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Author: Marcus Kirk Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 49
Book Description
The expectations management literature has so far focused on firms meeting the analyst consensus forecast -- the expectations of analysts as a group -- at earnings announcements. In this study we argue that investors may use individual analyst forecasts as additional benchmarks in evaluating reported earnings because the consensus forecast underutilizes private information contained in individual analyst forecasts. We predict that measures reflecting such private information have incremental explanatory power over the consensus forecast for the market's reaction to earnings news. We find results consistent with this prediction by examining two measures: (1) the percentage of individual forecasts met and (2) meeting the key analyst forecast. We extend the literature by documenting the role of individual analyst forecasts in investors' evaluations of reported earnings.
Author: Marcus Kirk Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 49
Book Description
The expectations management literature has so far focused on firms meeting the analyst consensus forecast -- the expectations of analysts as a group -- at earnings announcements. In this study we argue that investors may use individual analyst forecasts as additional benchmarks in evaluating reported earnings because the consensus forecast underutilizes private information contained in individual analyst forecasts. We predict that measures reflecting such private information have incremental explanatory power over the consensus forecast for the market's reaction to earnings news. We find results consistent with this prediction by examining two measures: (1) the percentage of individual forecasts met and (2) meeting the key analyst forecast. We extend the literature by documenting the role of individual analyst forecasts in investors' evaluations of reported earnings.
Author: Joshua Filzen Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 52
Book Description
We examine whether firms with greater financial statement complexity are more likely to meet or beat analysts' earnings expectations. We proxy for financial statement complexity using the firm's industry and year adjusted accounting policy disclosure length. Firms with more complex financial statements are more likely to just beat expectations than just miss expectations. Firms with complex financial statements appear to use expectations management to beat expectations, but do not use earnings management. Corroborating these findings, we find analysts rely more on management guidance for more complex firms. Firms with complex financial statements are also more likely to have analysts exclude items from actual 'street earnings', but tests suggest this strategy is not specifically used by complex firms to beat expectations. The effect we document is specific to analyst forecasts and not to other alternative benchmarks.
Author: Kai Wai Hui Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 50
Book Description
This study explores whether meeting or beating management forecasts is indicative of managerial talent. We find that the market reacts positively when firms meet or beat their management forecasts after controlling for meeting or beating analyst forecasts and management forecast errors. Further analyses reveal that firms meeting or beating management forecasts perform better in the future and are more likely to retain their CEOs. These findings suggest that meeting or beating management forecasts provides information on managerial talent, which is valued by investors. Next, we examine when management forecasts are distinct from analyst forecasts with respect to their indication of managerial talent. We find that the market premiums from meeting or beating management forecasts are positively associated with both firm-specific uncertainty and managers' firm-specific information advantages, while the market premiums from meeting or beating analyst forecasts are positively associated with analysts' macro-level information advantages.
Author: Wei Hsu (Ph.D.) Publisher: ISBN: Category : Business forecasting Languages : en Pages : 84
Book Description
I examine how firm-specific private and public information affect analyst forecast revisions. I find that when managers easily beat (struggle to meet) the consensus forecasts in the previous quarter, financial analysts revise their earnings forecasts upward (downward). The revision magnitudes are higher when there is more private information. Similarly, I find that when managers provide upward (downward) earnings guidance, analysts revise their forecasts upward (downward) more when there is more private information. In contrast, the revision magnitudes are lower when there is more public information. Additionally, I find that the magnitudes of analysts' downward revisions increase with private information prior to the stock option grant dates. I attribute these results to the analysts' dependence on managers in gleaning relevant private information. The effect of private information is smaller for firms covered by star analysts, consistent with star analysts acting as sophisticated skeptics and being more confident in their forecasts than other analysts. Further, for well-governed firms, upward revisions for positive earnings surprises are smaller when there is more private information. This is consistent with stronger governance attenuating analysts' concerns about firms' earnings quality, which in turn increases their reliance on public earnings numbers and reduces their need to accommodate managers for private information. Finally, I find that private information is negatively associated with target price forecast accuracy, and positively associated with target price forecast optimism. These results suggest that greater information asymmetry adversely affects forecast accuracy and creates incentives for analysts to appease managers to access private information.
Author: Timothy A. Seidel Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 69
Book Description
We examine whether managers appear to aggregate bias in multiple subjective accrual estimates to meet or just beat analyst expectations. We also consider whether the updated language in recent PCAOB auditing standards, focusing auditors on the potential for bias across multiple estimates, impacted this method of managing earnings. Using hand-collected data from a sample of manufacturing firms, we find that meeting or just beating the most recent consensus analyst earnings forecast is positively associated with income-increasing bias aggregated from multiple accounting estimates. We also find that this relation attenuates in the years following the issuance of PCAOB auditing standards focusing auditors on this issue. Further analyses reveal that after these standards were released, firms increased the use of income-increasing, unexpected non-GAAP exclusions to meet or just beat expectations, an alternative technique subject to less auditor scrutiny. Additionally, firms using bias from multiple accounting estimates after the updated guidance in these PCAOB standards do so using bias spread in smaller amounts across more individual estimates. These findings provide important insight into how managers use accruals to meet or just beat an important benchmark as well as the impact of PCAOB auditing standard updates on this earnings management practice.
Author: Quoc Tuan Quoc Ho Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
In this thesis, I study three aspects of sell-side analysts' stock price forecasts, henceforth target prices: analyst teams' target price forecast characteristics, analysts' use of information to revise target prices, and determinants of target price disagreement between analysts. The first essay studies the target price forecast performance of team analysts in the UK and finds that teams issue timelier but not less accurate target prices. Unlike evidence from previous studies, my findings suggest that analyst teamwork may improve forecast timeliness without sacrificing forecast accuracy. However, market reactions to team target price revisions are not significantly different from those to individual analyst target price revisions, suggesting that although target prices issued by analyst teams are timelier and not less accurate than those of individual analysts, investors do not consider analyst team target prices more informative. I conjecture that analysts may work in teams to meet the demand to cover more companies while maintaining the quality of research by individual team members rather than to issue more informative reports. In the second essay, I study how analysts revise their target prices in response to new information implicit in recent market returns, stock excess returns and other analysts' target price revisions. The results suggest that analysts' target price revisions are significantly influenced by market returns, stock excess return and other analysts' target price revisions. I also find that the correlation between target price revisions and stock excess returns is significantly higher when the news implicit in these returns is bad rather than good. I conjecture that analysts discover more bad news from the information in stock excess returns because firms tend to withhold bad news, disclosing it only when it becomes inevitable, while they disclose good news early. Using a new measure of bad to good news concentration, I show that the asymmetric responsiveness of target price revisions to positive and negative stock excess returns is significant for firms with the highest concentration of bad news but is insignificant for firms with the lowest concentration of bad news. I argue that firms with the highest concentration of bad news are more likely to withhold and accumulate bad news. The findings, therefore, support my hypothesis that analysts discover more bad news than good news from stock returns because firms tend to withhold bad news, disclosing it only when it is inevitable. The third essay examines the determinants of analyst target price disagreement. I find that while disagreement in short-term earnings and in long-term earnings growth forecasts are significant determinants, recent 12-month idiosyncratic return volatility has the strongest explanatory power for target price disagreement. The findings suggest that target price disagreement is driven not only by analyst disagreement about short-term earnings and long-term earnings growth, but also by differences in analysts' opinions about the impact of recent firm-specific events on value drivers beyond short-term future earnings and long-term growth, which are eventually reflected in past idiosyncratic return volatility.
Author: Tom Copeland Publisher: Wiley ISBN: 0471753645 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 448
Book Description
CEOs and managers live and die by delivering superior performance to shareholders. This is why expectations-based management has been developed. Outperform with Expectations-Based Management (EBM) introduces a revolutionary new performance metric that links performance standards, performance measurement, and the achievement of performance. It's easy to say that if a CEO can get performance measurement right, then performance improvement will follow. But what is the "right" measure of performance, and how do you use it to improve performance? Authors Tom Copeland and Aaron Dolgoff answer these questions and many more, as they show you how to find the measure of performance that has the strongest link to the creation of wealth for the owners of both public and private companies. They answer the puzzle of why growth in earnings is not correlated with shareholder returns and explain the under- and over-investment traps. And they explain how clear communications to investors and managers alike improve value. The bottom line is that share prices go up when companies exceed expectations -- short-term and long-term -- of income statement and balance sheet performance and daily operating value drivers. Gain a complete understanding of EBM and discover how to do this, and much more, while staying competitive in an unforgiving business environment.
Author: Kai Wai Hui Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 53
Book Description
This study documents a stock return premium for meeting or beating management's own earnings forecasts (MBMF) that is separate and distinct from the premium for meeting or beating analysts' earnings forecasts (MBAF) documented in prior literature. Cross-sectional analyses reveal that the MBMF premium relative to the MBAF premium increases when management forecasts are historically more accurate and are released closer to earnings announcement dates. We also find that MBMF is incrementally informative about a firm's future performance, CEO turnover, and forecast accuracy after considering MBAF. Our findings suggest that investors consider management earnings forecasts as an additional performance metric, along with analyst earnings forecasts, when forming earnings expectations.
Author: Marcus Kirk
Author: Marcus Kirk
Author: Joshua Filzen
Author: Kai Wai Hui
Author: Phyllis S. McGrath
Author: Dong Hyun Son
Author: Wei Hsu (Ph.D.)
Author: Timothy A. Seidel
Author: Quoc Tuan Quoc Ho
Author: Tom Copeland
Author: Kai Wai Hui