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Author: R.J. Aumann Publisher: Elsevier ISBN: 9780444894274 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 824
Book Description
This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes
Author: R.J. Aumann Publisher: Elsevier ISBN: 9780444894274 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 824
Book Description
This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes
Author: Tim Roughgarden Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 1316781178 Category : Computers Languages : en Pages : 356
Book Description
Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.
Author: Eric van Damme Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 364296978X Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 331
Book Description
The last decade has seen a steady increase in the application of concepts from noncooperative game theory to such diverse fields as economics, political science, law, operations research, biology and social psychology. As a byproduct of this increased activity, there has been a growing awareness of the fact that the basic noncooperative solution concept, that of Nash equilibrium, suffers from severe drawbacks. The two main shortcomings of this concept are the following: (i) In extensive form games, a Nash strategy may prescribe off the equilibrium path behavior that is manifestly irrational. (Specifically, Nash equilibria may involve incredible threats), (ii) Nash equilibria need not be robust with respect to small perturbations in the data of the game. Confronted with the growing evidence to the detriment of the Nash concept, game theorists were prompted to search for more refined equilibrium notions with better properties and they have come up with a wide array of alternative solution concepts. This book surveys the most important refinements that have been introduced. Its objectives are fourfold (i) to illustrate desirable properties as well as drawbacks of the various equilibrium notions by means of simple specific examples, (ii) to study the relationships between the various refinements, (iii) to derive simplifying characterizations, and (iv) to discuss the plausibility of the assumptions underlying the concepts.
Author: John C. Harsanyi Publisher: Mit Press ISBN: 9780262582384 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 378
Book Description
The authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this generation, have devoted a number of years to the development of the theory presented here, and to its economic applications. They propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any noncooperative game. And, because any cooperative game can be remodelled as a noncooperative bargaining game, their theory defines a one-point solution for any cooperative game as well.By providing solutions - based on the same principles of rational behavior - for all classes of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, both those with complete and with incomplete information, Harsanyi and Selten's approach achieves a remarkable degree of theoretical unification for game theory as a whole and provides a deeper insight into the nature of game-theoretic rationality.The book applies this theory to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games; bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides. The last chapter discusses the relationship of the authors' theory to other recently proposed solution concepts, particularly the Kohberg-Mertens stability theory.John C. Harsanyi is Flood Research Professor in Business Administration and Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley. Reinhard Selten is Professor of Economics Institute of Social and Economic Sciences: University of Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany.
Author: Philip D. Straffin Publisher: American Mathematical Society ISBN: 1470471965 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 256
Book Description
This book is an introduction to mathematical game theory, which might better be called the mathematical theory of conflict and cooperation. It is applicable whenever two individuals—or companies, or political parties, or nations—confront situations where the outcome for each depends on the behavior of all. What are the best strategies in such situations? If there are chances of cooperation, with whom should you cooperate, and how should you share the proceeds of cooperation? Since its creation by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944, game theory has shed new light on business, politics, economics, social psychology, philosophy, and evolutionary biology. In this book, its fundamental ideas are developed with mathematics at the level of high school algebra and applied to many of these fields (see the table of contents). Ideas like “fairness” are presented via axioms that fair allocations should satisfy; thus the reader is introduced to axiomatic thinking as well as to mathematical modeling of actual situations.
Author: E. van Damme Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642499708 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 161
Book Description
In this monograph, noncooperative games are studied. Since in a noncooperative game binding agreements are not possible, the solution of such a game has to be self enforcing, i. e. a Nash equilibrium (NASH [1950,1951J). In general, however, a game may possess many equilibria and so the problem arises which one of these should be chosen as the solution. It was first pointed out explicitly in SELTEN [1965J that I not all Nash equilibria of an extensive form game are qualified to be selected as the solution, since an equilibrium may prescribe irrational behavior at unreached parts of the game tree. Moreover, also for normal form games not all Nash equilibria are eligible, since an equilibrium need not be robust with respect to slight perturba tions in the data of the game. These observations lead to the conclusion that the Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined in order to obtain sensible solutions for every game. In the monograph, various refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept are studied. Some of these have been proposed in the literature, but others are presented here for the first time. The objective is to study the relations between these refine ments;to derive characterizations and to discuss the underlying assumptions. The greater part of the monograph (the chapters 2-5) is devoted to the study of normal form games. Extensive form games are considered in chapter 6.
Author: Erich Prisner Publisher: American Mathematical Soc. ISBN: 1614441154 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 309
Book Description
Game Theory through Examples is a thorough introduction to elementary game theory, covering finite games with complete information. The core philosophy underlying this volume is that abstract concepts are best learned when encountered first (and repeatedly) in concrete settings. Thus, the essential ideas of game theory are here presented in the context of actual games, real games much more complex and rich than the typical toy examples. All the fundamental ideas are here: Nash equilibria, backward induction, elementary probability, imperfect information, extensive and normal form, mixed and behavioral strategies. The active-learning, example-driven approach makes the text suitable for a course taught through problem solving. Students will be thoroughly engaged by the extensive classroom exercises, compelling homework problems, and nearly sixty projects in the text. Also available are approximately eighty Java applets and three dozen Excel spreadsheets in which students can play games and organize information in order to acquire a gut feeling to help in the analysis of the games. Mathematical exploration is a deep form of play; that maxim is embodied in this book. Game Theory through Examples is a lively introduction to this appealing theory. Assuming only high school prerequisites makes the volume especially suitable for a liberal arts or general education spirit-of-mathematics course. It could also serve as the active-learning supplement to a more abstract text in an upper-division game theory course.
Author: Branislav Bošanský Publisher: Springer Nature ISBN: 3030903702 Category : Computers Languages : en Pages : 385
Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2021,held in October 2021. Due to COVID-19 pandemic the conference was held virtually. The 20 full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 37 submissions. The papers focus on Theoretical Foundations in Equilibrium Computation; Machine Learning and Game Theory; Ransomware; Cyber-Physical Systems Security; Innovations in Attacks and Defenses.
Author: Hans Peters Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3540692916 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 362
Book Description
This book presents the basics of game theory both on an undergraduate level and on a more advanced mathematical level. It covers topics of interest in game theory, including cooperative game theory. Every chapter includes a problem section.
Author: Bernd Sturmfels Publisher: American Mathematical Soc. ISBN: 0821832514 Category : Mathematics Languages : en Pages : 162
Book Description
Bridging a number of mathematical disciplines, and exposing many facets of systems of polynomial equations, Bernd Sturmfels's study covers a wide spectrum of mathematical techniques and algorithms, both symbolic and numerical.
Author: R.J. Aumann
Author: R.J. Aumann
Author: Tim Roughgarden
Author: Eric van Damme
Author: John C. Harsanyi
Author: Philip D. Straffin
Author: E. van Damme
Author: Erich Prisner
Author: Branislav Bošanský
Author: Hans Peters
Author: Bernd Sturmfels