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Author: James D. Dana (Jr.) Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper develops an oligopoly model in which firms first choose capacity and then compete in prices in a series of advance-purchase markets. We show that when the elasticity of demand falls across periods, strong competitive forces prevent firms from utilizing intertemporal price discrimination. We then enrich the model by allowing firms to use inventory controls, or sales limits assigned to individual prices. We show that competing firms can profitably use inventory controls. Thus, although typically viewed as a tool to manage demand uncertainty, we show that inventory controls can also facilitate price discrimination in oligopoly.
Author: James D. Dana (Jr.) Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This paper develops an oligopoly model in which firms first choose capacity and then compete in prices in a series of advance-purchase markets. We show that when the elasticity of demand falls across periods, strong competitive forces prevent firms from utilizing intertemporal price discrimination. We then enrich the model by allowing firms to use inventory controls, or sales limits assigned to individual prices. We show that competing firms can profitably use inventory controls. Thus, although typically viewed as a tool to manage demand uncertainty, we show that inventory controls can also facilitate price discrimination in oligopoly.
Author: Victor F. Araman Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 41
Book Description
A firm that sells a non perishable product considers intertemporal price discrimination in the objective of maximizing the long-run average revenue. Each period, a number of interested customers approach the firm and can either purchase on arrival, or remain in the system for a period of time. During this time, each customer's valuation changes following a discrete and homogenous Markov chain. Customers leave the system if they either purchase at some point, or their valuations reach an absorbing state v0. We show that, in this context, cyclic strategies are optimal, or nearly optimal. When the pace of intertemporal pricing is constrained to be comparable to customers patience level, we have a good control on the cycle length and on the structure of the optimizing cyclic policies. We also obtain an algorithm that yields the optimal (or near optimal) cyclic solutions in polynomial time in the number of prices. We cast part of our results in a general framework of optimizing the long-run average revenues for a class of payoffs that we call weakly coupled, in which the revenue per period depends on a finite number of neighboring prices.
Author: Igal Hendel Publisher: ISBN: Category : Economics Languages : en Pages : 36
Book Description
Abstract: We study intertemporal price discrimination when consumers can store for future consumption needs. To make the problem tractable we offer a simple model of demand dynamics, which we estimate using market level data. Optimal pricing involves temporary price reductions that enable sellers to discriminate between price sensitive consumers, who anticipate future needs, and less price-sensitive consumers. We empirically quantify the impact of intertemporal price discrimination on profits and welfare. We find that sales: (1) capture 25-30% of the profit gap between non-discriminatory and third degree price discrimination profits, and (2) increase total welfare
Author: Ralph C. Bayer Publisher: ISBN: Category : Competition Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
In this study we investigate the impact of competition on markets for non-durable goods where intertemporal price discrimination is possible. We develop a simple model of different potential scenarios for intertemporal price discrimination and implement it in a laboratory experiment. We compare the outcomes in monopolies and duopolies. Surprisingly, we find that competition does not necessarily prevent intertemporal price discrimination, as our model predicts. However, competition generally reduces sales prices, but by far less than theory predicts. As expected, competition increases efficiency.
Author: Jean-Charles Rochet Publisher: ISBN: Category : Monopolies Languages : en Pages : 52
Book Description
We study the multiproduct monopoly profit maximisation problem for a seller who can commit to a dynamic pricing strategy. We show that if consumers' valuations are not strongly-ordered then optimality for the seller requires intertemporal price discrimination and it can be implemented by dynamic pricing on the cross-sell to the bundle. If consumers are perfectly negatively correlated, reducing the cross-sell price at a single point in time is optimal. For general valuations we show that if the cross-partial derivative of the profit function is negative then dynamic pricing on the cross-sell is more profitable than fixing prices. So we show that the celebrated Stokey (1979) no-discrimination-across-time result does not extend to multiple good sellers when consumers' valuations are drawn from the tilted uniform, the shifted uniform, the exponential, or the normal distribution. We extend our results to welfare, to complementarities in demand, and to the determination of optimal discount schedules.
Author: Samuel Raisanen Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 26
Book Description
When tickets are sold in advance, as with airlines, concerts, theaters and sporting events, in some cases advanced sales are made at a discount and in others a premium is charged. This paper argues that the more preference certain consumers are regarding future purchases the more likely firms will charge premiums. Alternatively, the higher a firms capacity, the more likely advanced purchase discount will be offered. Finally, endogenizing capacity choice, it is then shown that firms with high marginal costs of capacity are likely to choose premium pricing while low marginal costs of capacity results in more frequent discount pricing.
Author: James D. Dana (Jr.)
Author: James D. Dana (Jr.)
Author: Victor F. Araman
Author: Louis Phlips
Author: Mark Stenius Roberts
Author: Igal Hendel
Author: Ralph C. Bayer
Author: Jean-Charles Rochet
Author: 
Author: Samuel Raisanen
Author: Lionel Wilner