Objectivity Or Discretion in Judicial Decision Making as Perceived by George C. Christie and Ronald Dworkin PDF Download

Author: Jill I. Lunn
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Judicial process
Languages : en
Pages : 22

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Author: William C. Louthan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Judicial opinions
Languages : en
Pages : 416

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Author: Villa-Rosas, Gonzalo
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 180392263X
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 313

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Book Description
This thought-provoking book explores the multifaceted phenomenon of objectivity and its relations to various aspects of jurisprudence, legal interpretation and practical reasoning. Featuring contributions from an international group of researchers from differing legal contexts, it addresses topics relevant not only from a theoretical point of view but also themes directly connected with legal and judicial practice.

Author: Alexander Nikolaevich Shytov
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401597456
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 377

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Book Description
THE CONSCIENCE OF JUDGES AND APPLICA nON OF LEGAL RULES The book is devoted to the problem of the influence of moral judgements on the result of judicial decision-making in the process of application of the established (positive) law. It is the conscience of judges that takes the central place in the research. Conscience is understood in the meaning developed in the theory of Thomas Aquinas as the complex capacity of the human being to make moral judgements which represent acts of reason on the question of what is right or wrong in a particular situation. The reason why we need a theory of conscience in making judicial decisions lies in the nature of the positive law itself. On the one hand, there is an intrinsic conflict between the law as the body of rigid rules and the law as an living experience of those who are involved in social relationships. This conflict particularly finds its expression in the collision of strict justice and equity. The idea of equity does not reject the importance of rules in legal life. What is rejected is an idolatrous attitude to the rules when the uniqueness of a human being, his well being and happiness are disregarded and sacrificed in order to fulfil the observance of the rules. The rules themselves are neither good or bad. What makes them good or bad is their application.

Author: Michael S. Moore
Publisher: Ashgate Publishing
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 440

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Book Description
This volume collects six of Michael Moore's influential studies on moral and legal objectivity. Presented in an accessible format, the essays are brought together by a thought-provoking introduction. Contents: Introduction ETHICS Moral reality Moral reality revisited Good without God LAW Law as justice The plain truth about legal truth Legal reality: a naturalist approach to legal ontology NAME INDEX.

Author: Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Author: Frank H. Low-Beer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 232

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Book Description
Low-Beer, a lawyer, Canadian federal politician, and poet, examines judgment as exercise, identifying the critical elements of the exercise of judgment and relating them to cognitive functions. He argues against relegating judgement to the realm of the subjective, and looks at the extent to which it can be learned and its reciprocal relationship to character. He concludes that the exercise of judgment is a defining characteristic of professionalism in the courts, the professions, politics, and commerce. For scholars and lay readers. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Author: Aharon Barak
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780300239478
Category : Judges
Languages : en
Pages : 312

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Author: Brian Leiter
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 354

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Book Description

Author: Anthony Roy Reeves
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 410

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Book Description
Abstract: This dissertation is a philosophical investigation of judicial responsibility in adjudication. Recent work in political and legal philosophy has tended to assume that the primary problem for determining a judge's official responsibilities is providing an accurate theory of law. The dissertation argues that such a view of judicial responsibility fails to capture the complex moral position of the judge in the context of a morally imperfect state. A judge's responsibilities are complicated not simply by exceptionally wicked state policies (e.g. state sanctioned ethnic cleansing), but also by what most would regard as normal, but de-legitimating, features of actual modern democracies. After illustrating this point, the dissertation develops a general framework for responsible judicial reasoning. The account of responsible adjudication is informed by Ronald Dworkin's theory of legal interpretation - a theory that is cognizant of the role of moral reasoning in defensible adjudication. The dissertation argues that certain features of his theory offer good advice to the judge even if it fails as a theory of interpretation. The structure of the argument is as follows. Chapter One examines various rationales that might be offered for a judicial obligation to enforce law without consideration of the moral quality of it. The conclusion is that these arguments cannot substantiate a judicial obligation to enforce illegitimate law and that a responsible judge must be continually responsive to ethical demands that most legal theorists would not regard as part of a polity's legal system. Chapter Two defines the basic parameters of the adjudicative theory to be defended. The chapter discusses Dworkin's account of legal interpretation and identifies the features of the theory that accurately describe the moral position of the judge. Chapter Three further develops a model of adjudication and presents the main argument for its use in judicial decision-making. The contention is that judges should construe law according to rationales that justify the law and legal practice relevant to the question before the court. This would tend to ensure that the deployment of state power meets conditions of political legitimacy. Chapter Four addresses objections that might be raised against this view of responsible adjudication.