Author: Hong Hwang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
In a seminal paper, Eaton and Grossman (1986) conclude that an export tax is optimal if firms produce heterogeneous products and engage in Bertrand price competition. In particular, they made a comment that could be interpreted to mean that even in the case of a homogeneous product, the optimal policy is still an export tax. This paper has re-examined the case and found that the optimal export policy can be an export subsidy, free trade, or an export tax, depending on the marginal cost differential between the domestic and the foreign firms. Moreover, if government intervention entails a cost, free trade becomes the only optimal policy.
Optimal Trade Policy Under Homogeneous Bertrand Competition
Author: Hong Hwang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
In a seminal paper, Eaton and Grossman (1986) conclude that an export tax is optimal if firms produce heterogeneous products and engage in Bertrand price competition. In particular, they made a comment that could be interpreted to mean that even in the case of a homogeneous product, the optimal policy is still an export tax. This paper has re-examined the case and found that the optimal export policy can be an export subsidy, free trade, or an export tax, depending on the marginal cost differential between the domestic and the foreign firms. Moreover, if government intervention entails a cost, free trade becomes the only optimal policy.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
In a seminal paper, Eaton and Grossman (1986) conclude that an export tax is optimal if firms produce heterogeneous products and engage in Bertrand price competition. In particular, they made a comment that could be interpreted to mean that even in the case of a homogeneous product, the optimal policy is still an export tax. This paper has re-examined the case and found that the optimal export policy can be an export subsidy, free trade, or an export tax, depending on the marginal cost differential between the domestic and the foreign firms. Moreover, if government intervention entails a cost, free trade becomes the only optimal policy.
Strategic Trade Policy, Spillovers, and Uncertain Mode of Competition
Author: Krešimir Žigić
Publisher:
ISBN: 9788090232549
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 37
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN: 9788090232549
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 37
Book Description
Trade Policy Under Imperfect Competition
Author: Anthony J. Venables
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Applied mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Applied mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
Optimal Export Policy with Upstream Price Competition
Author: Tomomichi Mizuno
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We present a third-market model with a vertical trading structure, in which upstream input suppliers engage in homogeneous price competition. We show that, under downstream Bertrand competition, a non-monotonic export policy may result. Specifically, the optimal policy of the exporting country can turn into a tax-subsidy-tax as the degree of product substitutability rises. We also confirm the conventional result for which the optimal policy is an export subsidy (tax) if there is Cournot (Bertrand) competition downstream, provided that the number of domestic suppliers is at an intermediate level. We further discuss bilateral policy interventions when both exporting countries offer a subsidy/tax to their domestic downstream firms. We show that a non-monotonic export policy (tax-subsidy-tax) can arise even in this extended setting.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We present a third-market model with a vertical trading structure, in which upstream input suppliers engage in homogeneous price competition. We show that, under downstream Bertrand competition, a non-monotonic export policy may result. Specifically, the optimal policy of the exporting country can turn into a tax-subsidy-tax as the degree of product substitutability rises. We also confirm the conventional result for which the optimal policy is an export subsidy (tax) if there is Cournot (Bertrand) competition downstream, provided that the number of domestic suppliers is at an intermediate level. We further discuss bilateral policy interventions when both exporting countries offer a subsidy/tax to their domestic downstream firms. We show that a non-monotonic export policy (tax-subsidy-tax) can arise even in this extended setting.
Pitfalls in the Theory of International Trade Policy
Author: J. Peter Neary
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Commercial policy
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Commercial policy
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
A Note on Optimal Industrial Policy Towards Bertrand Homogeneous Duopoly
Author: Qi Duan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Recent studies in strategic trade and industrial policy analysis suggest that an investment subsidy, in the form of an R&D subsidy, a capacity subsidy or an advertising subsidy, would be a robust industrial policy recommendation towards an international differentiated oligopoly. However, in this paper, we show that this result does not carry over to the case of a Bertrand homogeneous duopoly. This result together with the fact that the optimal industrial policy is to set an investment subsidy when in product market competition firms play a Cournot output game, imply immediately that there hardly exists a robust industrial policy recommendation towards homogeneous goods industries.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Recent studies in strategic trade and industrial policy analysis suggest that an investment subsidy, in the form of an R&D subsidy, a capacity subsidy or an advertising subsidy, would be a robust industrial policy recommendation towards an international differentiated oligopoly. However, in this paper, we show that this result does not carry over to the case of a Bertrand homogeneous duopoly. This result together with the fact that the optimal industrial policy is to set an investment subsidy when in product market competition firms play a Cournot output game, imply immediately that there hardly exists a robust industrial policy recommendation towards homogeneous goods industries.
Optimal Trade Policy with Monopolistic Competition and Heterogeneous Firms
Author: Jan I. Haaland
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Commercial policy
Languages : en
Pages : 23
Book Description
This paper derives optimal trade and domestic taxes for a small open economy containing a monopolistically competitive (MC) sector in which firms may have heterogeneous productivity levels. Domestic protection brings gains from expanding the number of product varieties on offer, but these gains (and the corresponding rates of domestic subsidy or of import tariffs) are reduced by heterogeneity of foreign exporters who may withdraw from the market. Our analysis encompasses special cases in which the domestic MC sector can expand or contract flexibly, or is of fixed size. In the latter case gains from protection arise from terms of trade effects and, since various margins of substitution are switched off, only the relative values of domestic taxes, import tariffs and export taxes matter.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Commercial policy
Languages : en
Pages : 23
Book Description
This paper derives optimal trade and domestic taxes for a small open economy containing a monopolistically competitive (MC) sector in which firms may have heterogeneous productivity levels. Domestic protection brings gains from expanding the number of product varieties on offer, but these gains (and the corresponding rates of domestic subsidy or of import tariffs) are reduced by heterogeneity of foreign exporters who may withdraw from the market. Our analysis encompasses special cases in which the domestic MC sector can expand or contract flexibly, or is of fixed size. In the latter case gains from protection arise from terms of trade effects and, since various margins of substitution are switched off, only the relative values of domestic taxes, import tariffs and export taxes matter.
Differentiated Products, Vertical Related Markets, and Optimal Export Policy
Author: Stephen Jui-Hsien Chou
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper studies the optimal export policy in the context of a vertically related industry with differentiated products, and analyzes the effects of the degree of product substitutability and market structure on the determination of such a policy. It is shown that the results obtained in a similar model with homogeneous goods rivalry no longer hold when the goods are differentiated. Indeed, the degree of product substitutability plays an important role in the determination of export policies, and also determines whether a country can be better off under a trade policy war compared to free trade. The use of a differentiated product setting also allows one to compare export policies and countries' welfare levels under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. It is found that the results of the comparison are also sensitive to the degree of product substitutability.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper studies the optimal export policy in the context of a vertically related industry with differentiated products, and analyzes the effects of the degree of product substitutability and market structure on the determination of such a policy. It is shown that the results obtained in a similar model with homogeneous goods rivalry no longer hold when the goods are differentiated. Indeed, the degree of product substitutability plays an important role in the determination of export policies, and also determines whether a country can be better off under a trade policy war compared to free trade. The use of a differentiated product setting also allows one to compare export policies and countries' welfare levels under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. It is found that the results of the comparison are also sensitive to the degree of product substitutability.
Optimal Trade Policy with Monopolistic Competition and Heterogeneous Firms
Author: Jan I. Haaland
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Commercial policy
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper derives optimal trade and domestic taxes for a small open economy containing a monopolistically competitive (MC) sector in which firms may have heterogeneous productivity levels. Domestic protection brings gains from expanding the number of product varieties on offer, but these gains (and the corresponding rates of domestic subsidy or of import tariffs) are reduced by heterogeneity of foreign exporters who may withdraw from the market. Our analysis encompasses special cases in which the domestic MC sector can expand or contract flexibly, or is of fixed size. In the latter case gains from protection arise from terms of trade effects and, since various margins of substitution are switched off, only the relative values of domestic taxes, import tariffs and export taxes matter
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Commercial policy
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper derives optimal trade and domestic taxes for a small open economy containing a monopolistically competitive (MC) sector in which firms may have heterogeneous productivity levels. Domestic protection brings gains from expanding the number of product varieties on offer, but these gains (and the corresponding rates of domestic subsidy or of import tariffs) are reduced by heterogeneity of foreign exporters who may withdraw from the market. Our analysis encompasses special cases in which the domestic MC sector can expand or contract flexibly, or is of fixed size. In the latter case gains from protection arise from terms of trade effects and, since various margins of substitution are switched off, only the relative values of domestic taxes, import tariffs and export taxes matter
Optimal Trade Policy Under Endogenous Foreign Entry
Author: Federico Etro
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
I characterise the optimal unilateral trade policy for domestic firms competing in domestic or integrated markets with endogenous entry of foreign firms. Under conditions satisfied in most trade models (as with quasi-linear or CES preferences) the analysis is simplified by a Neutrality Theorem: any policy affecting the profitability of the domestic firm is not going to affect consumer surplus and the strategies of the foreign firms, but affects their entry decisions. In a domestic market, we fully characterise the optimal import tariff: this is positive in the classic linear Cournot case, but with a convex demand or product differentiation it is optimal to adopt an import subsidy. In an integrated market, the optimal subsidy to domestic production is always positive, independent from form of competition and size of the domestic market.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
I characterise the optimal unilateral trade policy for domestic firms competing in domestic or integrated markets with endogenous entry of foreign firms. Under conditions satisfied in most trade models (as with quasi-linear or CES preferences) the analysis is simplified by a Neutrality Theorem: any policy affecting the profitability of the domestic firm is not going to affect consumer surplus and the strategies of the foreign firms, but affects their entry decisions. In a domestic market, we fully characterise the optimal import tariff: this is positive in the classic linear Cournot case, but with a convex demand or product differentiation it is optimal to adopt an import subsidy. In an integrated market, the optimal subsidy to domestic production is always positive, independent from form of competition and size of the domestic market.