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Author: E. van Damme Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642499708 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 161
Book Description
In this monograph, noncooperative games are studied. Since in a noncooperative game binding agreements are not possible, the solution of such a game has to be self enforcing, i. e. a Nash equilibrium (NASH [1950,1951J). In general, however, a game may possess many equilibria and so the problem arises which one of these should be chosen as the solution. It was first pointed out explicitly in SELTEN [1965J that I not all Nash equilibria of an extensive form game are qualified to be selected as the solution, since an equilibrium may prescribe irrational behavior at unreached parts of the game tree. Moreover, also for normal form games not all Nash equilibria are eligible, since an equilibrium need not be robust with respect to slight perturba tions in the data of the game. These observations lead to the conclusion that the Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined in order to obtain sensible solutions for every game. In the monograph, various refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept are studied. Some of these have been proposed in the literature, but others are presented here for the first time. The objective is to study the relations between these refine ments;to derive characterizations and to discuss the underlying assumptions. The greater part of the monograph (the chapters 2-5) is devoted to the study of normal form games. Extensive form games are considered in chapter 6.
Author: E. van Damme Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642499708 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 161
Book Description
In this monograph, noncooperative games are studied. Since in a noncooperative game binding agreements are not possible, the solution of such a game has to be self enforcing, i. e. a Nash equilibrium (NASH [1950,1951J). In general, however, a game may possess many equilibria and so the problem arises which one of these should be chosen as the solution. It was first pointed out explicitly in SELTEN [1965J that I not all Nash equilibria of an extensive form game are qualified to be selected as the solution, since an equilibrium may prescribe irrational behavior at unreached parts of the game tree. Moreover, also for normal form games not all Nash equilibria are eligible, since an equilibrium need not be robust with respect to slight perturba tions in the data of the game. These observations lead to the conclusion that the Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined in order to obtain sensible solutions for every game. In the monograph, various refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept are studied. Some of these have been proposed in the literature, but others are presented here for the first time. The objective is to study the relations between these refine ments;to derive characterizations and to discuss the underlying assumptions. The greater part of the monograph (the chapters 2-5) is devoted to the study of normal form games. Extensive form games are considered in chapter 6.
Author: John Eatwell Publisher: Springer ISBN: 1349201812 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 275
Book Description
This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. It concentrates on the topic of game theory.
Author: Tatsuro Ichiishi Publisher: Academic Press ISBN: 1483295052 Category : Language Arts & Disciplines Languages : en Pages : 449
Book Description
Game Theory and Applications outlines game theory and proves its validity by examining it alongside the neoclassical paradigm. This book contends that the neoclassical theory is the exceptional case, and that game theory may indeed be the rule. The papers and abstracts collected here explore its recent development and suggest new research directions. - Explains many of the recent central developments in game theory - Highlights new research directions in economic theory which surpass the neoclassical paradigm - Includes game-theoretical analyses in economics, political science, and biology - Written by leading game theorists, economists, political scientists, and biologists
Author: Alfred R. Mele Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 9780198033240 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 498
Book Description
Rationality has long been a central topic in philosophy, crossing standard divisions and categories. It continues to attract much attention in published research and teaching by philosophers as well as scholars in other disciplines, including economics, psychology, and law. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality is an indispensable reference to the current state of play in this vital and interdisciplinary area of study. Twenty-two newly commissioned chapters by a roster of distinguished philosophers provide an overview of the prominent views on rationality, with each author also developing a unique and distinctive argument.
Author: Kevin Gebser Publisher: Springer Nature ISBN: 3031015452 Category : Computers Languages : en Pages : 88
Book Description
Game theory is the mathematical study of interaction among independent, self-interested agents. The audience for game theory has grown dramatically in recent years, and now spans disciplines as diverse as political science, biology, psychology, economics, linguistics, sociology, and computer science, among others. What has been missing is a relatively short introduction to the field covering the common basis that anyone with a professional interest in game theory is likely to require. Such a text would minimize notation, ruthlessly focus on essentials, and yet not sacrifice rigor. This Synthesis Lecture aims to fill this gap by providing a concise and accessible introduction to the field. It covers the main classes of games, their representations, and the main concepts used to analyze them.
Author: Eric van Damme Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 364296978X Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 331
Book Description
The last decade has seen a steady increase in the application of concepts from noncooperative game theory to such diverse fields as economics, political science, law, operations research, biology and social psychology. As a byproduct of this increased activity, there has been a growing awareness of the fact that the basic noncooperative solution concept, that of Nash equilibrium, suffers from severe drawbacks. The two main shortcomings of this concept are the following: (i) In extensive form games, a Nash strategy may prescribe off the equilibrium path behavior that is manifestly irrational. (Specifically, Nash equilibria may involve incredible threats), (ii) Nash equilibria need not be robust with respect to small perturbations in the data of the game. Confronted with the growing evidence to the detriment of the Nash concept, game theorists were prompted to search for more refined equilibrium notions with better properties and they have come up with a wide array of alternative solution concepts. This book surveys the most important refinements that have been introduced. Its objectives are fourfold (i) to illustrate desirable properties as well as drawbacks of the various equilibrium notions by means of simple specific examples, (ii) to study the relationships between the various refinements, (iii) to derive simplifying characterizations, and (iv) to discuss the plausibility of the assumptions underlying the concepts.
Author: Sylvia Nasar Publisher: Simon and Schuster ISBN: 1439126496 Category : Biography & Autobiography Languages : en Pages : 464
Book Description
**Also an Academy Award–winning film starring Russell Crowe and Jennifer Connelly—directed by Ron Howard** The powerful, dramatic biography of math genius John Nash, who overcame serious mental illness and schizophrenia to win the Nobel Prize. “How could you, a mathematician, believe that extraterrestrials were sending you messages?” the visitor from Harvard asked the West Virginian with the movie-star looks and Olympian manner. “Because the ideas I had about supernatural beings came to me the same way my mathematical ideas did,” came the answer. “So I took them seriously.” Thus begins the true story of John Nash, the mathematical genius who was a legend by age thirty when he slipped into madness, and who—thanks to the selflessness of a beautiful woman and the loyalty of the mathematics community—emerged after decades of ghostlike existence to win a Nobel Prize for triggering the game theory revolution. The inspiration for an Academy Award–winning movie, Sylvia Nasar’s now-classic biography is a drama about the mystery of the human mind, triumph over adversity, and the healing power of love.
Author: Drew Fudenberg Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 0262303760 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 605
Book Description
This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory—including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information—in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.
Author: E. van Damme
Author: E. van Damme
Author: John Eatwell
Author: Andrés Perea
Author: Tatsuro Ichiishi
Author: Michael Maschler
Author: Alfred R. Mele
Author: Kevin Gebser
Author: Eric van Damme
Author: Sylvia Nasar
Author: Drew Fudenberg