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Author: Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt Publisher: World Bank Publications ISBN: 2311540211 Category : Banks and banking Languages : en Pages : 52
Book Description
It is difficult to design and implement an effective safety net for banks, because overgenerous protection of banks may introduce a risk-enhancing moral hazard and destabilize the very system it is meant to protect. The safety net that policymakers design must provide the right mix of market and regulatory discipline, enough to protect depositors without unduly undermining market discipline on banks.
Author: Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt Publisher: World Bank Publications ISBN: 2311540211 Category : Banks and banking Languages : en Pages : 52
Book Description
It is difficult to design and implement an effective safety net for banks, because overgenerous protection of banks may introduce a risk-enhancing moral hazard and destabilize the very system it is meant to protect. The safety net that policymakers design must provide the right mix of market and regulatory discipline, enough to protect depositors without unduly undermining market discipline on banks.
Author: Asli Demirgüç-Kunt Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 44
Book Description
It is difficult to design and implement an effective safety net for banks, because overgenerous protection of banks may introduce a risk-enhancing moral hazard and destabilize the very system it is meant to protect. The safety net that policymakers design must provide the right mix of market and regulatory discipline - enough to protect depositors without unduly undermining market discipline on banks.There has been little empirical work on the effectiveness of safety nets designed for banks, for lack of data on safety net design across countries. Demirguuml;ccedil;-Kunt and Huizinga examine cross-country data on bank-level interest expense and deposit growth for evidence of market discipline in individual countries. In addition, using cross-country information on deposit insurance systems, they investigate the impact of explicit deposit insurance (and its key features) on bank interest rates and market discipline.They find that:middot; Many countries retain some degree of market discipline, regardless of the type of safety net.middot; The existence of explicit deposit insurance lowers banks' interest expenses and makes interest payments less sensitive to bank risk factors, especially bank liquidity.middot; Higher explicit coverage, broader coverage, and the existence of an earmarked insurance fund increase required-deposit rates and reduce market discipline.middot; Government provision of funds lowers deposit rates but also reduces market discipline.middot; Private (especially joint) management of insurance schemes lowers deposit rates and improves market discipline.This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study deposit insurance. The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].
Author: Edward J. Kane Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 63
Book Description
Kane explains how differences in the informational and contracting environments of countries affect the optimal design of their financial safety nets and their optimal strategies for managing financial crises. He explains how to design and operate safety nets at minimum cost to taxpayers and well-managed banks in countries whose informational and contracting technologies differ. His basic premise is that optimal regulation is not a one-size-fits-all proposition.A country's safety net should be transparent, deterrent to too much risk-taking, and accountable, but Kane shows large differences across countries in the transparency and deterrence banks afford their depositors, highlighting why the design of safety nets must allow for differences in the enforceability of private contracts.The weaker a country's informational, ethical, and corporate governance environment, the more a wholly governmental system of explicit deposit guarantees is apt to undermine bank safety and stability. How a country`s safety net evolves depends on the ability of the private and public sectors to value banks, discipline risk-taking, and resolve financial difficulties promptly. And political accountability is essential if the public part of these tasks is to evolve effectively and efficiently.As a rule of thumb, safety-net managers should avoid either subsidizing or taxing bank risk-taking, says Kane. Even if analysts could formulate a beneficial tax or subsidy rule, it is unlikely that channeling the effect through a government-run deposit insurance system that fails to account publicly for the size of taxpayers' stake could improve upon more straightforward arrangements.This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to design financial safety nets for developing countries. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Deposit Insurance (RPO 682-90). The author may be contacted at [email protected].
Author: Edward James Kane Publisher: ISBN: Category : Banks and banking Languages : en Pages : 72
Book Description
For optimal regulation, one size does not fit all. Differences in countries' informational and contracting environments (in the transparency of information, in protection for counterparties, and in political accountability), influence the design of their financial safety nets and their strategies for managing the breakdown of those nets.
Author: C. E. V. Borio Publisher: MIT Press ISBN: 9780262025751 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 472
Book Description
Leading academics and policymakers address the theory of market discipline and consider evidence across different industries and countries. The effectiveness of market discipline -- the strong built-in incentives that encourage banks and financial systems to operate soundly and efficiently -- commands much attention today, particularly in light of recent accounting scandals. As government discipline, in the form of regulation, seems to grows less effective as the banking industry and financial markets grow more complex, the role of market discipline becomes increasingly important. In this collection, which grew out of a conference cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, a diverse group of academics and policymakers address different aspects of the ability of market discipline to affect corporate behavior and performance. A major purpose of the book is to develop evidence on how market discipline operates across non-government regulated industries and in different countries, how successful it has been, and how it may transfer to a regulated industry. The chapters examine such topics as the theory of market discipline, evidence of market discipline in banking and other industries, evidence of market discipline for countries, the current state of corporate governance, and the interaction of market discipline and public policy.
Author: Charles W. Calomiris Publisher: American Enterprise Institute ISBN: 9780844771007 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 60
Book Description
Federal deposit insurance may be "the single most destabilizing influence in the financial system," says economist Charles W. Calomiris in a new study published by AEI. Market discipline provides a better bank safety net than government insurance, he concludes. The Postmodern Bank Safety Net: Lessons from Developed and Developing Economies shows how government deposit insurance subsidizes the risks taken by banks. Weak banks deliberately and sometimes with impunity take on greater risks than they can afford. Undue risk-taking would not be tolerated were private market discipline brought to bear on banks, Calomiris argues. Market discipline would place the regulatory burden on sophisticated market participants with their own money at stake-a bank would survive only if it had investors, and those investors would be willing to risk their money only if they were able to evaluate the bank's risk. Currently, banks that hide loan losses can avoid paying increased deposit insurance costs. At the same time, Calomiris says, government regulators lack strong incentive to determine the true risk characteristics of bank assets-government regulators do not have their own money at stake and they face political pressure to maintain the credit supply. The results can be calamitous. In the 1970s and 1980s the Farm Credit System was increasingly willing to lend against questionable collateral while private banks withdrew from the market as lending risk increased. The system failed, gripping U.S. farmers in a debt crisis. Similarly, the savings and loan failures and the oil-related bank collapses in Texas and Oklahoma of the 19080s can be attributed to the failure of the bank safety net. And Chile, Mexico, and Japan have suffered financial collapses because their governments protected banks from self-inflicted losses.
Author: Frederic S. Mishkin Publisher: University of Chicago Press ISBN: 0226531937 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 379
Book Description
Since banking systems play a crucial role in maintaining the overall health of the economy, the adverse effects of poorly supervised systems may be quite severe. Without some form of vigilant external oversight, banking systems could fall prey to excessive risk taking, moral hazard, and corruption. Prudential supervision provides that oversight, using government regulation and monitoring to ensure the soundness of the banking system and, by extension, the economy at large. The contributors to this thoughtful volume examine the current state of prudential supervision, focusing on fundamental issues and key pragmatic concerns. Why is prudential supervision so important? What kinds of excess must it guard against? What particular forms does it take? Which of these are the most effective deterrents against mismanagement and system overload in today's rapidly shifting financial climate? The contributors foresee a continued movement beyond simple regulatory rules in banking and toward a more active evaluation and supervision of a bank's risk management practices.
Author: Yong Tan Publisher: Chandos Publishing ISBN: 1780634463 Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 265
Book Description
Due to the financial crisis around the world, stability of the banking sector is critical. Several rounds of banking reforms in China have aimed to improve performance and competition, and Performance, Risk and Competition in the Chinese Banking Industry provides a comprehensive analysis of performance, risk, competition and their relationships in Chinese banking industry. The book consists of seven chapters: the first chapter gives an introduction, followed by an overview of the Chinese banking sector in chapter two. Chapter three discusses corporate governance in the Chinese banking sector. The fourth and fifth chapters investigate risk, performance, competition, and their relationships. Chapter six outlines future development of the Chinese banking sector, and finally, chapter seven provides a conclusion. Provides a comprehensive analysis of risk conditions in the Chinese banking sector A detailed investigation on the performance of the Chinese banking sector Examines the state of competition
Author: Richard Brearley Publisher: Routledge ISBN: 1134516355 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 329
Book Description
An overview of present day thought on the very topical subject of financial stability and central banking. The papers, written by leading researchers, provide a highly informed account of contemporary policy issues and explore the legal, regulatory, managerial and economic issues that affect central banks.
Author: Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt
Author: Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt
Author: Asli Demirgüç-Kunt
Author: Edward J. Kane
Author: Edward James Kane
Author: C. E. V. Borio
Author: Asli DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT
Author: Charles W. Calomiris
Author: Frederic S. Mishkin
Author: Yong Tan
Author: Richard Brearley