Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Infinite Horizon PDF Download

Author: Lionel Wilner
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 14

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Author: Mark Bagnoli
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 31

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Author: Omar Besbes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
We study a firm's optimal pricing policy under price commitment. The firm's objective is to maximize its long-term average revenue given a steady arrival of strategic customers. In particular, customers arrive over time, are strategic in timing their purchases and are heterogeneous along two dimensions: their valuation for the firm's product and their willingness to wait before purchasing or leaving. The customers' patience and valuation may be correlated in an arbitrary fashion. For this general formulation, we prove that the firm may restrict attention to cyclic pricing policies, which have length at most twice the maximum willingness to wait of the customer population. To efficiently compute optimal policies, we develop a dynamic programming approach which uses a novel state space which is general, enabling to handle arbitrary problem primitives, and that generalizes to finite horizon problems with non-stationary parameters. We analyze the class of monotone pricing policies and establish their suboptimality in general. Optimal policies are, in a typical scenario, characterized by nested sales, where the firm offers partial discounts throughout each cycle, offers a significant discount halfway through the cycle, with the largest discount offered at the end of the cycle. We further establish a form of equivalence between the problem of pricing for a stream of heterogeneous strategic customers and pricing for a pool of heterogeneous customers who may stockpile units of the product.

Author: Ichiro Takahashi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Commercial policy
Languages : en
Pages : 478

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Author: Pennsylvania
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 506

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Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262061414
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 616

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Book Description
This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory—including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information—in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.

Author: Elmar Wolfstetter
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521645348
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 394

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Book Description
This book in microeconomics focuses on the strategic analysis of markets under imperfect competition, incomplete information, and incentives. Part I of the book covers imperfect competition, from monopoly and regulation to the strategic analysis of oligopolistic markets. Part II explains the analytics of risk, stochastic dominance, and risk aversion, supplemented with a variety of applications from different areas in economics. Part III focuses on markets and incentives under incomplete information, including a comprehensive introduction to the theory of auctions, which plays an important role in modern economics.

Author: Michael E. Wetzstein
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136226656
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1096

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Book Description
This book introduces the main concepts of microeconomics to upper division undergraduate students or first year graduate students who have undergone at least one elementary calculus course. The book fully integrates graphical and mathematical concepts and offers over 150 analytical examples demonstrating numerical solutions. The book has a strong theoretical basis but shows how microeconomics can be brought to bear on the real world. New Features for this edition include: an incorporation of the theory of stock externalities associated with greenhouse gases development of the section on insurance with particular reference to the new US healthcare program greater integration of game theoretic concepts throughout the book. The book’s style is accessible, but also rigorous. Mathematical examples are provided throughout the book, in particular for key concepts and the result is a balanced approach in terms of prose, graphics, and mathematics.

Author: Michael Eugene Wetzstein
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 0415603692
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1096

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Book Description
This book introduces the main concepts of microeconomics to students who have undergone at least one elementary calculus course. It fully integrates graphical and mathematical concepts and offers analytical examples demonstrating numerical solutions. The book has a strong theoretical basis but shows how microeconomics can be brought to bear on the real world. New Features for this edition include: An incorporation of the theory of stock externalities associated with greenhouse gases ; Development of the section on insurance with particular reference to the new US healthcare program ; greater integration of game theoretic concepts throughout the book. The book's style is accessible, but also rigorous. Mathematical examples are provided throughout the book, in particular for key concepts and the result is a balanced approach in terms of prose, graphics, and mathematics.

Author: Victor F. Araman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 41

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Book Description
A firm that sells a non perishable product considers intertemporal price discrimination in the objective of maximizing the long-run average revenue. Each period, a number of interested customers approach the firm and can either purchase on arrival, or remain in the system for a period of time. During this time, each customer's valuation changes following a discrete and homogenous Markov chain. Customers leave the system if they either purchase at some point, or their valuations reach an absorbing state v0. We show that, in this context, cyclic strategies are optimal, or nearly optimal. When the pace of intertemporal pricing is constrained to be comparable to customers patience level, we have a good control on the cycle length and on the structure of the optimizing cyclic policies. We also obtain an algorithm that yields the optimal (or near optimal) cyclic solutions in polynomial time in the number of prices. We cast part of our results in a general framework of optimizing the long-run average revenues for a class of payoffs that we call weakly coupled, in which the revenue per period depends on a finite number of neighboring prices.