Optimal Contracts in an Idiosyncratic Market PDF Download

Author: Michael Riordan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 60

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Author: M. A. H. Dempster
Publisher: CRC Press
ISBN: 1498712339
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 725

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Since a major source of income for many countries comes from exporting commodities, price discovery and information transmission between commodity futures markets are key issues for continued economic development.This book covers the fundamental theory of and derivatives pricing for major commodity markets as well as the interaction between commodi

Author: Peter Benson
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674237595
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 625

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Book Description
Legal thinkers typically justify contract law on the basis of economics or promissory morality. But Peter Benson takes another approach. He argues that contract is best explained as a transfer of rights governed by a conception of justice. The result is a comprehensive theory of contract law congruent with Rawlsian liberalism.

Author: Günter Bamberg
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642750605
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 538

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Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.

Author: Shaun Tyson
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136354743
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 248

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Top Pay is an extremely topical and contentious area and compensation and benefits is a well-defined area of interest in HR. This book investigates how the field of top pay developed? Why is there so much interest in top pay? Why governments take such an interest? Separation of ownership from control. The issues of Institutional shareholding, globalisation, comparisons between countries,equity theory and government policy are all addressed

Author: Didier Cossin
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461513936
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 105

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Optimal Control of Credit Risk presents an alternative methodology to deal with a financial problem that has not been well analyzed yet: the control of credit risk. Credit risk has become recently the center of interest of the financial community, with new instruments (such as Credit Risk Derivatives) and new methodologies (such as Credit Metrics) being developed. The recent literature has focused on the pricing of credit risk. On the other hand, practitioners tend to eliminate credit risk rather than price it. They do so via collateralization. The authors propose here a methodological basis for an optimal collateralization. The monograph is organized as follows: Chapter 1 reviews the main avenues of literature related to our problem; Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the main optimal control principles; and Chapter 3 presents the models and their setting. In the remaining chapters, the authors propose two sets of programs. One set of programs will apply in cases where the information on the assets=value is readily available (full observation case), while the other applies when costly audits are needed in order to assess this value (partial observation case). In either case, the modeling stage leads to a set of quasi-variational inequalities which the authors attempt to solve numerically in the simpler case of full observations. This is done in Chapter 6. Finally a simulation analysis is carried out in Chapter 7, in which the authors study the influence on the control process of changes in the different model parameters. This precedes a discussion on possible extensions in Chapter 8 and some concluding remarks in Section 9.

Author: Suren Basov
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 9811010412
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 181

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Book Description
This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation. Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design. This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.

Author: Jaeyoung Sung
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 9819954878
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 348

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Book Description
This book provides a self-contained introduction to discrete-time and continuous-time models in contracting theory to advanced undergraduate and graduate students in economics and finance and researchers focusing on closed-form solutions and their economic implications. Discrete-time models are introduced to highlight important elements in both economics and mathematics of contracting problems and to serve as a bridge for continuous-time models and their applications. The book serves as a bridge between the currently two almost separate strands of textbooks on discrete- and continuous-time contracting models This book is written in a manner that makes complex mathematical concepts more accessible to economists. However, it would also be an invaluable tool for applied mathematicians who are looking to learn about possible economic applications of various control methods.

Author: Bengt Holmstrom
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262518538
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 263

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Book Description
Two leading economists develop a theory explaining the demand for and supply of liquid assets. Why do financial institutions, industrial companies, and households hold low-yielding money balances, Treasury bills, and other liquid assets? When and to what extent can the state and international financial markets make up for a shortage of liquid assets, allowing agents to save and share risk more effectively? These questions are at the center of all financial crises, including the current global one. In Inside and Outside Liquidity, leading economists Bengt Holmström and Jean Tirole offer an original, unified perspective on these questions. In a slight, but important, departure from the standard theory of finance, they show how imperfect pledgeability of corporate income leads to a demand for as well as a shortage of liquidity with interesting implications for the pricing of assets, investment decisions, and liquidity management. The government has an active role to play in improving risk-sharing between consumers with limited commitment power and firms dealing with the high costs of potential liquidity shortages. In this perspective, private risk-sharing is always imperfect and may lead to financial crises that can be alleviated through government interventions.

Author: Mr.Jens Nystedt
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 145184820X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 49

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Book Description
Recent regulatory initiatives in the United States have again raised the issue of a 'level regulatory and supervisory playing field' and the degree of competition globally between over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and organized derivative exchange (ODE) markets. This paper models some important aspects of how an ODE market interrelates with the OTC markets. It analyzes various ways in which an ODE market can respond to competition from the OTC markets and considers whether ODE markets would actually benefit from a more level playing field. Among other factors, such as different transaction costs, different abilities to mitigate credit risk play a significant role in determining the degree of competition between the two types of markets. This implies that a potentially important service ODE markets can provide OTC market participants is to extend clearing services to them. Such services would allow the OTC markets to focus more on providing less competitive contracts/innovations and instead customize its contracts to specific investors' risk preferences and needs.