Author: Todd Davies Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Stanford students were shown hypothetical preference profiles involving 3 to 5 voters and 2 to 6 alternatives. Profiles were constructed to test subjects' adherence to two related social choice criteria implicated in Arrow's impossibility theorem: inter-menu consistency (IMC) - which is a consequence of the collective rationality assumption - and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Subjects violated both IMC and IIA in strong numbers, and robustly across presentation methods. The results suggest that IMC and IIA are not intuitively fair principles according to these subjects. A weaker principle which is consistent with many of Arrow's philosophical justifications for IIA and IMC is defined as 'independence of unavailable alternatives' (IUA). A majority of subjects adhere to IUA in evaluating an example that yields strong violations of both IMC and IIA, but the effect is sensitive to presentation. Other principles characterizing subjects' revealed social preferences are described.
Author: Jozo Dujmovic Publisher: John Wiley & Sons ISBN: 1119256461 Category : Computers Languages : en Pages : 916
Book Description
A novel approach to decision engineering, with a verified framework for modeling human reasoning Soft Computing Evaluation Logic provides an in-depth examination of evaluation decision problems and presents comprehensive guidance toward the use of the Logic Scoring of Preference (LSP) method in modeling complex decision criteria. Fully aligned with current developments in computational intelligence, the discussion covers the design and use of LSP criteria for evaluation and comparison in diverse areas, such as search engines, medical conditions, real estate, space management, habitat mitigation projects in ecology, and land use and residential development suitability maps, with versatile transfer to other similar decision-modeling contexts. Human decision making is rife with fuzziness, imprecision, uncertainty, and half-truths—yet humans make evaluation decisions every day. In this book, such decision processes are observed, analyzed, and modeled. The result is graded logic, a soft computing mathematical infrastructure that provides both formal logic and semantic generalizations of classical Boolean logic. Graded logic is used for logic aggregation in the context of evaluation models consistent with observable properties of human reasoning. The LSP method, based on graded logic and logic aggregation, is a vital component of an industrial-strength decision engineering framework. Thus, the book: Provides detailed theoretical background for graded logic Provides a theory of logic aggregators Explains the LSP method for designing complex evaluation criteria and their use Shows techniques for evaluation, comparison, and selection of complex systems, as well as the cost/suitability analysis, optimization, sensitivity analysis, tradeoff analysis, and missingness-tolerant aggregation Includes a survey of available LSP software tools, including ISEE, ANSY and LSP.NT. With quantitative modeling of human reasoning, novel approaches to modeling decision criteria, and a verified decision engineering framework applicable to a broad array of applications, this book is an invaluable resource for graduate students, researchers, and practitioners working within the decision engineering realm.
Author: Andranick S. Tanguiane Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 3642765165 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 335
Book Description
Aggregation is the conjunction of information, aimed at its compact represen tation. Any time when the totality of data is described in terms of general ized indicators, conventional counts, typical representatives and characteristic dependences, one directly or indirectly deals with aggregation. It includes revealing the most significant characteristics and distinctive features, quanti tative and qualitative analysis. As a result, the information becomes adaptable for further processing and convenient for human perception. Aggregation is widely used in economics, statistics, management, planning, system analysis, and many other fields. That is why aggregation is so important in data pro cessing. Aggregation of preferences is a particular case of the general problem of ag gregation. It arises in multicriteria decision-making and collective choice, when a set of alternatives has to be ordered with respect to contradicting criteria, or various individual opinions. However, in spite of apparent similarity the problems of multicriteria decision-making and collective choice are somewhat different. Indeed, an improvement in some specifications at the cost of worsen ing others is not the same as the satisfaction of interests of some individuals to the prejudice of the rest. In the former case the reciprocal compensations are considered within a certain entirety; in the latter we infringe upon the rights of independent individuals. Moreover, in multicriteria decision-making one usu ally takes into account objective factors, whereas in collective choice one has to compare subjective opinions which cannot be measured properly.
Author: Stergios Athanasoglou Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Consider a setting in which individual strict preferences need to be aggregated into a social strict preference relation. For two alternatives and an odd number of agents, it follows from May's Theorem that the majority aggregation rule is the only one satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and strategy-proofness (SP). For more than two alternatives, anonymity and neutrality are incompatible in many instances and we explore this tradeoff for strategy-proof rules. The notion of SP that we employ is Kemeny-SP (K- SP), which is based on the Kemeny distance between social orderings and strengthens previously used concepts in an intuitive manner. Dropping anonymity and keeping neutrality, we identify and analyze the first known nontrivial family of K-SP rules, namely semi-dictator rules. For two agents, semi-dictator rules are characterized by local unanimity, neutrality, and K-SP. For an arbitrary number of agents, we generalize semi-dictator rules to allow for committees and show that they retain their desirable properties. Dropping neutrality and keeping anonymity, we establish possibility results for three alternatives. We provide a computer-aided solution to the existence of a locally unanimous, anonymous, and K-SP rule for two agents and four alternatives. Finally, we show that there is no K-SP and anonymous rule which always chooses one of the agents' preferences.
Author: Zeshui Xu Publisher: Springer ISBN: 3642284035 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 241
Book Description
This book offers an in-depth and comprehensive introduction to the priority methods of intuitionistic preference relations, the consistency and consensus improving procedures for intuitionistic preference relations, the approaches to group decision making based on intuitionistic preference relations, the approaches and models for interactive decision making with intuitionistic fuzzy information, and the extended results in interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy environments.
Author: Saša Pekeč Publisher: Springer Nature ISBN: 3030314898 Category : Computers Languages : en Pages : 187
Book Description
This book constitutes the conference proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, ADT 2019, held in Durham, NC, USA, in October 2019. The 10 full papers presented together with 7 short papers were carefully selected from 31 submissions. The papers focus on algorithmic decision theory broadly defined, seeking to bring together researchers and practitioners coming from diverse areas of computer science, economics and operations research in order to improve the theory and practice of modern decision support.
Author: Francesca Bellet Publisher: Springer Nature ISBN: 3031015568 Category : Computers Languages : en Pages : 90
Book Description
Computational social choice is an expanding field that merges classical topics like economics and voting theory with more modern topics like artificial intelligence, multiagent systems, and computational complexity. This book provides a concise introduction to the main research lines in this field, covering aspects such as preference modelling, uncertainty reasoning, social choice, stable matching, and computational aspects of preference aggregation and manipulation. The book is centered around the notion of preference reasoning, both in the single-agent and the multi-agent setting. It presents the main approaches to modeling and reasoning with preferences, with particular attention to two popular and powerful formalisms, soft constraints and CP-nets. The authors consider preference elicitation and various forms of uncertainty in soft constraints. They review the most relevant results in voting, with special attention to computational social choice. Finally, the book considers preferences in matching problems. The book is intended for students and researchers who may be interested in an introduction to preference reasoning and multi-agent preference aggregation, and who want to know the basic notions and results in computational social choice. Table of Contents: Introduction / Preference Modeling and Reasoning / Uncertainty in Preference Reasoning / Aggregating Preferences / Stable Marriage Problems
Author: Olle Abrahamsson Publisher: Linköping University Electronic Press ISBN: 9180755992 Category : Languages : en Pages : 156
Book Description
This thesis studies two problems defined on complex networks, of which the first explores a conceivable extension of structural balance theory and the other concerns convergence issues in opinion dynamics. In the first half of the thesis we discuss possible definitions of structural balance conditions in a network with preference orderings as node attributes. The main result is that for the case with three alternatives (A, B, C) we reduce the (3!)3 = 216 possible configurations of triangles to 10 equivalence classes, and use these as measures of balance of a triangle towards possible extensions of structural balance theory. Moreover, we derive a general formula for the number of equivalent classes for preferences on n alternatives. Finally, we analyze a real-world data set and compare its empirical distribution of triangle equivalence classes to a null hypothesis in which preferences are randomly assigned to the nodes. The second half of the thesis concerns an opinion dynamics model in which each agent takes a random Bernoulli distributed action whose probability is updated at each discrete time step, and we prove that this model converges almost surely to consensus. We also provide a detailed critique of a claimed proof of this result in the literature. We generalize the result by proving that the assumption of irreducibility in the original model is not necessary. Furthermore, we prove as a corollary of the generalized result that the almost sure convergence to consensus holds also in the presence of a fully stubborn agent which never changes its opinion. In addition, we show that the model, in both the original and generalized cases, converges to consensus also in rth moment. Avhandlingen studerar två problem definierade på komplexa nätverk, varav det första utforskar en tänkbar utökning av strukturell balansteori och det andra behandlar konvergensfrågor inom opinionsdynamik. I avhandlingens första hälft diskuteras möjliga definitioner på villkor för strukturell balans i ett nätverk med preferensordningar som nodattribut. Huvudresultatet är att för fallet med tre alternativ (A, B, C) så kan de (3!)3 = 216 möjliga konfigurationerna av trianglar reduceras till 10 ekvivalensklasser, vilka används som mått på en triangels balans som ett steg mot möjliga utökningar av strukturell balansteori. Vi härleder även en generell formel för antalet ekvivalensklasser för preferensordningar med n alternativ. Slutligen analyseras en empirisk datamängd och dess empiriska sannolikhetsfördelning av triangel-ekvivalensklasser jämförs med en nollhypotes i vilken preferenser tilldelas noderna slumpmässigt. Den andra hälften av avhandlingen rör en opinionsdynamikmodell där varje agent agerar slumpmässigt enligt en Bernoullifördelning vars sannolikhet uppdateras vid varje diskret tidssteg, och vi bevisar att denna modell konvergerar nästan säkert till konsensus. Vi ger också en detaljerad kritik av ett påstått bevis av detta resultat i litteraturen. Vi generaliserar resultatet genom att visa att antagandet om irreducibilitet i den ursprungliga modellen inte är nödvändigt. Vidare visar vi, som följdsats av det generaliserade resultatet, att den nästan säkra konvergensen till konsensus även håller om en agent är fullständigt envis och aldrig byter åsikt. I tillägg till detta visar vi att modellen, både i det ursprungliga och i det generaliserade fallet, konvergerar till konsensus även i r:te ordningens moment.
Author: Todd Davies
Author: Jozo Dujmovic
Author: Andranick S. Tanguiane
Author: Stergios Athanasoglou
Author: Paul Douglas Lyon
Author: Zeshui Xu
Author: Saša Pekeč
Author: Francesca Bellet
Author: Olle Abrahamsson
Author: Charles K. Rowley