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Author: Joseph M. Lynch Publisher: Cornell University Press ISBN: 9780801472718 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 340
Book Description
No concept sparks more controversy in constitutional debate than "original intent." Offering a legal historian's approach to the subject, this book demonstrates that the framers deliberately obscured one of their more important decisions. Joseph M. Lynch argues that the Constitution was a product of political struggles involving regional interests, economic concerns, and ideology. The framers, he maintains, settled on enigmatic wording of the Necessary and Proper Clause and of the General Welfare provision in the Spending Clause as a compromise, leaving the extent of federal power to be determined by the political process. During ratification, however, attempts by dissident framers to undo the compromise were repelled in The Federalist: charges of overly broad congressional powers were met with protestations that in fact these powers were limited. Lynch describes how early lawmakers applied the Constitution to such issues as executive power and privilege, the deportation of aliens, and the prohibition of seditious speech. He follows the disputes over the interpretation of this document--focusing on James Madison's changing views--as the new government took shape and political parties were formed. Lynch points out that the first six Congresses and President George Washington disregarded the framers' intentions when they were deemed impractical to follow. In contrast, he warns that the version of original intent put forth in recent Supreme Court opinions regarding congressional power could hinder Congress in serving the nation.
Author: Joseph M. Lynch Publisher: Cornell University Press ISBN: 9780801472718 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 340
Book Description
No concept sparks more controversy in constitutional debate than "original intent." Offering a legal historian's approach to the subject, this book demonstrates that the framers deliberately obscured one of their more important decisions. Joseph M. Lynch argues that the Constitution was a product of political struggles involving regional interests, economic concerns, and ideology. The framers, he maintains, settled on enigmatic wording of the Necessary and Proper Clause and of the General Welfare provision in the Spending Clause as a compromise, leaving the extent of federal power to be determined by the political process. During ratification, however, attempts by dissident framers to undo the compromise were repelled in The Federalist: charges of overly broad congressional powers were met with protestations that in fact these powers were limited. Lynch describes how early lawmakers applied the Constitution to such issues as executive power and privilege, the deportation of aliens, and the prohibition of seditious speech. He follows the disputes over the interpretation of this document--focusing on James Madison's changing views--as the new government took shape and political parties were formed. Lynch points out that the first six Congresses and President George Washington disregarded the framers' intentions when they were deemed impractical to follow. In contrast, he warns that the version of original intent put forth in recent Supreme Court opinions regarding congressional power could hinder Congress in serving the nation.
Author: Sumit Bisarya and Thibaut Noel Publisher: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) ISBN: 9176714144 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 14
Book Description
Countries often amend their constitutions or enact new ones following major political events, such as the founding of newly independent states, the fall of an authoritarian regime or the end of violent conflict. Significant constitutional reform at a crucial moment is often a high-stakes process because a constitution regulates access to public power and resources among different groups. While disagreements over divisive topics are likely and even inherent to constitution-making, they may also result in a serious deadlock when stakeholders are unable to reach agreement. A prolonged deadlock can delay or even derail the whole reform process. In this context, it may be advisable to create incentives that can help parties to the negotiations overcome divergence and resolve deadlocks should they occur. This Constitution Brief focuses on strategies and mechanisms for breaking a deadlock in constitutional negotiations conducted in an environment of competitive democratic politics.
Author: Andrew Coan Publisher: Harvard University Press ISBN: 0674986954 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 281
Book Description
In this groundbreaking analysis of Supreme Court decision-making, Andrew Coan explains how judicial caseload shapes the course of American constitutional law and the role of the Court in American society. Compared with the vast machinery surrounding Congress and the president, the Supreme Court is a tiny institution that can resolve only a small fraction of the constitutional issues that arise in any given year. Rationing the Constitution shows that this simple yet frequently ignored fact is essential to understanding how the Supreme Court makes constitutional law. Due to the structural organization of the judiciary and certain widely shared professional norms, the capacity of the Supreme Court to review lower-court decisions is severely limited. From this fact, Andrew Coan develops a novel and arresting theory of Supreme Court decision-making. In deciding cases, the Court must not invite more litigation than it can handle. On many of the most important constitutional questions—touching on federalism, the separation of powers, and individual rights—this constraint creates a strong pressure to adopt hard-edged categorical rules, or defer to the political process, or both. The implications for U.S. constitutional law are profound. Lawyers, academics, and social activists pursuing social reform through the courts must consider whether their goals can be accomplished within the constraints of judicial capacity. Often the answer will be no. The limits of judicial capacity also substantially constrain the Court’s much touted—and frequently lamented—power to overrule democratic majorities. As Rationing the Constitution demonstrates, the Supreme Court is David, not Goliath.
Author: Deepak Malhotra Publisher: Berrett-Koehler Publishers ISBN: 1626566992 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 295
Book Description
“Filled with great strategies you can immediately put to use in your business and personal lives . . . extremely entertaining, thought-provoking.” —Tyra Banks, CEO, TYRA Beauty, and creator of America’s Next Top Model Some negotiations are easy. Others are more difficult. And then there are situations that seem completely hopeless. Conflict is escalating, people are getting aggressive, and no one is willing to back down. And to top it off, you have little power or other resources to work with. Harvard professor and negotiation adviser Deepak Malhotra shows how to defuse even the most potentially explosive situations and to find success when things seem impossible. Malhotra identifies three broad approaches for breaking deadlocks and resolving conflicts, and draws out scores of actionable lessons using behind-the-scenes stories of fascinating real-life negotiations, including drafting of the US Constitution, resolving the Cuban Missile Crisis, ending bitter disputes in the NFL and NHL, and beating the odds in complex business situations. But he also shows how these same principles and tactics can be applied in everyday life, whether you are making corporate deals, negotiating job offers, resolving business disputes, tackling obstacles in personal relationships, or even negotiating with children. As Malhotra reminds us, regardless of the context or which issues are on the table, negotiation is always, fundamentally, about human interaction. No matter how high the stakes or how protracted the dispute, the object of negotiation is to engage with other human beings in a way that leads to better understandings and agreements. The principles and strategies in this book will help you do this more effectively in every situation. “This book is magic for any deal maker.” —Daniel H. Pink, New York Times-bestselling author
Author: Andrew Arato Publisher: Columbia University Press ISBN: 0231143028 Category : History Languages : en Pages : 376
Book Description
The attempt in 2004 to draft an interim constitution in Iraq and the effort to enact a permanent one in 2005 were unintended outcomes of the American occupation, which first sought to impose a constitution by its agents. This two-stage constitution-making paradigm, implemented in a wholly unplanned move by the Iraqis and their American sponsors, formed a kind of compromise between the populist-democratic project of Shi'ite clerics and America's external interference. As long as it was used in a coherent and legitimate way, the method held promise. Unfortunately, the logic of external imposition and political exclusion compromised the negotiations. Andrew Arato is the first person to record this historic process and analyze its special problems. He compares the drafting of the Iraqi constitution to similar, externally imposed constitutional revolutions by the United States, especially in Japan and Germany, and identifies the political missteps that contributed to problems of learning and legitimacy. Instead of claiming that the right model of constitution making would have maintained stability in Iraq, Arato focuses on the fragile opportunity for democratization that was strengthened only slightly by the methods used to draft a constitution. Arato contends that this event would have benefited greatly from an overall framework of internationalization, and he argues that a better set of guidelines (rather than the obsolete Hague and Geneva regulations) should be followed in the future. With access to an extensive body of literature, Arato highlights the difficulty of exporting democracy to a country that opposes all such foreign designs and fundamentally disagrees on matters of political identity.
Author: George Anderson Publisher: Oxford University Press ISBN: 0192573616 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 556
Book Description
This collection of essays surveys the full range of challenges that territorial conflicts pose for constitution-making processes and constitutional design. It provides seventeen in-depth case studies of countries going through periods of intense constitutional engagement in a variety of contexts: small distinct territories, bi-communal countries, highly diverse countries with many politically salient regions, and countries where territorial politics is important but secondary to other bases for political mobilization. Specific examples are drawn from Iraq, Kenya, Cyprus, Nigeria, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the UK (Scotland), Ukraine, Bolivia, India, Spain, Yemen, Nepal, Ethiopia, Indonesia (Aceh), the Philippines (Mindanao), and Bosnia-Herzegovina. While the volume draws significant normative conclusions, it is based on a realist view of the complexity of territorial and other political cleavages (the country's "political geometry"), and the power configurations that lead into periods of constitutional engagement. Thematic chapters on constitution-making processes and constitutional design draw original conclusions from the comparative analysis of the case studies and relate these to the existing literature, both in political science and comparative constitutional law. This volume is essential reading for scholars of federalism, consociational power-sharing arrangements, asymmetrical devolution, and devolution more generally. The combination of in-depth case studies and broad thematic analysis allows for analytical and normative conclusions that will be of major relevance to practitioners and advisors engaged in constitutional design.
Author: Joseph M. Lynch
Author: Joseph M. Lynch
Author: Sumit Bisarya and Thibaut Noel
Author: Andrew Coan
Author: Deepak Malhotra
Author: Vivien Hart
Author: Andrew Arato
Author: Paul R. Williams
Author: Zeynep Yanasmayan
Author: George Anderson
Author: Michele Brandt