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Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
The purpose of this monograph is to inquire whether or not the traditional explanation of poor peacetime training and unit readiness is adequate to account for U.S. Army defeats during the first month of the Korean War. General histories of the war, such as those written by Roy Appleman, Clay Blair, and T.R. Fehrenbach, identify poor physical conditioning, lack of combat training, low strength and weak small unit leadership as prevalent in all U.S. Army units. The post-1945 drawdown is identified as the root cause of these shortcomings. The Army's equipment was "old and worn" and its soldiers were "undertrained, understrength, ill- equipped." This paper will focus on what happened to the regiments in two of the Eighth Army's three divisions. It will consider the performance of all three of the 24th Infantry Division's regiments between 5-20 July, or from Task Force Smith's first encounter north of Osan to the brutal stand at Taejon. It is this period in particular that historians have identified the materiel, personnel and training weaknesses as being critical, and have, by extrapolation, extended their importance to other units.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
The purpose of this monograph is to inquire whether or not the traditional explanation of poor peacetime training and unit readiness is adequate to account for U.S. Army defeats during the first month of the Korean War. General histories of the war, such as those written by Roy Appleman, Clay Blair, and T.R. Fehrenbach, identify poor physical conditioning, lack of combat training, low strength and weak small unit leadership as prevalent in all U.S. Army units. The post-1945 drawdown is identified as the root cause of these shortcomings. The Army's equipment was "old and worn" and its soldiers were "undertrained, understrength, ill- equipped." This paper will focus on what happened to the regiments in two of the Eighth Army's three divisions. It will consider the performance of all three of the 24th Infantry Division's regiments between 5-20 July, or from Task Force Smith's first encounter north of Osan to the brutal stand at Taejon. It is this period in particular that historians have identified the materiel, personnel and training weaknesses as being critical, and have, by extrapolation, extended their importance to other units.
Author: U S Army Command and General Staff Coll Publisher: CreateSpace ISBN: 9781508902768 Category : Languages : en Pages : 64
Book Description
When the 24th Infantry Division deployed to Korea in July 1950 it experienced a series of defeats from 5-20 July in an attempt to delay the invading North Korean People's Army (NKPA). The division suffered devastating losses of men and equipment and was withdrawn from combat because it was no longer capable of effective combat operations. Historians blamed the appalling losses and demoralizing defeats of 5-20 July on poor training, poor equipment, and lazy, ill-disciplined soldiers of an occupation army. The operational approach and the operational art of the commanders and staffs of the Eight Army and the 24th Infantry Division was the real cause of this reckless waste of American lives. They failed to employ their forces in accordance with their training, experience, and readiness and that of the enemy. Additionally, the gains the 24th Infantry Division achieved in delaying the NKPA were not decisive. The subsequent successful defense of the Pusan Perimeter occurred despite, not because of the 24th ID's delaying operation. This monograph explores the reasons for the 24th Infantry Division's defeats between 5 and 20 July. Although Eighth Army was not at an optimal state of readiness, it was sufficiently equipped and ready to conduct fundamental operational and tactical tasks. In modern warfare, technology and numerical preponderance are not the primary determinant of results; force employment is the primary cause of victory or defeat. Lastly, this monograph examines the operational art of the 24th Infantry Division and shows the small delays achieved were not decisive. The primary and immediate cause of failure was poor force employment and operational art. The 24th Infantry Division should have been able to delay two reinforced NKPA Infantry Divisions without suffering the devastating losses that it did.
Author: Thomas E. Hanson Publisher: Texas A&M University Press ISBN: 1603443355 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 201
Book Description
"Historians and sliders have not been kind to either [General Douglas] MacArthur or the soldiers whom he placed in harm's way in the summer of 1950 ... This study seeks to redress the imbalance that exists between fact and interpretation. For too long historians and soldiers have roundly criticized Task Force Smith's performance, extrapolated from its fate a set of assumptions about what constitutes readiness, and then used those assumptions to condemn the entire Eighth Army. The reality is much more complex. A proper examination of the historical record reveals wide disparities in the readiness and combat effectiveness of the subordinate units of America's first forward-deployed Cold War field force ... This work will demonstrate how units achieved that readiness by means of case studies of four infantry regiments, one from each of the four infantry divisions that constituted the Eighth Army in 1950. It synthesizes contemporary training doctrine, training records generated by maneuver units, unit histories, reports of inspections by outside agencies, contemporary self-assessments, and the observations of veterans who served in Japan in the fifteen months before the outbreak of the Korean War. It challenges the long-standing reputation of the Eighth Army as flabby, dispirited, and weak"--Introduction.
Author: Daniel P. Bolger Publisher: www.Militarybookshop.CompanyUK ISBN: 9781780390055 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 178
Book Description
Low-intensity conflict (LIC) often has been viewed as the wrong kind of warfare for the American military, dating back to the war in Vietnam and extending to the present conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. From the American perspective, LIC occurs when the U.S. military must seek limited aims with a relatively modest number of available regular forces, as opposed to the larger commitments that bring into play the full panoply of advanced technology and massive commitments of troops. Yet despite the conventional view, U.S. forces have achieved success in LIC, albeit "under the radar" and with credit largely assigned to allied forces, in a number of counterguerrilla wars in the 1960s."Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969" focuses on what the author calls the Second Korean conflict, which flared up in November 1966 and sputtered to an ill-defined halt more than three years later. During that time, North Korean special operations teams had challenged the U.S. and its South Korean allies in every category of low-intensity conflict - small-scale skirmishes along the Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas, spectacular terrorist strikes, attempts to foment a viable insurgency in the South, and even the seizure of the USS Pueblo - and failed. This book offers a case study in how an operational-level commander, General Charles H. Bonesteel III, met the challenge of LIC. He and his Korean subordinates crafted a series of shrewd, pragmatic measures that defanged North Korea's aggressive campaign. According to the convincing argument made by "Scenes from an Unfinished War," because the U.S. successfully fought the "wrong kind" of war, it likely blocked another kind of wrong war - a land war in Asia. The Second Korean Conflict serves as a corrective to assumptions about the American military's abilities to formulate and execute a winning counterinsurgency strategy. Originally published in 1991. 180 pages. maps. ill.
Author: Stephen R. Taaffe Publisher: University Press of Kansas ISBN: 0700622217 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 278
Book Description
Wedged chronologically between World War II and Vietnam, the Korean War—which began with North Korea's invasion of South Korea in June of 1950—possessed neither the virtuous triumphalism of the former nor the tragic pathos of the latter. Most Americans supported defending South Korea, but there was considerable controversy during the war as to the best means to do so—and the question was at least as exasperating for American army officers as it was for the general public. A longtime historian of American military leadership in the crucible of war, Stephen R. Taaffe takes a close critical look at how the highest ranking field commanders of the Eighth Army acquitted themselves in the first, decisive year in Korea. Because an army is no better than its leadership, his analysis opens a new perspective on the army's performance in Korea, and on the conduct of the war itself. In that first year, the Eighth Army's leadership ran the gamut from impressive to lackluster—a surprising unevenness since so many of the high-ranking officers had been battle-tested in World War II. Taaffe attributes these leadership difficulties to the army's woefully unprepared state at the war's start, army personnel policies, and General Douglas MacArthur's corrosive habit of manipulating his subordinates and pitting them against each other. He explores the personalities at play, their pre-war experiences, the manner of their selection, their accomplishments and failures, and, of course, their individual relationships with each other and MacArthur. By explaining who these field, corps, and division commanders were, Taaffe exposes the army's institutional and organizational problems that contributed to its up-and-down fortunes in Korea in 1950–1951. Providing a better understanding of MacArthur's controversial generalship, Taaffe’s book offers new and invaluable insight into the army's life-and-death struggle in America's least understood conflict.
Author: William T. Bowers Publisher: DIANE Publishing ISBN: 0788139908 Category : Korean War, 1950-1953 Languages : en Pages : 313
Book Description
The history of the 24th Infantry regiment in Korea is a difficult one, both for the veterans of the unit & for the Army. This book tells both what happened to the 24th Infantry, & why it happened. The Army must be aware of the corrosive effects of segregation & the racial prejudices that accompanied it. The consequences of the system crippled the trust & mutual confidence so necessary among the soldiers & leaders of combat units & weakened the bonds that held the 24th together, producing profound effects on the battlefield. Tables, maps & illustrations.
Author: Donald W. Boose Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 131704150X Category : History Languages : en Pages : 494
Book Description
This essential companion provides a comprehensive study of the literature on the causes, course, and consequences of the Korean War, 1950-1953. Aimed primarily at readers with a special interest in military history and contemporary conflict studies, the authors summarize and analyze the key research issues in what for years was known as the 'Forgotten War.' The book comprises three main thematic parts, each with chapters ranging across a variety of crucial topics covering the background, conduct, clashes, and outcome of the Korean War. The first part sets the historical stage, with chapters focusing on the main participants. The second part provides details on the tactics, equipment, and logistics of the belligerents. Part III covers the course of the war, with each chapter addressing a key stage of the fighting in chronological order. The enormous increase in writings on the Korean War during the last thirty years, following the release of key primary source documents, has revived and energized the interest of scholars. This essential reference work not only provides an overview of recent research, but also assesses what impact this has had on understanding the war.
Author: Scott Ray McMichael Publisher: ISBN: Category : Infantry Languages : en Pages : 264
Book Description
This study seeks to clarify the nature of light infantry. General characteristics of light infantry forces are identified, and an analysis of how light forces operate tactically and how they are supported is presented. In the process, the relationship of the light infantry ethic to its organization is evaluated, and the differences between light infantry and conventional infantry is illuminated. For the purpose of this study, the term conventional infantry refers to modern-day motorized and mechanized infantry and to the large dismounted infantry forces typical of the standard infantry divisions of World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. The study concludes that light infantry is unique and distinct. A light infantry ethic exits and manifests itself in a distinctive tactical style, in a special attitude toward the environment, in a freedom from dependence on fixed lines of communication, and in a strong propensity for self-reliance. The study is based on a historical analysis of 4 light infantry forces employed during and since World War II: The Chindits, in the 1944 Burma campaign against the Japanese; The Chinese communist Forces during the Korean War; British operations in Malaya and Borneo 1948-66; and the First Special Service Force in the mountains of Italy 1942-44. -- p. [2] of cover.
Author: Russell A. Gugeler Publisher: Government Printing Office ISBN: Category : History Languages : en Pages : 270
Book Description
A description of selected small unit actions, written primarily to acquaint junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted soldiers with combat experiences in Korea.
Author: 
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Author: Richard E. Wiersema
Author: U S Army Command and General Staff Coll
Author: Thomas E. Hanson
Author: Daniel P. Bolger
Author: Stephen R. Taaffe
Author: William T. Bowers
Author: Donald W. Boose
Author: Scott Ray McMichael
Author: Russell A. Gugeler