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Author: Davide Cianciaruso Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Firms sometimes obtain soft private information about growth prospects along with hard information about current or past performance. In this environment, we find that optimizing disclosures over multiple periods yields nonlinear stock price reactions following both voluntary and mandatory disclosures. Further, we derive several predictions about distinct short-run and long-run effects of disclosures and nondisclosures on security prices. Under specified conditions, when the volatility of the firm's earnings increases, the average contemporaneous and prospective post-mandatory-disclosure market premia (for voluntary disclosures over nondisclosures) rise, while farther-in-future market discounts (for such voluntary disclosures) also become larger. Our analysis moreover predicts that both the disclosure probability and the information content of nondisclosures can increase in the persistence of earnings.
Author: Davide Cianciaruso Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Firms sometimes obtain soft private information about growth prospects along with hard information about current or past performance. In this environment, we find that optimizing disclosures over multiple periods yields nonlinear stock price reactions following both voluntary and mandatory disclosures. Further, we derive several predictions about distinct short-run and long-run effects of disclosures and nondisclosures on security prices. Under specified conditions, when the volatility of the firm's earnings increases, the average contemporaneous and prospective post-mandatory-disclosure market premia (for voluntary disclosures over nondisclosures) rise, while farther-in-future market discounts (for such voluntary disclosures) also become larger. Our analysis moreover predicts that both the disclosure probability and the information content of nondisclosures can increase in the persistence of earnings.
Author: A. Mitchell Polinsky Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We analyze a model in which firms are able to acquire information about product risks and may or may not be required to disclose this information. We initially study the effect of disclosure rules assuming that firms are not liable for the harm caused by their products. Although mandatory disclosure obviously is superior to voluntary disclosure given the information about product risks that firms possess - since such information has value to consumers - voluntary disclosure induces firms to acquire more information about product risks because they can keep silent if the information is unfavorable. The latter effect could lead to higher social welfare under voluntary disclosure. The same results hold if firms are liable for harm under the negligence standard of liability. Under strict liability, however, firms are indifferent about revealing information concerning product risk, and mandatory and voluntary disclosure rules are equivalent.
Author: Michael J. Fishman Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Numerous rules mandate the disclosure of information. This article analyzes why such rules are enacted. Specifically, 1) why wouldn't firms voluntarily disclose their private information; and 2) given that voluntary disclosure would not be forthcoming, who has the incentive to lobby for mandatory disclosure rules? Previous analyses of disclosure assume that all customers understand the disclosures that can be made. A key result in these analyses is that there is no role for mandatory disclosure. Either voluntary disclosure is forthcoming or if it is not, no one is better off with mandatory disclosure. We analyze a market in which not all customers understand the disclosures that can be made. We show that if the fraction of customers who would understand a firm's disclosure is too low, then voluntary disclosure may not be forthcoming. In this case, mandatory disclosure benefits some (possibly all) customers and may also benefit firms. Thus we identify a motive for someone to lobby for such rules. Our results suggest that we should find mandatory disclosure rules with regard to information that is relatively difficult to understand.
Author: Nisan Langberg Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 42
Book Description
We analyze the voluntary disclosure decision of a manager when analysts scrutinize the quality of disclosure. We derive an equilibrium in which managers voluntarily disclose unfavorable information only if sufficiently precise, but disclose favorable news with lower levels of accuracy. We show that analysts cover good news disclosures with higher scrutiny. To the extent analysts rely on mandatory financial reports to interpret voluntary disclosures, we show that more precise financial reports may lead to more precise but less frequent voluntary disclosures. Moreover, a slant toward conservatism in financial reports can lead to less precise yet more frequent voluntary disclosures.
Author: Judith Seddon Publisher: Law Business Research Ltd. ISBN: 1912377837 Category : Languages : en Pages : 987
Book Description
There's never been a greater likelihood a company and its key people will become embroiled in a cross-border investigation. But emerging unscarred is a challenge. Local laws and procedures on corporate offences differ extensively - and can be contradictory. To extricate oneself with minimal cost requires a nuanced ability to blend understanding of the local law with the wider dimension and, in particular, to understand where the different countries showing an interest will differ in approach, expectations or conclusions. Against this backdrop, GIR has published the second edition of The Practitioner's Guide to Global Investigation. The book is divided into two parts with chapters written exclusively by leading names in the field. Using US and UK practice and procedure, Part I tracks the development of a serious allegation (whether originating inside or outside a company) - looking at the key risks that arise and the challenges it poses, along with the opportunities for its resolution. It offers expert insight into fact-gathering (including document preservation and collection, witness interviews); structuring the investigation (the complexities of cross-border privilege issues); and strategising effectively to resolve cross-border probes and manage corporate reputation.Part II features detailed comparable surveys of the relevant law and practice in jurisdictions that build on many of the vital issues pinpointed in Part I.
Author: Sunita Sah Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 28
Book Description
Professionals face conflicts-of-interest when they have a personal interest in giving biased advice. Mandatory disclosure -- informing consumers of the conflict -- is a widely adopted strategy in numerous professions, such as medicine, finance, and accounting. Prior research has, however, shown that such disclosures have little impact on consumer behavior, and can backfire by leading advisors to give even more biased advice. We present results from three experiments with real monetary stakes which show that, although disclosure has generally been found to be ineffective for dealing with unavoidable conflicts-of-interest, it can be beneficial when providers have the ability to avoid conflicts. Mandatory and voluntary disclosure can deter advisors from accepting conflicts-of-interest so they have nothing to disclose except the absence of conflicts. To explain these results, we propose that people are averse to being viewed as biased, and policies designed to activate reputational and ethical concerns will motivate advisors to avoid conflicts-of-interest.
Author: Davide Cianciaruso
Author: Davide Cianciaruso
Author: Mark Edward Bagnoli
Author: 邱紫庭
Author: A. Mitchell Polinsky
Author: Michael J. Fishman
Author: Nisan Langberg
Author: Judith Seddon
Author: Sunita Sah
Author: H. Boshnak
Author: Jong Chool Park