Author: David Stuart Scharfstein
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 240
Book Description
Market Competition and Incentives
Author: David Stuart Scharfstein
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 240
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 240
Book Description
Competition, Choice, and Incentives in Government Programs
Author: Albert Morales
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 9780742552135
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 502
Book Description
Since the 1980s, the language used around market-based government has muddied its meaning and polarized its proponents and critics, making the topic politicized and controversial. Competition, Choice, and Incentives in Government Programs hopes to reframe competing views of market-based government so it is seen not as an ideology but rather as a fact-based set of approaches for managing government services and programs more efficiently and effectively.
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 9780742552135
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 502
Book Description
Since the 1980s, the language used around market-based government has muddied its meaning and polarized its proponents and critics, making the topic politicized and controversial. Competition, Choice, and Incentives in Government Programs hopes to reframe competing views of market-based government so it is seen not as an ideology but rather as a fact-based set of approaches for managing government services and programs more efficiently and effectively.
Market Competition & Lower Tier Incentives
Individual Preferences, Organization, and Competition in a Model of R & D Incentive Provision
Author: Nicola Lacetera
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 33
Book Description
Abstract: Understanding the organization of R & D activities requires the simultaneous consideration of scientific workers' talent and tastes, companies' organizational choices, and the characteristics of the relevant industry. We develop a model of the provision of incentives to corporate scientists, in an environment where (1) scientists engage in multiple activities when performing research; (2) knowledge is not perfectly appropriable; (3) scientists are responsive to both monetary and non-monetary incentives; and (4) firms compete on the product market. We show that both the degree of knowledge spillovers and of market competition affect the incentives given to scientists, and these effects interact. First, high knowledge spillovers lead firms to soften incentives when product market competition is high, and to strengthen incentives when competition is low. Second, the relationship between the intensity of competition and the power of incentives is U-shaped, with the exact shape depending on the degree of knowledge spillovers. We also show that the performance-contingent pay for both applied and basic research increases with the non-pecuniary benefits that scientists obtain from research. We relate our findings to the existing empirical research, and also discuss their implications for management and public policy.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 33
Book Description
Abstract: Understanding the organization of R & D activities requires the simultaneous consideration of scientific workers' talent and tastes, companies' organizational choices, and the characteristics of the relevant industry. We develop a model of the provision of incentives to corporate scientists, in an environment where (1) scientists engage in multiple activities when performing research; (2) knowledge is not perfectly appropriable; (3) scientists are responsive to both monetary and non-monetary incentives; and (4) firms compete on the product market. We show that both the degree of knowledge spillovers and of market competition affect the incentives given to scientists, and these effects interact. First, high knowledge spillovers lead firms to soften incentives when product market competition is high, and to strengthen incentives when competition is low. Second, the relationship between the intensity of competition and the power of incentives is U-shaped, with the exact shape depending on the degree of knowledge spillovers. We also show that the performance-contingent pay for both applied and basic research increases with the non-pecuniary benefits that scientists obtain from research. We relate our findings to the existing empirical research, and also discuss their implications for management and public policy.
Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition
Author: Klaus M. Schmidt
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Incentives in industry
Languages : en
Pages : 34
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Incentives in industry
Languages : en
Pages : 34
Book Description
Information, Incentives and the Economics of Control
Author: G. C. Archibald
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521330459
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 191
Book Description
This 1992 book examines alternative methods for achieving optimality without all the apparatus of economic planning (such as information retrieval, computation of solutions, and separate implementation systems), or a vain reliance on sufficiently 'perfect' competition. All rely entirely on the self-interest of economic agents and voluntary contract.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521330459
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 191
Book Description
This 1992 book examines alternative methods for achieving optimality without all the apparatus of economic planning (such as information retrieval, computation of solutions, and separate implementation systems), or a vain reliance on sufficiently 'perfect' competition. All rely entirely on the self-interest of economic agents and voluntary contract.
Essays on managerial incentives and product-market competition
Author: Giancarlo Spagnolo
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789172585003
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 170
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789172585003
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 170
Book Description
Product Market Competition, Managerial Incentives, and Firm Valuation
Author: Stefan Beiner
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 53
Book Description
This paper contributes to the very small empirical literature on the effects of competition on managerial incentive schemes. Based on a theoretical model that incorporates both strategic interaction between firms and a principal agent relationship, we analyze the relationship between product market competition, incentive schemes and firm valuation. The model predicts a nonlinear relationship between the intensity of product market competition and the strength of managerial incentives. We test the implications of our model empirically based on a unique and hand-collected dataset comprising over 600 observations on 200 Swiss firms over the 2002 to 2005 period. Our results suggest that, consistent with the implications of our model, the relation between product market competition and managerial intensive schemes is convex indicating that above a certain level of intensity in product market competition, the marginal effect of competition on the strength of the incentive schemes increases in the level of competition. Moreover, competition is associated with lower firm values. These results are robust to accounting for a potential endogeneity of managerial incentives and firm value in a simultaneous equations framework.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 53
Book Description
This paper contributes to the very small empirical literature on the effects of competition on managerial incentive schemes. Based on a theoretical model that incorporates both strategic interaction between firms and a principal agent relationship, we analyze the relationship between product market competition, incentive schemes and firm valuation. The model predicts a nonlinear relationship between the intensity of product market competition and the strength of managerial incentives. We test the implications of our model empirically based on a unique and hand-collected dataset comprising over 600 observations on 200 Swiss firms over the 2002 to 2005 period. Our results suggest that, consistent with the implications of our model, the relation between product market competition and managerial intensive schemes is convex indicating that above a certain level of intensity in product market competition, the marginal effect of competition on the strength of the incentive schemes increases in the level of competition. Moreover, competition is associated with lower firm values. These results are robust to accounting for a potential endogeneity of managerial incentives and firm value in a simultaneous equations framework.
Knowledge and Incentives in Policy
Author: Stefanie Haeffele
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 1786603993
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 302
Book Description
This book, authored by public policy practitioners and researchers, tackle such pressing issues as public education, the process for approving medical devices, tax policy, and land use regulation.
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 1786603993
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 302
Book Description
This book, authored by public policy practitioners and researchers, tackle such pressing issues as public education, the process for approving medical devices, tax policy, and land use regulation.
Strategic Incentives for Innovations and Market Competition
Author: Evangelia Chalioti
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 22
Book Description
We consider a principal-agent model to provide a general analysis of how risk affects incentives of firms who invest in cost-reducing R&D and compete in the product market. We specify the conditions under which higher risk reduces incentives of all firms. We also examine the conditions under which an increase in risk may trigger opposite responses of rivals in the same industry: some firms will strengthen while other firms will weaken the incentives provided to their agents. This result holds regardless of the mode of competition in the product market, Cournot or Bertrand, as long as the rivals' R&D decisions are strategic substitutes. It can generate new empirical implications and can provide an explanation for the lack of strong empirical support in the literature for a negative relationship between risk and incentives. We also discuss policy implications regarding the effect of risk on the incentives to innovate and welfare.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 22
Book Description
We consider a principal-agent model to provide a general analysis of how risk affects incentives of firms who invest in cost-reducing R&D and compete in the product market. We specify the conditions under which higher risk reduces incentives of all firms. We also examine the conditions under which an increase in risk may trigger opposite responses of rivals in the same industry: some firms will strengthen while other firms will weaken the incentives provided to their agents. This result holds regardless of the mode of competition in the product market, Cournot or Bertrand, as long as the rivals' R&D decisions are strategic substitutes. It can generate new empirical implications and can provide an explanation for the lack of strong empirical support in the literature for a negative relationship between risk and incentives. We also discuss policy implications regarding the effect of risk on the incentives to innovate and welfare.