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Author: Delina Agnosteva Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 94
Book Description
We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint. Importantly, trade costs affect cartel shipments and welfare not only directly but also indirectly through discipline. Using extensive data on international cartels, we find that trade costs exert a negative and significant effect on cartel discipline. In turn, cartel discipline has a negative and significant impact on trade flows, in line with the model.
Author: Delina Agnosteva Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 94
Book Description
We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint. Importantly, trade costs affect cartel shipments and welfare not only directly but also indirectly through discipline. Using extensive data on international cartels, we find that trade costs exert a negative and significant effect on cartel discipline. In turn, cartel discipline has a negative and significant impact on trade flows, in line with the model.
Author: Delina Emilova Agnosteva Publisher: ISBN: Category : Cartels Languages : en Pages : 422
Book Description
My dissertation studies the links between international cartels and international trade both theoretically and empirically. In the first section of my dissertation, I examine the implications of collusion for trade and welfare in the context of two different theoretical frameworks. First, I build a quantity-setting duopoly model of multi-product firms which interact repeatedly in national markets separated by trade costs to study the impact of collusion on trade and welfare. Each firm produces two goods but has a competitive cost advantage in one. In this setting, an international cartel can choose to shut down production of the inefficiently produced good and import it instead, and thus, can promote trade relative to competition. Further, the cartel extracts surplus by exploiting its market power, but also generates efficiency gains by rationalizing production and trade. Therefore, maximal collusion can welfare-dominate Cournot competition regardless of whether trade costs take the form of transportation costs or import tariffs. Second, I construct a multi-market duopoly model to study the consequences of economic integration for collusive discipline, optimal shipments, and welfare. Firms interact repeatedly in quantities in each other's home markets as well as in third-country markets. When the no-deviation constraint is active, national markets become strategically linked and thus internal and external trade liberalization affects output deliveries and welfare levels in all countries. I characterize the dependence of collusive stability and cartel discipline on trade costs and relative market size. I derive novel results regarding the impact of economic integration on national welfare. For instance, the analysis shows that regional trade liberalization can hurt all countries and the absence of internal trade might be welfare-superior to free internal trade to all nations. In the second chapter, I describe the novel data on international cartels that I have hand-collected. The cartel data cover 173 international cartels and include information on the exact duration of the cartels, the countries of nationality of the cartel-members, as well as the 6-digit product code of the goods subject to collusive activities. Moreover, the data contain various cartel characteristics pertaining to the instruments of collusion (i.e., price-fixing, bid-rigging, sales quotas) as well as details on the practices adopted by the cartel members and the scope of collusion (i.e., cartel's market share). I merge the cartel dataset with the most disaggregated trade data available, standard proxies for trade costs, and product substitutability. In the last chapter, I analyze the empirical linkages between cartels and trade. First, I find that the average effect of cartels on trade is positive and significant. With regards to the effects of multi-product collusion on bilateral trade, the results show that the impact of multi-product cartels on trade is positive, significant and statistically larger than the effect of single-product cartels, consistent with my model. The positive and significant impact of multi-product cartels on trade becomes more pronounced when the goods are sufficiently unrelated, in line with the theoretical model. Moreover, I propose a two-stage estimation procedure to examine empirically 1) the relations between cartel discipline and (internal and external) trade costs; 2) the relation between (internal and external) trade and cartel discipline. As predicted by the theory, both internal trade costs and external trade costs are inversely related to collusive discipline. Using the first-stage estimates, I construct different measures of cartel discipline, and in the second-stage analysis I find the effect of cartel discipline on both internal and external trade to be negative and significant, in line with the theoretical predictions.
Author: Alla Pozdnakova Publisher: Kluwer Law International B.V. ISBN: 9041127178 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 494
Book Description
As of October 2008, liner shipping companies lose their privileged status under EU competition law due to withdrawal of the liner conference block exemption, which generously authorized horizontal price-fixing and similar agreements between liner shipping companies. Where the liner consortia block exemption does not apply, all cooperative activity should be carefully and individually assessed under the competition provisions of the EC Treaty. Alla Pozdnakova has taken this opportunity to research and write an in-depth study of competition law problems in the liner shipping context. Her analysis is not only the first to examine the new European regime, and thus the most up-to-date study of the subject; it is in fact the first major independent study of how Articles 81 and 82 EC are construed and applied to the market conduct of liner shipping companies. In particular, the author addresses the following legal questions: * Does cooperation between liner shipping companies infringe Article 81(1) even if it does not entail hard-core restrictions of competition? * Can a cooperative arrangement between liner shipping companies claim that the efficiencies they produce outweigh the negative impact on competition (Article 81(3))? * When do certain market strategies of liner carriers become an abuse of a collective or individual dominant position (Article 82)? * Does parallel pricing behaviour infringe EC Treaty competition rules? Systematically, the author considers various market strategies of liner shipping companies and tests them as to their compatibility with EC Treaty competition provisions. In doing so, she thoroughly analyses European Commission decisions and judgments of the European courts, applying them authoritatively to the liner shipping sector. In this way, her book provides a well-structured account that clearly identifies the legal issues that liner shipping companies are likely to face once the special treatment traditionally allowed them is withdrawn. A summary of current and prospective developments in EU competition regulation and policy in liner shipping rounds up the analysis. Liner Shipping and EU Competition Law will be a unique and powerful resource for practitioners and policymakers as liner shipping companies restructure their agreements and market strategies to accommodate loss of the block exemption. It is also sure to become a definitive analysis of the legal identity of the liner shipping market sector under European competition law.
Author: Mr.Marco Airaudo Publisher: International Monetary Fund ISBN: 1498343724 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 34
Book Description
We explore the stability properties of interest rate rules granting an explicit response to stock prices in a New-Keynesian DSGE model populated by Blanchard-Yaari non-Ricardian households. The constant turnover between long-time stock holders and asset-poor newcomers generates a financial wealth channel where the wedge between current and expected future aggregate consumption is affected by the market value of financial wealth, making stock prices non-redundant for the business cycle. We find that if the financial wealth channel is sufficiently strong, responding to stock prices enlarges the policy space for which the rational expectations equilibrium is both determinate and learnable (in the E-stability sense of Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). In particular, the Taylor principle ceases to be necessary and also mildly passive policy responses to inflation lead to determinacy and E-stability. Our results appear to be more prominent in economies characterized by a lower elasticity of substitution across differentiated products and/or more rigid labor markets.
Author: Bruce A. Blonigen Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing ISBN: 1785366157 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 719
Book Description
International trade has grown rapidly over the past half century, accommodated by the transportation industry through concomitant growth and technological change. But while the connection between transport and trade flows is clear, the academic literature often looks at these two issues separately. This Handbook is unique in pulling together the key insights of each field while highlighting what we know about their intersection and ideas for future research in this relatively unexamined but growing area of study.
Author: Michael Dennis Whinston Publisher: ISBN: Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 272
Book Description
Antitrust law regulates economic activity but differs in its operation from what is traditionally considered "regulation." Where regulation is often industry-specific and involves the direct setting of prices, product characteristics, or entry, antitrust law focuses more broadly on maintaining certain basic rules of competition. In these lectures Michael Whinston offers an accessible and lucid account of the economics behind antitrust law, looking at some of the most recent developments in antitrust economics and highlighting areas that require further research. He focuses on three areas: price fixing, in which competitors agree to restrict output or raise price; horizontal mergers, in which competitors agree to merge their operations; and exclusionary vertical contracts, in which a competitor seeks to exclude a rival. Antitrust commentators widely regard the prohibition on price fixing as the most settled and economically sound area of antitrust. Whinston's discussion seeks to unsettle this view, suggesting that some fundamental issues in this area are, in fact, not well understood. In his discussion of horizontal mergers, Whinston describes the substantial advances in recent theoretical and empirical work and suggests fruitful directions for further research. The complex area of exclusionary vertical contracts is perhaps the most controversial in antitrust. The influential "Chicago School" cast doubt on arguments that vertical contracts could be profitably used to exclude rivals. Recent theoretical work, to which Whinston has made important contributions, instead shows that such contracts can be profitable tools for exclusion. Whinston's discussion sheds light on the controversy in this area and the nature of those recent theoretical contributions. Sponsored by the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Author: United Nations Publisher: UN ISBN: 9789211304114 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 562
Book Description
The 2020 UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons is the fifth of its kind mandated by the General Assembly through the 2010 United Nations Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons. It covers more than 130 countries and provides an overview of patterns and flows of trafficking in persons at global, regional and national levels, based primarily on trafficking cases detected between 2017 and 2019. As UNODC has been systematically collecting data on trafficking in persons for more than a decade, trend information is presented for a broad range of indicators.
Author: Roger D. Blair Publisher: Oxford Handbooks ISBN: 0199388598 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 665
Book Description
More than any other area of regulation, antitrust economics shapes law and policy in the United States, the Americas, Europe, and Asia. In a number of different areas of antitrust, advances in theory and empirical work have caused a fundamental reevaluation and shift of some of the assumptions behind antitrust policy. This reevaluation has profound implications for the future of the field. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics has collected chapters from many of the leading figures in antitrust. In doing so, this two volume Handbook provides an important reference guide for scholars, teachers, and practitioners. However, it is more than a merely reference guide. Rather, it has a number of different goals. First, it takes stock of the current state of scholarship across a number of different antitrust topics. In doing so, it relies primarily upon the economics scholarship. In some situations, though, there is also coverage of legal scholarship, case law developments, and legal policies. The second goal of the Handbook is to provide some ideas about future directions of antitrust scholarship and policy. Antitrust economics has evolved over the last 60 years. It has both shaped policy and been shaped by policy. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics will serve as a policy and research guide of next steps to consider when shaping the future of the field of antitrust.
Author: Delina Agnosteva
Author: Delina Agnosteva
Author: Delina Emilova Agnosteva
Author: Alla Pozdnakova
Author: Mr.Marco Airaudo
Author: Bruce A. Blonigen
Author: Michael Dennis Whinston
Author: United Nations
Author: Roger D. Blair
Author: Steven C. Salop
Author: Dani Rodrik