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Author: Jessica Brown Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0198847203 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 305
Book Description
Traditionally, the notion of defeat has been central to epistemology, practical reasoning, and ethics. Within epistemology, it is standardly assumed that a subject who knows that p, or justifiably believes that p, can lose this knowledge or justified belief by acquiring a so-called 'defeater', whether that is evidence that not-p, evidence that the process that produced her belief is unreliable, or evidence that she has likely misevaluated her own evidence. Within ethics and practical reasoning, it is widely accepted that a subject may initially have a reason to do something although this reason is later defeated by her acquisition of further information. However, the traditional conception of defeat has recently come under attack. Some have argued that the notion of defeat is problematically motivated; others that defeat is hard to accommodate within externalist or naturalistic accounts of knowledge or justification; and still others that the intuitions that support defeat can be explained in other ways. This volume presents new work re-examining the very notion of defeat, and its place in epistemology and in normativity theory at large.
Author: Jessica Brown Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0198847203 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 305
Book Description
Traditionally, the notion of defeat has been central to epistemology, practical reasoning, and ethics. Within epistemology, it is standardly assumed that a subject who knows that p, or justifiably believes that p, can lose this knowledge or justified belief by acquiring a so-called 'defeater', whether that is evidence that not-p, evidence that the process that produced her belief is unreliable, or evidence that she has likely misevaluated her own evidence. Within ethics and practical reasoning, it is widely accepted that a subject may initially have a reason to do something although this reason is later defeated by her acquisition of further information. However, the traditional conception of defeat has recently come under attack. Some have argued that the notion of defeat is problematically motivated; others that defeat is hard to accommodate within externalist or naturalistic accounts of knowledge or justification; and still others that the intuitions that support defeat can be explained in other ways. This volume presents new work re-examining the very notion of defeat, and its place in epistemology and in normativity theory at large.
Author: Jan Constantin Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG ISBN: 3110730685 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 291
Book Description
A number of well-developed theories shed light on the question, under what circumstances our beliefs enjoy epistemic justification. Yet, comparatively little is known about epistemic defeat—when new information causes the loss of epistemic justification. This book proposes and defends a detailed account of epistemic defeaters. The main kinds of defeaters are analyzed in detail and integrated into a general framework that aims to explain how beliefs lose justification. It is argued that defeaters introduce incompatibilities into a noetic system and thereby prompt a structured re-evaluation process that makes a justified reinstatement of the defeated belief impossible. The account is then applied to the topic of disagreement, where it is used in an argument for conciliationism, as well as a new explanation for higher-order defeat. Throughout the book, the notion of defeat is the center of attention, while a number of new issues are discussed at the intersections of defeat and justification. Specifically, new problems are raised for broadly internalist accounts of defeat, a fully descriptive reliabilist account of defeat is provided, and the case for normative defeat is revisited.
Author: Robert Audi Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA ISBN: 0195141121 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 303
Book Description
This book sets out a theory of rationality applicable to both practical and theoretical reason. Audi explains the role of experience in grounding rationality, delineates the structure of central elements and attacks the egocentric view of rationality.
Author: Mattias Skipper Publisher: ISBN: 0198829779 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 331
Book Description
We often have reason to doubt our own ability to form rational beliefs, particularly when we are exposed to higher-order evidence. This book explains how disagreements with trusted friends, or learning of our own cognitive biases, can impact on our views. From there it explores a range of interrelated issues on this topic of higher-order evidence.
Author: Daniel Star Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0192549006 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 1105
Book Description
The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity maps a central terrain of philosophy, and provides an authoritative guide to it. Few concepts have received as much attention in recent philosophy as the concept of a reason to do or believe something. And one of the most contested ideas in philosophy is normativity, the 'ought' in claims that we ought to do or believe something. This is the first volume to provide broad coverage of the study of reasons and normativity across multiple philosophical subfields. In addition to focusing on reasons in ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, action, and language, the Handbook explores philosophical work on the nature of normativity in general. Topics covered include: the unity of normativity; the fundamentality of reasons; attempts to explain reasons in other terms; the relation of motivational reasons to normative reasons; the internalist constraint; the logic and language of reasons and 'ought'; connections between reasons, intentions, choices, and actions; connections between reasons, reasoning, and rationality; connections between reasons, knowledge, understanding and evidence; reasons encountered in perception and testimony; moral principles, prudence and reasons; agent-relative reasons; epistemic challenges to our access to reasons; normativity in relation to meaning, concepts, and intentionality; instrumental reasons; pragmatic reasons for belief; aesthetic reasons; and reasons for emotions.
Author: Daniel Star Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0199657882 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 1105
Book Description
'The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity' contains 44 commissioned chapters on a wide range of topics, and will appeal to readers with an interest in ethics or epistemology. A diverse selection of substantive positions are defended by leading proponents of the views in question, and provide broad coverage of the study of reasons and normativity across multiple philosophical subfields. In addition to focusing on reasons as part of the study of ethics and as part of the study of epistemology (as well as focusing on reasons as part of the study of the philosophy of language and as part of the study of the philosophy of mind), the Handbook covers recent developments concerning the nature of normativity in general. A number of the contributions to the Handbook explicitly address such "metanormative" issues, bridging subfields as they do so. --
Author: Nathan Ballantyne Publisher: ISBN: 019084728X Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 345
Book Description
Epistemology and inquiry -- Regulative epistemology in the seventeenth century -- How do epistemic principles guide? -- How to know our limits -- Disagreement and debunking -- Counterfactual interlocutors -- Unpossessed evidence -- Epistemic trespassing -- Novices and expert disagreement -- Self-defeat? -- The end of inquiry.
Author: Jan Constantin Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG ISBN: 3110730545 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 297
Book Description
A number of well-developed theories shed light on the question, under what circumstances our beliefs enjoy epistemic justification. Yet, comparatively little is known about epistemic defeat—when new information causes the loss of epistemic justification. This book proposes and defends a detailed account of epistemic defeaters. The main kinds of defeaters are analyzed in detail and integrated into a general framework that aims to explain how beliefs lose justification. It is argued that defeaters introduce incompatibilities into a noetic system and thereby prompt a structured re-evaluation process that makes a justified reinstatement of the defeated belief impossible. The account is then applied to the topic of disagreement, where it is used in an argument for conciliationism, as well as a new explanation for higher-order defeat. Throughout the book, the notion of defeat is the center of attention, while a number of new issues are discussed at the intersections of defeat and justification. Specifically, new problems are raised for broadly internalist accounts of defeat, a fully descriptive reliabilist account of defeat is provided, and the case for normative defeat is revisited.
Author: John F. Horty Publisher: OUP USA ISBN: 0199744076 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 276
Book Description
In this volume, John Horty brings to bear his work in logic to present a framework that allows for answers to key questions about reasons and reasoning, namely: What are reasons, and how do they support actions or conclusions?
Author: Robert Audi Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA ISBN: 0190221836 Category : Philosophy Languages : en Pages : 297
Book Description
This book is a wide-ranging treatment of central topics in epistemology. It provides conceptions of belief and knowledge, offers a theory of how they are grounded in our experience and in the social context of testimony, and connects them with the will and with action, moral responsibility, and intellectual virtue.
Author: Jessica Brown
Author: Jessica Brown
Author: Jan Constantin
Author: Robert Audi
Author: Mattias Skipper
Author: Daniel Star
Author: Daniel Star
Author: Nathan Ballantyne
Author: Jan Constantin
Author: John F. Horty
Author: Robert Audi