with two keynote contributions and four invited papers were carefully reviewed and selected from a total of 208 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on algebraic and circuit complexity, algorithm analysis, approximation and optimization, complexity, concurrency, efficient data structures, graph algorithms, language theory, codes and automata, model checking and protocol analysis, networks and routing, reasoning and verification, scheduling, secure computation, specification and deduction, and structural complexity.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540422870
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 1098
Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 28th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, ICALP 2001, held in Crete, Greece in July 2001. The 80 revised papers presented together with two keynote contributions and four invited papers were carefully reviewed and selected from a total of 208 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on algebraic and circuit complexity, algorithm analysis, approximation and optimization, complexity, concurrency, efficient data structures, graph algorithms, language theory, codes and automata, model checking and protocol analysis, networks and routing, reasoning and verification, scheduling, secure computation, specification and deduction, and structural complexity.
Automata, Languages and Programming
Author: Peter Widmayer
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9783540438649
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 1100
Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, ICALP 2002, held in Malaga, Spain, in July 2002. The 83 revised full papers presented together with 7 invited papers were carefully reviewed and selected from a total of 269 submissions. All current aspects of theoretical computer science are addressed and major new results are presented.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9783540438649
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 1100
Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, ICALP 2002, held in Malaga, Spain, in July 2002. The 83 revised full papers presented together with 7 invited papers were carefully reviewed and selected from a total of 269 submissions. All current aspects of theoretical computer science are addressed and major new results are presented.