Is Weapon System Cost Growth Increasing? PDF Download

Author: Obaid Younossi
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833041355
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 142

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Book Description
In recent decades, there have been numerous attempts to rein in the cost growth of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition programs. Cost growth is the ratio of the cost estimate reported in a program's final Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) and the cost-estimate baseline reported in a prior SAR issued at a particular milestone. Drawing on prior RAND research, new analyses of completed and ongoing weapon system programs, and data drawn from SARs, this study addresses the following questions: What is the cost growth of DoD weapon systems? What has been the trend of cost growth over the past three decades? To address the magnitude of cost growth, it examines cost growth in completed programs; to evaluate the cost growth trend over time, it provides additional analysis of a selection of ongoing programs. This sample of ongoing programs permits a look at growth trends in the more recent past. Changes in the mix of system types over time and dollar-weighted analysis were also considered because earlier studies have suggested that cost growth varies by program type and the cost of the program. The findings suggest that development cost growth over the past three decades has remained high and without any significant improvement.

Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
Cost growth in DoD acquisition programs has been a long-standing concern of senior policymakers and members of Congress. In recent decades, there have been numerous attempts to rein in this growth. Some changes involve reforms to the acquisition process, while others entail legislation. The RAND Corporation has a long history of studying cost growth in defense acquisition, with research reaching back to the 1950s.

Author: Joseph George Bolten
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833042890
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 117

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Book Description
Previous studies have shown that the Department of Defense (DoD) and the military departments have historically underestimated the cost of new weapon systems. Quantifying cost growth is important, but the larger issue is why cost growth occurs. To address that issue, this analysis uses data from Selected Acquisition Reports to examine 35 mature, but not necessarily complete, major defense acquisition programs similar to the type and complexity of those typically managed by the Air Force. The programs are first examined as a complete set, then Air Force and non-Air Force programs are analyzed separately to determine whether the causes of cost growth in the two groups differ. Four major sources of cost growth were identified: (1) errors in estimation and scheduling, (2) decisions made by the government, (3) financial matters, and (4) miscellaneous sources. Total (development plus procurement) cost growth, when measured as simple averages among the program set, is dominated by decisions, which account for more than two-thirds of the growth. Most decisions-related cost growth involves quantity changes (22 percent), requirements growth (13 percent), and schedule changes (9 percent). Cost estimation (10 percent) is the only large contributor in the errors category. Less than 4 percent of the overall cost growth is due to financial and miscellaneous causes. Because decisions involving changes in requirements, quantities, and production schedules dominate cost growth, program managers, service leadership, and Congress should look for ways to reduce changes in these areas.

Author: Rhys McCormick
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 1538140225
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 70

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Book Description
With the advent of the information age, both commercial industry and the Department of Defense are moving towards complex R&D-intensive systems over the simpler, mass-produced systems of the industrial age. This CSIS report analyzes the historical trends in the relationship of production costs to development costs in complex acquisition programs. To understand this phenomenon, the study team examines it at two different levels. The first is the macro investment level where portfolio management trade-offs are made between aggregate development and procurement and between programs. The second level is individual programs where the ambitions of the program and the underlying technology shape the resources required for a program to complete development.

Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 168

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Book Description

Author: Matthew S. Goldberg
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437924352
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 23

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Book Description
This testimony is an analyses of DoD¿s budget requests and preliminary projections for FY 2011 through 2028. Those projections are based in part on the President¿s 2010 budget request and budget justification materials the Admin. provided to the Congress with that request. Among the other sources consulted to supplement this analysis were DoD press releases and briefing materials and the Sec. of Defense¿s announcement in April 2009 of changes to the nation¿s defense plans. The long-term demand for defense resources could be larger than the auditor¿s base projections. The auditor estimates that supporting the number of deployed service members would require recurring annual appropriations of about $20 billion in 2010 dollars. Illus.

Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Budget
Languages : en
Pages : 124

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Book Description

Author: Francois Melese
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 131753171X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 325

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Book Description
This is the first comprehensive book on Military Cost-Benefit Analysis and provides novel approaches to structuring cost-benefit and affordability analysis amidst an uncertain defense environment and cloudy fiscal prospects. Lifting the veil on military Cost-Benefit Analysis, this volume offers several new practical tools designed to guide defense investments (and divestments), combined with a selection of real-world applications. The widespread employment of Cost-Benefit Analysis offers a unique opportunity to transform legacy defense forces into efficient, effective, and accountable 21st century organizations. A synthesis of economics, statistics and decision theory, CBA is currently used in a wide range of defense applications in countries around the world: i) to shape national security strategy, ii) to set acquisition policy, and iii) to inform critical investments in people, equipment, infrastructure, services and supplies. As sovereign debt challenges squeeze national budgets, and emerging threats disrupt traditional notions of security, this volume offers valuable tools to navigate the political landscape, meet calls for fiscal accountability, and boost the effectiveness of defense investments to help guarantee future peace and stability. A valuable resource for scholars, practitioners, novices and experts, this book offers a comprehensive overview of Military Cost-Benefit Analysis and will appeal to anyone interested or involved in improving national security, and will also be of general interest to those responsible for major government programs, projects or policies.

Author: Peter Wijninga
Publisher: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
ISBN: 9491040804
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 53

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Book Description
The Royal Netherlands Air Force should invest in a mix of weapons systems to facilitate joint operations. Observation and prolonged surveillance is becoming an important task. Strategic cooperation with R&D institutes and the aerospace industry is crucial. The importance of air power lies in creating conditions for successful performance of sea, land, and air forces. Observation and prolonged surveillance will become a main task of the Air Force. Rapid technological developments in the use of unmanned systems and space resources are making this increasingly feasible and affordable.

Author: Ashley Townshend
Publisher: United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney
ISBN: 1742104738
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 104

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Book Description
America no longer enjoys military primacy in the Indo-Pacific and its capacity to uphold a favourable balance of power is increasingly uncertain. The combined effect of ongoing wars in the Middle East, budget austerity, underinvestment in advanced military capabilities and the scale of America’s liberal order-building agenda has left the US armed forces ill-prepared for great power competition in the Indo-Pacific. America’s 2018 National Defense Strategy aims to address this crisis of strategic insolvency by tasking the Joint Force to prepare for one great power war, rather than multiple smaller conflicts, and urging the military to prioritise requirements for deterrence vis-à-vis China. Chinese counter-intervention systems have undermined America’s ability to project power into the Indo-Pacific, raising the risk that China could use limited force to achieve a fait accompli victory before America can respond; and challenging US security guarantees in the process. For America, denying this kind of aggression places a premium on advanced military assets, enhanced posture arrangements, new operational concepts and other costly changes. While the Pentagon is trying to focus on these challenges, an outdated superpower mindset in the foreign policy establishment is likely to limit Washington’s ability to scale back other global commitments or make the strategic trade-offs required to succeed in the Indo-Pacific. Over the next decade, the US defence budget is unlikely to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy owing to a combination of political, fiscal and internal pressures. The US defence budget has been subjected to nearly a decade of delayed and unpredictable funding. Repeated failures by Congress to pass regular and sustained budgets has hindered the Pentagon’s ability to effectively allocate resources and plan over the long term. Growing partisanship and ideological polarisation — within and between both major parties in Congress — will make consensus on federal spending priorities hard to achieve. Lawmakers are likely to continue reaching political compromises over America’s national defence at the expense of its strategic objectives. America faces growing deficits and rising levels of public debt; and political action to rectify these challenges has so far been sluggish. If current trends persist, a shrinking portion of the federal budget will be available for defence, constraining budget top lines into the future. Above-inflation growth in key accounts within the defence budget — such as operations and maintenance — will leave the Pentagon with fewer resources to grow the military and acquire new weapons systems. Every year it becomes more expensive to maintain the same sized military. America has an atrophying force that is not sufficiently ready, equipped or postured for great power competition in the Indo-Pacific — a challenge it is working hard to address. Twenty years of near-continuous combat and budget instability has eroded the readiness of key elements in the US Air Force, Navy, Army and Marine Corps. Military accidents have risen, aging equipment is being used beyond its lifespan and training has been cut. Some readiness levels across the Joint Force are improving, but structural challenges remain. Military platforms built in the 1980s are becoming harder and more costly to maintain; while many systems designed for great power conflict were curtailed in the 2000s to make way for the force requirements of Middle Eastern wars — leading to stretched capacity and overuse. The military is beginning to field and experiment with next-generation capabilities. But the deferment or cancellation of new weapons programs over the last few decades has created a backlog of simultaneous modernisation priorities that will likely outstrip budget capacity. Many US and allied operating bases in the Indo-Pacific are exposed to possible Chinese missile attack and lack hardened infrastructure. Forward deployed munitions and supplies are not set to wartime requirements and, concerningly, America’s logistics capability has steeply declined. New operational concepts and novel capabilities are being tested in the Indo-Pacific with an eye towards denying and blunting Chinese aggression. Some services, like the Marine Corps, plan extensive reforms away from counterinsurgency and towards sea control and denial. A strategy of collective defence is fast becoming necessary as a way of offsetting shortfalls in America’s regional military power and holding the line against rising Chinese strength. To advance this approach, Australia should: Pursue capability aggregation and collective deterrence with capable regional allies and partners, including the United States and Japan. Reform US-Australia alliance coordination mechanisms to focus on strengthening regional deterrence objectives. Rebalance Australian defence resources from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific. Establish new, and expand existing, high-end military exercises with allies and partners to develop and demonstrate new operational concepts for Indo-Pacific contingencies. Acquire robust land-based strike and denial capabilities. Improve regional posture, infrastructure and networked logistics, including in northern Australia. Increase stockpiles and create sovereign capabilities in the storage and production of precision munitions, fuel and other materiel necessary for sustained high-end conflict. Establish an Indo-Pacific Security Workshop to drive US-allied joint operational concept development. Advance joint experimental research and development projects aimed at improving the cost-capability curve.