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Author: Publisher: SET Vakfı İktisadi İşletmesi ISBN: Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 312
Book Description
The Gulf is a sub-region consisting of Saudi Arabia and five small states, namely Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. This sub-region emerged after the British recognized the independence of the above-mentioned small entities between 1961 and 1971. Having an abundant amount of natural resources, i.e. oil and natural gas, the Gulf States are among the richest countries in the world; therefore, they do not share the poverty and political instability widely found in the Middle East. The Gulf is a sub-region consisting of Saudi Arabia and five small states, namely Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. This sub-region emerged after the British recognized the independence of the above-mentioned small entities between 1961 and 1971. Having an abundant amount of natural resources, i.e. oil and natural gas, the Gulf States are among the richest countries in the world; therefore, they do not share the poverty and political instability widely found in the Middle East. The sub-region was institutionalized with the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 as a result of three important regional developments –the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980. The GCC was mainly designed as a security institution to counter regional threats emanating from the other side of the Persian Gulf, namely Iran. However, after the invasion of Kuwait, by Saddam’s Iraq, the Gulf States became alarmed and asked the United States to protect their political independence against all regional threats. After the collapse of the Cold War, the Gulf States initiated a process of regional integration and significant steps were taken to achieve a monetary and economic union. At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the Gulf States decided to introduce “al-khaleeji” as the common currency. However, this promising process was halted with the eruption of the Arab uprisings and revolutions. The Arab uprisings have imposed the greatest threat to the unity of the Gulf. For the first time in their history, the Gulf States began to be challenged politically from not only external threats but also internal dynamics. The process of sweeping changes throughout the Middle East instigated great concern in the Gulf, the most pro-status quo states in the region. During the first two years, 2011-2013, the Gulf States tried to follow a defensive policy against the powers of change. They strived to keep the wave of uprisings away from the Gulf. After they had overcome their shock and confusion, they began to take initiatives to intervene into the regional crises. Some of the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, organized a military coup against the region’s first and only democratically elected government of Muhammad Morsi, placing Egypt in an economically and politically vulnerable position. Furthermore, these two countries interfered into the domestic affairs of other regional states in crisis such as Libya, Yemen and Lebanon. They succeeded in turning the “Arab Spring” into an “Arab Winter” by eliminating, de-legitimizing and weakening the carriers of reform, the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates, throughout the Arab world. Thus, indirectly they suppressed the moderate non-state actors in favor of radical actors and terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda. Saudi Arabia and the UAE went further and tried to redesign the region through their ambitious regional policies. Encouraged by the United States and Israel, they gained the support from countries that are dependent on their petro-dollars such as Bahrain, Egypt and Jordan. These two states attempted to lead both the Arab and Muslim worlds; and therefore, mobilized their only asset, billions of petro-dollars, to buy influence in the region. In order to be able to lead the Arab world, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had to delegitimize the Muslim Brotherhood and affiliated groups and political parties –the main carriers of popular demonstrations throughout the Arab world. Therefore, they declared all these political groups and social movements as “terrorist organizations.” They even attempted to ostracize those regional countries, i.e. Turkey and Qatar that support these popular movements, while at the same time forcing other countries to support their regional policies. The first target was Qatar; the Arab state most open to liberal values and diversity. In 2014, Saudi Arabia and the UAE forced Qatar to cut its relations with regional non-state actors such as the Brotherhood and Hamas, but the Obama Administration did not allow Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to instigate a crisis. However, after Trump came to power, these two states reintroduced the crisis and imposed their blockade against Qatar. Nevertheless, with the strong support of Turkey and Iran, two significant regional powers, the policy of Saudi Arabia and the UAE has failed. As a result, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have shattered the unity of not only the Arabs but also that of the Gulf. While Oman maintained its neutral position, by following an active neutrality policy and playing a mediating role, Kuwait tried to prevent the breakup of the Gulf region. Although it has not declared so publicly, Kuwait rejects the regional design attempts by the Saudi and Emirati governments. To lead the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia led the foundation of the so-called “Islamic Military Alliance” comprising of more than 50 nations. However, it became clear in a short time period that this attempt was not a real Islamic alliance to bring stability to the region, but a measure to fortify a Sunni bloc against Iranian regional expansionism. That is, Saudi Arabia tried to utilize the Sunni Islamic understanding for its regional policies. It is not difficult to claim that Saudi Arabia and the UAE will not be able to realize this project. The possibility of ending up with the disillusionment of the Arab and Muslim streets and alienation of some Sunni countries is quite high. Overall the project, which has been executed with the support of the U.S. and Israel, is an attempt to deepen the sectarian strife between Shias and Sunnis and it will not bring political stability or peace to the region. In conclusion, in order to protect themselves against regional threats and to establish a balance of power against other regional powers, the small Gulf States must form military alliances and political institutions with other regional countries. First, they need to maintain the unity of the Gulf. Second, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi should encourage other regional actors to contribute to the regional stability. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have to end the Qatari crisis, a lose-lose crisis manufactured by these two states, since it is undermining the sub-region’s security and economic outlook. Third, the Gulf States must keep the sub-region as the island of political and economic stability in the chaotic Middle East and contribute to the gradual and peaceful reconstruction of the region. To achieve this objective, the Gulf States must stop using conflicting political discourses. Considering all these important developments, the Gulf region has attracted a lot of attention among the scholars and Insight Turkey, through this special issue, aims to cover some of the main topics such as the Qatari crisis, the rise of sectarianism, the foreign policies of the pro-status quo countries and the relations of these states with Turkey. The situation in the Gulf region gets more complicated as time passes and the division between blocks has started to become deeper. Ufuk Ulutaş and Burhanettin Duran provide a comprehensive analysis of all of the actors, including here global and regional ones, which are currently included in the Gulf affairs. Without any doubt, the Qatari crisis has played a decisive role in manifesting the existing regional rifts. In the light of this, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen and Marwan Kabalan focus on this crisis, which started with the blockade of Qatar by the so-called Quartet, i.e. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt. With a special focus on the Gulf and U.S. policies respectively, both of the authors provide valuable insights regarding the crisis and the future of the Gulf. The main division in the region comes as a result of the rise of sectarianism, which has transformed into local sectarian and regional geopolitical confrontations among some Gulf States –mainly Saudi Arabia and the UAE– and Iran. Emad Kaddorah, in his commentary, argues that the regional conflict over the Gulf region is geo-sectarian, meaning that it is a geopolitical contest, which has recently been engulfed by a sectarian dimension. Saudi Arabia remains one of the main actors in the region and it deserves special attention. The articles of Simon Mabon and May Darwich help to better understand the domestic and foreign policies of Saudi Arabia. Mabon looks at the actions of the new crown prince to explore the impact of Bin Salman’s influence on both the Kingdom and the Middle East more broadly. On the other hand, Darwich analyzes the Saudi intervention in Yemen, a war that many have started to consider as “Saudis Vietnam war.” More specifically, May Darwich offers an alternative explanation for the abrupt Saudi aggressiveness toward Yemen and argues that this intervention is driven by the Saudi leadership aims to assert the Kingdom’s status as a regional power in the Middle East. Despite Saudi Arabia, the UAE is another important actor in the region, whose impact is underestimated. By focusing on the military bases built by the UAE in the Horn of Africa, İsmail Numan Telci and Tuba Öztürk Horoz provide an explanation on the real motivations behind the Emirati foreign policies which have started to focus more on hard power, a deviation from the perpetual foreign policies of the other Gulf States. Amidst the shattering order of the Gulf, Turkey has pursued a careful and balancing policy, finding itself sided neither with the Saudi-led block, nor with the Iranian-led block. At this point it is important to understand the background of the Turkey-GCC states relations and Özden Zeynep Oktav in her article brings a detailed analysis of the root causes that led to the policy divergences between Turkey, and some GCC states, i.e. Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This special issue of Insight Turkey includes five off-topic pieces, which indeed are closely related with the Gulf affairs. In his commentary, M. Akif Kireçci, focuses on the initiatives undertaken by Turkey after Trump declared Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and how the divided Gulf States left aside their disparities to protect the rights of Palestinians against this fallacious decision. The article of Osama Anter Hamdi complements Kireçci’s commentary, as the author provides a comprehensive analysis of the American foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict since the establishment of the Israeli state. Iran, of course, deserves special attention as the foreign policies of the Gulf States are mostly designed to balance the Iranian influence in the region. The three remaining articles of the issue deal with U.S. Iranian relations, the nuclear deal and how Iran and Turkey serve as a model of emulation for other states in the region. Written by İmran Demir, Farhad Rezaei, and Ibrahim Khatib and As’ad Ghanem, respectively, these three articles are worth reading in order to better understand the Iranian policies. “The Gulf on the Verge: Ambitions, Crises and Shattering Order,” provides timely analyses for a region that once again has become the linchpin of global affairs. We are confident that this issue of Insight Turkey will be a great contribution to the Gulf studies.
Author: Publisher: SET Vakfı İktisadi İşletmesi ISBN: Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 312
Book Description
The Gulf is a sub-region consisting of Saudi Arabia and five small states, namely Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. This sub-region emerged after the British recognized the independence of the above-mentioned small entities between 1961 and 1971. Having an abundant amount of natural resources, i.e. oil and natural gas, the Gulf States are among the richest countries in the world; therefore, they do not share the poverty and political instability widely found in the Middle East. The Gulf is a sub-region consisting of Saudi Arabia and five small states, namely Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. This sub-region emerged after the British recognized the independence of the above-mentioned small entities between 1961 and 1971. Having an abundant amount of natural resources, i.e. oil and natural gas, the Gulf States are among the richest countries in the world; therefore, they do not share the poverty and political instability widely found in the Middle East. The sub-region was institutionalized with the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 as a result of three important regional developments –the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980. The GCC was mainly designed as a security institution to counter regional threats emanating from the other side of the Persian Gulf, namely Iran. However, after the invasion of Kuwait, by Saddam’s Iraq, the Gulf States became alarmed and asked the United States to protect their political independence against all regional threats. After the collapse of the Cold War, the Gulf States initiated a process of regional integration and significant steps were taken to achieve a monetary and economic union. At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the Gulf States decided to introduce “al-khaleeji” as the common currency. However, this promising process was halted with the eruption of the Arab uprisings and revolutions. The Arab uprisings have imposed the greatest threat to the unity of the Gulf. For the first time in their history, the Gulf States began to be challenged politically from not only external threats but also internal dynamics. The process of sweeping changes throughout the Middle East instigated great concern in the Gulf, the most pro-status quo states in the region. During the first two years, 2011-2013, the Gulf States tried to follow a defensive policy against the powers of change. They strived to keep the wave of uprisings away from the Gulf. After they had overcome their shock and confusion, they began to take initiatives to intervene into the regional crises. Some of the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, organized a military coup against the region’s first and only democratically elected government of Muhammad Morsi, placing Egypt in an economically and politically vulnerable position. Furthermore, these two countries interfered into the domestic affairs of other regional states in crisis such as Libya, Yemen and Lebanon. They succeeded in turning the “Arab Spring” into an “Arab Winter” by eliminating, de-legitimizing and weakening the carriers of reform, the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates, throughout the Arab world. Thus, indirectly they suppressed the moderate non-state actors in favor of radical actors and terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda. Saudi Arabia and the UAE went further and tried to redesign the region through their ambitious regional policies. Encouraged by the United States and Israel, they gained the support from countries that are dependent on their petro-dollars such as Bahrain, Egypt and Jordan. These two states attempted to lead both the Arab and Muslim worlds; and therefore, mobilized their only asset, billions of petro-dollars, to buy influence in the region. In order to be able to lead the Arab world, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had to delegitimize the Muslim Brotherhood and affiliated groups and political parties –the main carriers of popular demonstrations throughout the Arab world. Therefore, they declared all these political groups and social movements as “terrorist organizations.” They even attempted to ostracize those regional countries, i.e. Turkey and Qatar that support these popular movements, while at the same time forcing other countries to support their regional policies. The first target was Qatar; the Arab state most open to liberal values and diversity. In 2014, Saudi Arabia and the UAE forced Qatar to cut its relations with regional non-state actors such as the Brotherhood and Hamas, but the Obama Administration did not allow Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to instigate a crisis. However, after Trump came to power, these two states reintroduced the crisis and imposed their blockade against Qatar. Nevertheless, with the strong support of Turkey and Iran, two significant regional powers, the policy of Saudi Arabia and the UAE has failed. As a result, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have shattered the unity of not only the Arabs but also that of the Gulf. While Oman maintained its neutral position, by following an active neutrality policy and playing a mediating role, Kuwait tried to prevent the breakup of the Gulf region. Although it has not declared so publicly, Kuwait rejects the regional design attempts by the Saudi and Emirati governments. To lead the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia led the foundation of the so-called “Islamic Military Alliance” comprising of more than 50 nations. However, it became clear in a short time period that this attempt was not a real Islamic alliance to bring stability to the region, but a measure to fortify a Sunni bloc against Iranian regional expansionism. That is, Saudi Arabia tried to utilize the Sunni Islamic understanding for its regional policies. It is not difficult to claim that Saudi Arabia and the UAE will not be able to realize this project. The possibility of ending up with the disillusionment of the Arab and Muslim streets and alienation of some Sunni countries is quite high. Overall the project, which has been executed with the support of the U.S. and Israel, is an attempt to deepen the sectarian strife between Shias and Sunnis and it will not bring political stability or peace to the region. In conclusion, in order to protect themselves against regional threats and to establish a balance of power against other regional powers, the small Gulf States must form military alliances and political institutions with other regional countries. First, they need to maintain the unity of the Gulf. Second, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi should encourage other regional actors to contribute to the regional stability. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have to end the Qatari crisis, a lose-lose crisis manufactured by these two states, since it is undermining the sub-region’s security and economic outlook. Third, the Gulf States must keep the sub-region as the island of political and economic stability in the chaotic Middle East and contribute to the gradual and peaceful reconstruction of the region. To achieve this objective, the Gulf States must stop using conflicting political discourses. Considering all these important developments, the Gulf region has attracted a lot of attention among the scholars and Insight Turkey, through this special issue, aims to cover some of the main topics such as the Qatari crisis, the rise of sectarianism, the foreign policies of the pro-status quo countries and the relations of these states with Turkey. The situation in the Gulf region gets more complicated as time passes and the division between blocks has started to become deeper. Ufuk Ulutaş and Burhanettin Duran provide a comprehensive analysis of all of the actors, including here global and regional ones, which are currently included in the Gulf affairs. Without any doubt, the Qatari crisis has played a decisive role in manifesting the existing regional rifts. In the light of this, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen and Marwan Kabalan focus on this crisis, which started with the blockade of Qatar by the so-called Quartet, i.e. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt. With a special focus on the Gulf and U.S. policies respectively, both of the authors provide valuable insights regarding the crisis and the future of the Gulf. The main division in the region comes as a result of the rise of sectarianism, which has transformed into local sectarian and regional geopolitical confrontations among some Gulf States –mainly Saudi Arabia and the UAE– and Iran. Emad Kaddorah, in his commentary, argues that the regional conflict over the Gulf region is geo-sectarian, meaning that it is a geopolitical contest, which has recently been engulfed by a sectarian dimension. Saudi Arabia remains one of the main actors in the region and it deserves special attention. The articles of Simon Mabon and May Darwich help to better understand the domestic and foreign policies of Saudi Arabia. Mabon looks at the actions of the new crown prince to explore the impact of Bin Salman’s influence on both the Kingdom and the Middle East more broadly. On the other hand, Darwich analyzes the Saudi intervention in Yemen, a war that many have started to consider as “Saudis Vietnam war.” More specifically, May Darwich offers an alternative explanation for the abrupt Saudi aggressiveness toward Yemen and argues that this intervention is driven by the Saudi leadership aims to assert the Kingdom’s status as a regional power in the Middle East. Despite Saudi Arabia, the UAE is another important actor in the region, whose impact is underestimated. By focusing on the military bases built by the UAE in the Horn of Africa, İsmail Numan Telci and Tuba Öztürk Horoz provide an explanation on the real motivations behind the Emirati foreign policies which have started to focus more on hard power, a deviation from the perpetual foreign policies of the other Gulf States. Amidst the shattering order of the Gulf, Turkey has pursued a careful and balancing policy, finding itself sided neither with the Saudi-led block, nor with the Iranian-led block. At this point it is important to understand the background of the Turkey-GCC states relations and Özden Zeynep Oktav in her article brings a detailed analysis of the root causes that led to the policy divergences between Turkey, and some GCC states, i.e. Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This special issue of Insight Turkey includes five off-topic pieces, which indeed are closely related with the Gulf affairs. In his commentary, M. Akif Kireçci, focuses on the initiatives undertaken by Turkey after Trump declared Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and how the divided Gulf States left aside their disparities to protect the rights of Palestinians against this fallacious decision. The article of Osama Anter Hamdi complements Kireçci’s commentary, as the author provides a comprehensive analysis of the American foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict since the establishment of the Israeli state. Iran, of course, deserves special attention as the foreign policies of the Gulf States are mostly designed to balance the Iranian influence in the region. The three remaining articles of the issue deal with U.S. Iranian relations, the nuclear deal and how Iran and Turkey serve as a model of emulation for other states in the region. Written by İmran Demir, Farhad Rezaei, and Ibrahim Khatib and As’ad Ghanem, respectively, these three articles are worth reading in order to better understand the Iranian policies. “The Gulf on the Verge: Ambitions, Crises and Shattering Order,” provides timely analyses for a region that once again has become the linchpin of global affairs. We are confident that this issue of Insight Turkey will be a great contribution to the Gulf studies.
Author: Publisher: SET Vakfı İktisadi İşletmesi ISBN: Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 264
Book Description
Today, the world system is in a transition and experiencing a deep international crisis. The U.S. has begun to oppose the basic international institutions such as the United Nations and its subsidiary organs and specialized agencies, even though most of these were established with American motivation. The hegemon state, the U.S., has been alienating most of its partners and even allies. The U.S. governments have begun to focus on the national setting and to underestimate the international one; to favor unilateral policies over multilateral ones. The presidency of Donald Trump has expedited this process. American rejection of providing global public goods such as international security and free trade has led to a systemic crisis. The relative decline of American power coincides with the persistent rise of China. Those who claim that the days of Pax-Americana are numbered assert that the rise of China will determine the future of the world system. China has begun to expand its influence worldwide. For this purpose it has established alternative political and economic international institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Furthermore, China leads the establishment of some other international organizations as well. BRICS is only one of these formations challenging the political hegemony of the West, led by the U.S. One of the most promising Chinese projects is the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Project, aspiring to connect the East (China) to the West (the world markets). It is expected that, on its completion, the OBOR Project will take China to the center of the world economy and politics. China has been the fastest growing economy in the world for the last thirty years. Its share of the world trade has increased dramatically, recording the highest share in world exports for several years. China has been enjoying economic transactions with all major international actors with more than 200 partners in exports and imports. However, in terms of per capita income China still lags behind the advanced Western countries. Furthermore, according to the calculations made by the World Bank and IMF, Chinese per capita income is still lower than the world average. China recently began to invest in the political and military sphere in the non-Western world. It has military bases in its near abroad and in the African continent. That is, Chinese economic influence and technological leadership is supported by its political and military power. In spite of the increase in Chinese military and political might, it is careful not to challenge the U.S. and the West. There are several reasons for this policy. First of all, China is aware of its vulnerabilities. It suffers some economic and political inconsistencies and weaknesses. For instance, it has to fortify its regional dominance first in the South China Sea and achieve its longtime one-China policy as a precondition for a possible global hegemony. Second, China wants to win the global rivalry without resorting to war with the current hegemon. Therefore, Chinese leaders refrain from opposing the American hegemony politically. Even though it has introduced some international institutions, the Chinese leadership does not propose a political and diplomatic alternative to the West. It will take time for China to offer a full-scale global leadership alternative to the world, since the global hegemony requires not only economic and military power but also values and norms for cultural hegemony. Lastly, China is not ready to take the global responsibility, since it brings high costs. As long as the current American hegemony works in favor of China, there is no need for China to change the course of its development. In the light of these developments, this issue of Insight Turkey focuses on some of the most important topics related to China’s persistent rise in the international system. More specifically, this issue postulates on how to read and understand China’s policies towards global powers, i.e. the U.S. and Russia, and regional powers, i.e. India and Turkey. Africa has once again returned to the attention of the global powers after being left for many years in the shadow of western politics. In recent years, Africa has become the center of China’s public, economic and military diplomacy. As it may be expected, China’s investments in Africa are not totally ‘welcomed’ by the U.S. Earl Conteh-Morgan in his commentary focuses on the strategic rivalry between China and the U.S. in Africa. Conteh-Morgan argues that their rivalry has progressed from mild to intense, with both powers increasing their activities on the continent and decreasing Africa’s erstwhile marginalization. Another rivalry that shapes China’s foreign policies in the region is that with India. Especially, since the Doklam Plateau incident in mid-2017, the expectation of a possible tension between the two regional powers is ever present. Taking this into consideration Bruno Maçães, in his commentary, ponders the economic and strategic rivalry between China and India along with a number of dimensions: infrastructure, border disputes, sea power, and trade.
Author: Nader Entessar Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield ISBN: 1498588875 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 289
Book Description
With the advent of the Trump Administration, relations between Iran and the United States have become increasingly conflictual to the point that a future war between the two countries is a realistic possibility. President Trump has unilaterally withdrawn the US from the historic Iran nuclear accord and has re-imposed the nuclear-related sanctions, which had been removed as a result of that accord. Reflecting a new determined US effort to curb Iran's hegemonic behavior throughout the Middle East, Trump's Iran policy has all the markings of a sharp discontinuity in the Iran containment strategy of the previous six US administrations. The regime change policy, spearheaded by a hawkish cabinet with a long history of antipathy toward the Iranian government, has become the most salient feature of US policy toward Iran under President Trump. This turn in US foreign policy has important consequences not just for Iran but also for Iran's neighbors and prospects of long-term stability in the Persian Gulf and beyond. This book seeks to examine the fluid dynamic of US-Iran relations in the Trump era by providing a social scientific understanding of the pattern of hostility and antagonism between Washington and Tehran and the resulting spiraling conflict that may lead to a disastrous war in the region.
Author: Emad Y. Kaddorah Publisher: Cambridge Scholars Publishing ISBN: 1527575330 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 190
Book Description
The GCC states and Turkey have recently experienced economic growth and played influential regional roles. In tandem, their relationships grew significantly, and Turkey was considered, for a while, as a “strategic partner”. Common challenges have made them consider an alliance to balance other powers and threats. However, many emerging issues have turned them into rivals for regional influence on divergent agendas during the last decade. All in all, their relations are dynamic and rapidly changing. Some regional crises were subjects of political agreement and coordination in their early stages, such as the cases in Libya, Syria and Yemen. However, this agreement has diminished and sometimes turned into conflict. Iran’s policies have also led to its change from being a factor of agreement to a factor of difference. On the other hand, some tensions, which were major causes of escalation, were resolved or eased, such as the Gulf crisis and the contest over Egypt. These relations affected the whole region, as well as the great powers involved there. Therefore, this book studies the commonalities between the GCC states and Turkey and analyzes their differences. All parties expressed their desire to restore cooperation despite continuing competition on some regional issues. The book proposes some ideas that can be considered to make convergence possible again.
Author: Michael Stephens Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing ISBN: 0755617177 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 264
Book Description
As the UK enters a period of intense public introspection in the wake of Brexit, this book takes on one of the key questions emerging from the divisive process: what is Britain's place in the world? The Middle East is one of the regions the UK has been most engaged in historically. This book assesses the drivers of foreign policy successes and failures and asks if there is a way to revitalise British influence in the region, and if this is even desirable. The book analyses the values, trade and security concerns that drive the UK's foreign policy. There are separate chapters on the non- Arab powers – Israel, Turkey and Iran – as well as chapters on the Middle Eastern Arab states and regions including the Gulf, Iraq, Egypt, and Syria and the Levant. The contributions are from leading specialists in the field: Rosemary Hollis, Michael Clarke, Ian Black, Bill Park, Christopher Phillips, Sanam Vakil, Michael Stephens and Louise Kettle. They each explain and re-assess the declining western influence and continued instability in the region and what this means for the UK's priorities and strategy towards the MENA. This is an essential book for policy makers, journalists and researchers focused on foreign policy towards the Middle East.
Author: Adnan Özdemi̇r Publisher: SET Vakfı İktisadi İşletmesi ISBN: Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 264
Book Description
Türkiye successfully conducted both presidential and parliamentarian elections on May 14, the second elections since the change of the governmental system, so completing yet another election process without encountering significant issues. The People’s Alliance led by AK Party has secured the majority in the legislative body, the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye. Although President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came first in the first round of the presidential elections, he could not pass the 50 percent threshold. President Erdoğan received 52 percent of the votes after the runoff elections on May 28. Thus, both President Erdoğan and AK Party, which has won all general elections since 2002, are continuing in the task of ruling the country for the next five years. Both Turkish and foreign observers and officials have attached great importance to these elections. Some even claimed that this year the Turkish elections are the most important globally due to the implications for international politics. However, it is crucial to emphasize that a significant number of Western media outlets and experts, influenced by their inclination to envision a Türkiye without Erdoğan, were unable to accurately forecast and analyze the election outcomes. In certain instances, they even launched direct attacks on Turkish democracy and President Erdoğan. Nevertheless, the election results, which genuinely reflect the national will, served as a profound lesson for all, highlighting the importance of recognizing and respecting the democratic choices made by the Turkish people. Yet the discussions surrounding the election results and their potential impact on Türkiye, its foreign policy, and the broader international political landscape are well-founded. There are several expectations from President Erdoğan and his government for the next five years. First of all, President Erdoğan and the AK Party government will consolidate and institutionalize the new governmental system that was introduced after the 2016 July 15 coup attempt, one of the main turning points in the recent history of the country. Although there are high expectations that the Erdoğan government will make some revisions within the new political system, there is no chance to return to a parliamentarian system, which was the main promise of the opposition during the election campaign. Second, the current Turkish foreign policy orientation will be consolidated and institutionalized. In recent years, Türkiye has been following a relatively independent and Ankara-centered foreign policy orientation. Türkiye has abandoned its Western-oriented foreign policy orientation and diversified its foreign relations. In an interview with the press during his first foreign visit since his re-election on May 28, 2023, President Erdoğan has clearly underlined Türkiye’s diversified foreign policy understanding. He has pointed out that Türkiye, which pursues the policy of balance based on national interests, is close to both the West and the East. Third, with the separation of internal and external security after the change of the governmental system, the two inward looking security institutions, namely the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the National Intelligence Organization (MİT), have experienced a large-scale transformation. Thus, TSK and MİT have become real foreign policy actors and begun playing a more effective role in foreign policy issues, especially in the protection of the country’s national security against external threats and in the struggle against anti-Turkish terrorist organizations deployed in different countries. Since then, Türkiye has been taking more initiatives in foreign policy issues as a result of high-level harmony between these security institutions and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, under the leadership of President Erdoğan, this large-scale harmony among foreign policy actors has enabled Türkiye to mobilize hard and soft power at the same time, which is an indication of Türkiye’s high-level capacity and its strategic autonomy. Fourth, with the increase of the number of foreign policy actors, after the introduction and transformation of some state institutions, Türkiye has increased its effectiveness in international politics. Governmental institutions such as the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), the Presidency of Turks Abroad and related Communities (YTB), Yunus Emre Institute (YEE), and Turkish Maarif Foundation have begun to play effective roles in the foreign policy field. Diversification in foreign policy actors is an indication of Türkiye’s autonomous foreign policy orientation. Türkiye has been deploying different foreign policy actors in different issue areas. President Erdoğan has declared that Türkiye will prioritize security policy for the next five years. By mobilizing hard, smart and soft powers of the country and also by activating different foreign policy actors, Türkiye will follow an integrated foreign policy understanding. The main responsibility of the new government will be the protection of Türkiye’s national interests and the provision of peace and stability in its regions. Türkiye, which opposes the return of a polarized world politics, is determined to use diplomatic means and take initiatives in the resolution on international crises. President Erdoğan and his new government will continue to attach great importance to its relations with the Western countries and to the NATO alliance. However, Türkiye expects the alliance to take more effective counterterrorism measures and the Western countries not to safeguard anti-Turkish terrorist organizations. Türkiye will continue to have a bilateral relationship with the West based on equal partnership. The new government will push for visa liberalization and updating the customs union in its relations with the European Union. One the one hand, Türkiye is determined to improve and enhance its relations with other Turkish states, especially with Azerbaijan. Following the signing of a military alliance after the Second Karabakh War, its bilateral relations with Azerbaijan are unique. Türkiye will continue to strive for the further integration of the Turkish world. On the other hand, Türkiye will continue its efforts to bring peace and stability to its regions. The Erdoğan government is determined to continue the normalization process with other regional countries in the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Eastern Mediterranean. To sum up, Türkiye is determined to consolidate its strategic autonomy, to play a leadership and stabilizer role in its regions, and to improve its relations with all countries in the world. The main priorities of Türkiye are the protection and maximization of its national interests, the promotion of the normalization processes, and the formation of a Turkish axis in the near future. Türkiye expects to achieve these objectives with its strong infrastructure, manufacturing industry, self-reliance in the defense industry, and strategic investments in the energy sector, among others. Thus, it will be possible to make an effective start for the vision which has been called ‘Century of Türkiye.’ With that being said, the forthcoming issue of Insight Turkey, building upon the previous edition that delved into Türkiye’s domestic affairs and the upcoming general elections, strives to shed light on Türkiye’s foreign policy while providing a thorough analysis of past general elections. Within this context, the current issue presents a comprehensive compilation of four expert comments and four research articles focusing on the subject matter. Additionally, it broadens the scope by including one off-topic comment and three off-topic research articles, thus enriching the range of topics covered. Our commentary section starts with Talha Köse’s valuable contribution that tackles the relations between Türkiye and the West, in particular with the EU. Emphasizing that President Erdogan’s re-election in the 2023 general elections is considered an unexpected development in Europe and many Western countries, Köse argues that this state of surprise stems from the misinformation of decision-makers and the public in Türkiye and the West by “experts” and “pollsters.” For this reason, the European states, who thought that the Table of Six would come to power, suspended their relations with Türkiye until the elections, while the post-election Erdoğan victory encouraged the European states to congratulate Türkiye’s leader and accept the result as soon as possible. Köse states that various media outlets and think tanks in Europe have taken a more balanced stance against the Turkish president after treating him as an enemy for the last six months, and argues that this situation has started a new era in Türkiye-Europe relations. As the Russia-Ukraine war continues, NATO enlargement remains one of the most important topics in the West. In this context, Arif Bağbaşlıoğlu focuses on NATO-Türkiye relations through the lenses of the enlargement policy by focusing especially on the case of Sweden and Finland. The author expresses Ankara’s stance and cautious attitude towards Finland and Sweden’s NATO membership applications and also emphasizes that Türkiye has been generally a supporter of NATO’s enlargement policies and that NATO’s decision-making process positively affects Türkiye’s relations with candidate countries. In our next commentary, Valeria Giannotta provides an overview of Western media perception of the general election of Türkiye. Gionnotta emphasizes that the Western media included news that was distorted and created a false perception in the general elections in Türkiye, especially in the first round, that it was a biased reading based on ideological connotations and aimed to influence the result of the vote. She continues that the election results should be seen as a lesson on how to look at Türkiye, its government, and its people, and therefore produce more accurate and authentic information, rejecting all kinds of superficial foresight and manipulation attempts. On the other hand, Bünyamin Bezci evaluates in detail the May 2023 elections and the reasons that secured the victory of President Erdoğan and the failure of the opposition. According to Bezci, the most important factor that contributed to President Erdoğan’s victory has been the popular appreciation of his deeds and performance. This issue centers on Turkish foreign policy, and within it, Burhanettin Duran and Kemal İnat present a research article that offers a comprehensive framework for a deeper understanding of the subject. Their article delves into the intricacies of Turkish foreign policy, addressing both regional and global challenges that it encounters. Duran and İnat argue that Türkiye took advantage of the deepening competition between global powers under the AK Party to part ways with its traditional foreign policy tradition and pursue a more independent foreign policy. Accordingly, the country expanded its economic and military capacity significantly during the relevant period to make possible the policy of balance between the West, Russia, and China. Following up, Muhidin Mulalić and Mirsad Karić, focusing on Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans, apply Ulrich Beck’s theory of cosmopolitanism, reflexivity, and risk on Türkiye’s diplomatic relations with the Western Balkans countries. In our next research article, Adnan Özdemir aims to investigate the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on the foreign trade volume of Türkiye. Özdemir’s article discusses the effect of the Russia-Ukraine war on the tourism and contracting sectors, which make the most positive contribution to Türkiye’s current account deficit and are at the forefront of the economic sectors. On the other hand, Laçin İdil Öztığ takes a distinct approach to Turkish foreign policy by focusing on neighboring countries. Her research paper compares Türkiye’s position on the Azerbajani-Armenian conflicts and discusses its impacts and implications in the context of regional dynamics. In this article comparing the strategies implemented by Türkiye in foreign policy by evaluating the first and second Karabakh wars, Öztığ claimed that Türkiye’s support to Azerbaijan in the first Karabakh war was seen as insufficient to change the course of the war, while it played a more assertive role in the second Karabakh war. In an off-topic commentary, Gökhan Çınkara and Batu Çoşkun analyze the Abraham Accords, the subsequent diplomatic initiatives and efforts to create a security umbrella through regional geopolitical shifts, and ideological transformations. The authors state that the main factors behind the emergence of the Abraham Accords were elite preferences in the Persian Gulf, rising nationalism, and the quest for permanent political stability sought by the constituents of the Gulf society. According to Çınkara and Çoşkun, the Abraham Accords is one of the most significant geopolitical developments in the Middle East in this decade. Our spring issue is enriched with three off-topic research articles, expanding the breadth of our coverage. One of these articles, authored by Sarmad Ali Khan and Saira Nawaz Abbasi, delves into the contemporary understanding of warfare in the 21st century, which evolves alongside advancing technologies. Specifically, they address the pressing subject of cyber warfare and its role in unconventional strategic competition. The authors, who claim that the U.S. and China are in competition in every domain, argue that cyberspace is militarized and reveals it as the fifth battleground. According to Khan and Abbasi, cyber campaigns developed by Beijing and Washington for various targets cause a cyber arms race between the two countries. Tunç Demirtaş aims to analyze the Tigray crisis in Ethiopia based on the policies of global and regional powers in the context of the African neo-colonial order and emphasizes that although the colonial system has ended in the international system, the power struggle in Africa continues through neo-colonialism. Last but not least, Ersin Aksoy and Aytaç Kadıoğlu focus on the integration dynamics in the case of Iraqi refugees in Syria. Aiming to analyze barriers to integration by addressing geographic proximity, cultural threat, acceptance processes, political rent, and limited economic resources, the authors evaluate the refugee flow from Iraq to Syria since the 2003 Iraq War in their research papers to understand the impact of these factors. As we witnessed one of the most significant elections –both for Türkiye and the world– on the centennial of the Turkish Republic’s founding, Insight Turkey proudly presents a special issue that meticulously evaluates the elections and examines how Türkiye’s foreign policy will be shaped in their aftermath. Through this special edition, our aim is to offer our readers a comprehensive analysis of Turkish foreign policy, while outlining the implications of the election results in this regard.
Author: Publisher: SET Vakfı İktisadi İşletmesi ISBN: Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 249
Book Description
After the dismemberment of the Ottoman State, even though it lost a huge territory, Turkey chose not to pursue an irredentist foreign policy, and although it was a continuation of the Ottoman State, it did not want to maintain the Ottoman heritage. Instead the Republic of Turkey preferred to follow a pro status quo and a comprehensive Westernist foreign policy orientation. When the Soviet Union threatened Turkey in the wake of the Second World War, Turkey needed to officially be part of the Western world. Therefore, it had to accept the subordination to the liberal Western world and a dependent relationship with the United States due to the requirements of the bipolar world system. In spite of the vertical nature of this relationship, both sides benefitted from this strong and sustainable alliance relationship. On the one hand, the Western alliance provided security against the Soviet threat, military and economic support, and political advantages to Turkey. On the other hand, the Western countries gained a great deal from Turkey, who served as the most important NATO ally in the southeastern European front and hosted military air bases against threats coming from the east. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Turkey continued to be a strategic ally of the West. However, after the changes in the global balance of power, the weakening of the American leadership, and the more assertive and competitive foreign policies of other global powers such as Russia and China, Turkey has decided to search for greater autonomy in its region. Furthermore, the Western states’ policies, especially those of the U.S., have forced Turkey to follow a more independent foreign policy in order to be able to counter the increasing political instability in its regions. More specifically, the Western countries have preferred to collaborate with some anti-Turkish regional actors that threaten Turkey’s national security. Especially after the Western support for the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETÖ) and the Syrian branch of PKK (YPG/PYD), both of which are considered as terrorist organizations by Turkey, the credibility of the Western countries has decreased dramatically in Turkey, leaving no other possible choice than questing for a more autonomous foreign policy. Thus, Turkey has begun to take necessary measures to search for a new and high-level status in the international system. Among others, Turkey has diversified its foreign economic relations and increased its material capacity. To this end, Turkey has begun to develop an Ankara-centered foreign policy and to oppose any developments that are detrimental to its national security. Turkey is still determined to maintain its alliance with the Western countries, but demands to revise the relationship, which became anachronic in the light of developments at a regional and global level. In its search for alternative partners and an independent foreign policy, Turkey has improved its relations with Russia, the main alternative challenger and balancer against the Western/American hegemony. For instance, when the Turkish offer to buy Patriots was rejected by the U.S government, Ankara reached a deal with Russia to buy S-400 missile defense systems. For many years now, Turkey has been asking for a comprehensive reformation in the international system and for a more inclusive approach in which multilateral international platforms such as the United Nations play a bigger role. Furthermore, since the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, the power of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) was consolidated. Three successful operations (Operation Euphrates Shield, Operation Olive Branch, and Operation Peace Spring) were undertaken in northern and northeastern Syria and as a result Turkey has strengthened its position in the Syrian conflict and prevented the projections of other actors involved in the crisis, thus indicating that it is a game changer in the region. Moreover, Turkey has recently initiated the Operation Claw in Northern Iraq against the PKK and has sent two drilling ships (Fatih and Yavuz) and one seismic ship (Barbaros) to the Eastern Mediterranean. In short, when forced, Turkey will be able to take unilateral measures to find solutions for the crises it may face in the future. Notwithstanding these developments, in principle, Turkey never questioned its longtime relations with the West. However, despite its membership of Western regional organizations like NATO, relationship with the Council of Europe and its EU membership process, the Western perception of Turkey has been extremely negative, and Western countries continue to take measures against Ankara. Fearing a loss control over Turkey, the Western powers have been trying to prevent Turkey’s quest for autonomy and punish any step taken in this regard. Furthermore, they have attempted to create an anti-Turkish regional bloc to contain Turkey’s regional effectiveness, i.e. the most recent rapprochement between Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt. Lastly, Western countries consistently support anti-Turkish forces in the region, including terrorist groups. It should also be noted that, at a time of multi-dimensional and multi-layered global threats and challenges, there is a high level of interdependency between Turkey and its NATO allies. European defense still starts from Turkey, especially when it comes to international terrorism and international migration. Therefore, it is very difficult to initiate a paradigm shift in Turkish-West relations. The only way for both sides to overcome the conflictual issues is to accept the new realities and to redefine the alliance relations. On the one hand, the Western countries should accept the new role that Turkey is determined to play in its regions and take the Turkish security concerns into attention. On the other hand, Turkey needs to continue its contributions to the NATO operations and to challenge the threats emanating from the Middle East, since Ankara cannot confront the regional threats by itself. This new issue of Insight Turkey showcases the emergence of Turkey as a regional power in the changing international system and aims to guide readers through the assortment of obstacles within Turkey’s foreign policy and how Turkey’s new diplomacy has navigated the nation to a whole new international arena. Turkey, in a volatile region, has plumbed the depths of autonomy in its foreign policy for the last decade and this has resulted in trouble with Turkey’s strategic and NATO ally, the United States. Ali Balcı’s commentary elucidates the quest of Turkey’s autonomy in the Middle East, where the collaboration with Russia and Iran consolidates its quest. Considering Turkey’s partnership with different actors for more autonomy, Balcı elaborates that the interests of Turkey and the U.S. are clashing in a region, where Turkey is a subordinate actor. The Syrian civil war has been a cardinal phenomenon having defined Turkey’s relationships with its NATO ally, the U.S., and its neighbor and successor of the Soviet Union, Russia. William Hale canonically expounds how the U.S. has condoned Turkey’s security concerns, thereby allowing Turkey to work with Russia in order to ward off the eminent threats emerging from Syria such as ISIS and YPG/PKK. Furthermore, this commentary suggests the tense relationship between Turkey and the U.S. not be taken at face value. As mentioned early, Turkey has been asking for a comprehensive reformation in the international system. The famous motto: “The world is bigger than five,” made famous by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan highlights the increasing need to reform the international system in favor of justice and fair representation for all members of the UN. The lack of social, economic, or humanitarian elements practiced within global governance continues to divide nations between the ‘center’ and ‘periphery.’ Berdal Aral delves deeper into the meaning of this motto and how domestically this idea emerged with the AK Party’s use of morality in governance and connecting more international ties to poorer countries in Asia and Africa. President Erdoğan envisages a more just multipolar world against the damage being done from the privileged few on the Security Council, by reintroducing necessary reforms advocating for peace over power. The relationship between Russia and Turkey has been steadily improving since the fall of the Soviet Union. As cooperation continues to increase, a few hard internal and external challenges have tested whether the relationship between these two great powers can persevere over differing interests. The military-strategic threats these countries face is the main driving force maneuvering these two nations’ relationships. The greatest of these came in 2015 with the downing of the Russian SU-24 bomber aircraft over its violations of Turkish airspace, this example alone caused geopolitical escalations that were crucial to resolve diplomatically. Resolution has been found with partnership in Syria and over arms trade as Turkey sees Russia as a path of diversification away from the West. In this regard, Şener Aktürk explores the various challenges endured and the reaction Russia had to the various threats Turkey has faced in recent years. The Eastern Mediterranean has remained one of the main focus areas of international attention due to the abundant amount of gas reserves around the Levant and island of Cyprus. Lately, Turkey has made sure to show its presence in the region at a time when energy security here has been an increasing issue as global actors compete over resources in the area. Mehmet Efe Biresselioglu discusses Turkey’s position in the contested energy-rich region as it continues to secure its interests in North Cyprus and diversify its own energy. As Turkey maximizes its energy potential, the reactions from surrounding states and the EU has hindered any sense of fair resolution to all regional parties. The unresolved dispute over Cyprus and respect for territorial sovereignty continues to be an ongoing dilemma that can see constructive progress made if Turkey is seen as a strategic partner, and not a part of the problem. The Turkish Lira suffered one of its most severe economic shocks in 2018, sending waves of uncertainty of Turkey’s economic potential worldwide. Among speculation as to what factors inhibit economic shocks on the Turkish market, Nurullah Gür, Mevlüt Tatlıyer, and Şerif Dilek address the view that geopolitical issues and slowed down reform measures are the main culprits to the depreciation. With the decline of the currency against the dollar, the Turkish government swiftly set to decrease the inflation rate and instill real sector reforms with a developmentalist approach to remedy the situation. Turkey continues to develop financial alternatives with reducing reliance on imports and growing in the export market, learning to safeguard against economic shocks has been a testing ground for the Turkish economy in recent years. Murat Ülgül introduces the importance of personal diplomacy, and how it is an effective tool in the modern world, thus making it no surprise that it has increased in practice within Turkey. Ülgül contends that personal diplomacy explains Turkey’s foreign policy better as it is most effective in crisis periods, when there is dominant leadership, and when the political leader is confident about his/her ability to shape policies, all of which are applicable in Turkey. Turkish judiciary faced its biggest crisis on the night of July 15, 2016 during the coup attempt organized by FETÖ members who wanted to bring down the democratically elected government. They, however, did not succeed owing to the sturdy resistance of prosecutors and judges who were determined to uphold the rule of law against the coup-plotters. A prominent lawyer, Hüseyin Aydın, clarifies how the Turkish judiciary has even-handedly conducted the prosecution process since the night of July 15. Convulsed by unrest, Iran has returned to the center of the world’s attention. Farhad Rezaei explores Iran’s aim towards increasing their militarization, as a means of survival even at the cost of destabilizing its regional neighbors, and international discomfort. Dividing Iran’s military doctrine between ideological-political and military-technological, Iran propagates its own notion as an Islamic protectorate and compensates for its military shortcomings, like its relatively weak air force, by bolstering its ballistic sector. To measure Iran’s military-technology by taking inventory of Iran’s military weaponry shows that they are at a disadvantage in the international realm. Therefore, they frequently resort to asymmetrical warfare with the use of proxy groups and cyberwarfare, where they have found limited success. While Iran is likely to continue to develop its weaponry, it is disadvantaged by richer neighbors partnered with America, economic sanctions, and the fact that its intentions on growth are seen more as a threat than domestic development. The last piece of this issue brings attention to the Kashmir Crisis –a simmering conflict– which has long been glossed over by many countries and international organizations yet, it has to be addressed due to the human rights violations in the region. The Public Safety Act, which is a preventive detention law and required to comply with the international law, is used as a political tool to realize the objectives of authorities rather than its advocated primary aim of detaining people. Mohmad Aabit Bhat sheds a light on the covert intentions of the law, which has been “enforced” in the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, with a discursive approach. These past years have been a challenging test for Turkish diplomacy, as fluctuating relationships and conflicting interests have been at the foreground, whether it’s in the warzone of Syria or on the international stage at the UN. Insight Turkey’s last issue for 2019 “Turkey’s New Foreign Policy: A Quest for Autonomy” analyses how Turkey with great stamina has proven that it is a strong cooperative player and balancer between the polarities of the world, as a voice for the oppressed and a pillar of strength among the dominant forces in the world.
Author: Ayşe Avcı Publisher: SET Vakfı İktisadi İşletmesi ISBN: Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 280
Book Description
On May 14, 2023, Türkiye will hold both the presidential and the parliamentarian elections, in which the Turkish people will choose the president and all 600 members of the Turkish Parliament. This will be the second elections since the transition to the presidential system in 2017. After the first elections, held in June 2018, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected as the first president of the new governmental system, and AK Party received more than 42 percent of the total votes, winning almost half of the seats in parliament. As in the first elections, two major political blocs will compete, namely, the People’s Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı) and the Nation Alliance (Millet İttifakı). The People’s Alliance bloc consists of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AK Party) led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) led by Devlet Bahçeli, the Great Unity Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi, BBP) led by Mustafa Destici, the New Welfare Party (Yeniden Refah Partisi, YRP) led by Fatih Erbakan and the Free Cause Party (Hür Dava Partisi, HÜDA-PAR) led by Zekeriya Yapıcıoğlu. The second political bloc, the Nation Alliance also known as the Table of Six (Altılı Masa), is made up of six-plus-one political parties. The alliance, which was initially formed in May 2018 by four political parties, now consists of six parties, while one party supports the bloc from outside. The Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) led by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and the Good Party (İyi Parti, İP) led by Meral Akşener are the two main allies. They were/are officially supported by four smaller political parties. The Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) led by Gültekin Uysal represents the center right, while the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) led by Temel Karamollaoğlu is the continuation of Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamic political tradition. The two additional political parties, the Future Party (Gelecek Partisi, GP) led by Ahmet Davutoğlu and the Democracy and Progress Party (Demokrasi ve Atılım Partisi, DEVA Party) led by Ali Babacan are breakaway groups from the ruling AK Party. They have recently joined the Nation Alliance in an attempt to overthrow the ruling party, which has been in power for the last two decades. In addition to these six political parties, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP) led by Pervin Buldan and Mithat Sancar, also supports the Nation Alliance. However, it did not become an official partner of the Nation Alliance, since some partners of the alliance, most notably the İP, generally representing the secular Turkish nationalists, oppose the alliance with HDP due to its close connections with PKK. Therefore, although HDP has declared its support for the candidacy of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, it has not joined the alliance. It has become obvious that two political alliances will dominate the election process, therefore there are effectively only two main presidential candidates. While the People’s Alliance has nominated Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Nation Alliance has nominated Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu for the presidential post. Concurrently, there are two additional candidates, Muharrem İnce and Sinan Oğan, supported by other small political parties that will no doubt influence the election results, however they are not expected to get more than a small percentage of the vote. The two opposing and conflicting political blocs represent an almost absolute mutual exclusive perspective about the future of Türkiye and the politics of the country, reflecting the increasing polarization of Turkish politics. These two alliances have two opposite and conflictual perspectives of Türkiye. The People’s Alliance emerged as a consequence of a domestic stance against the attacks Türkiye faced after the bloody coup attempt by FETÖ on July 15, 2016, which led to many major changes in the country. The alliance aims to maintain the current government, to consolidate the current presidential system, to continue the country’s transformation program, to protect the country against both internal and external threats, to increase its deterrent military power, to strengthen its economic development, and to globalize its diplomatic power. The Nation Alliance, on the other hand, was formed as a reaction to the People’s Alliance, since no one political party was/is able to challenge the power of AK Party and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The alliance is determined to reverse the course of politics in the country and to reverse many of the changes made by the AK Party governments. It claims that if it wins the elections, it will initiate a process of restoration, revive the old political system, change the regime, revive the old, and turn to the status quo ante. However, the Nation Alliance is quite a vulnerable and fractured opposition bloc. It seems that while the Nation Alliance agrees on what it does not want, specifically the rule of the AK Party, the bloc does not know what it wants instead. There is no real consensus among the fragmented opposition parties about the future of the country. Not only do different political parties expect different developments, even different wings within certain political parties make different suggestions. For example, some officials of the biggest partner of the Nation Alliance, the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), has declared that they will apologize (helalleşmek) to certain mistreated groups such as the women who were excluded from education and work because they chose to wear Islamic clothing. On the other hand, some other representatives and supporters emphasize that they will take revenge (hesaplaşmak) against other groups close to AK Party. Another important event that reflects the division within and the brittleness of the Nation Alliance is related to the announcement of their presidential candidate. Not only did it take more than ten meetings and several months for them to decide, but at the end of the process, the leader of İP, Akşener, left the block as she (and her party) did not approve the candidacy of Kılıçdaroğlu. Nevertheless, she came back to the table just one day later accepting Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy but adding two new names, Ekrem İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş, CHP mayors of İstanbul and Ankara respectively, to the existing five vice-presidents. Indeed, for a long time, Akşener had been campaigning that one of these two men be selected for the presidential candidacy. The upcoming elections, which are held on the centennial anniversary of the Turkish Republic, put Türkiye at an important crossroads. It seems that two conflictual perspectives, the bloc that supports the consolidation of the presidential system and the bloc that supports a regime change, will collide. While the People’s Alliance emphasize autonomy in foreign policy and seeks to achieve regional leadership, the Nation Alliance promote an inward-looking political system and withdrawal from regional issues. Whatever the position of the bloc, one thing is for sure: The Turkish people want a strong leadership in foreign policy during this crucial global transition period. The turnout in Turkish elections is relatively high, generally over 80 percent, which is one of the highest in the world. Considering the politicization in the people’s daily lives, political polarization and the harsh political dialogue, it seems that the turnout in the upcoming elections will be even higher. Furthermore, the earthquake disaster of February 6 has further exacerbated and aroused the political fault lines. However, at the end of this high level of democratic competition and turnout in elections, Turkish democracy will be the winner, and it will be consolidated. Taking into consideration these developments and the importance of the elections -not only for Türkiye but for the regional and global affairs as well- this issue of Insight Turkey tackles some of the most important and determinative topics influencing the results. Disinformation has been one of the most noticeable ramifications we are experiencing of the digital revolution. At the same time, Türkiye, situated in a geopolitical hotspot, is one of the countries that is both a target and a hub of disinformation campaigns in the region. Within this context, Fahrettin Altun, the Presidency Communications Director has penned a commentary addressing misinformation and disinformation with a special focus on Türkiye and the initiatives undertaken by Communication Directorate. Within the same line of thought, Yenal Göksun provides an overview of Türkiye’s strategic communication policy and evolution of the Turkish communication model and the current strategic communication initiatives undertaken by the Directorate of Communications. According to Göksun, Türkiye’s evolving development and foreign policy agenda, which has developed rapidly in the last 20 years, has pushed it to undertake more ambitious efforts in the field of communication and public diplomacy, and as a result, innovations have been made in strategic communication policies. Turning to one of the most discussed issues in recent years in Türkiye’s politics, Cem Duran Uzun focuses on the country’s presidential system and the different government systems proposed by various parties before the 2023 elections. He specifically focuses on the differences between the U.S. presidential system and Türkiye’s administrative system, which overhauled its political system in 2017 and replaced the parliamentary system with a Turkish-style presidential system. Following up, Hamit Emrah Beriş evaluates the key issues in Turkish politics before the 2023 elections. Beriş argues that the 2023 elections are one of the most important in Türkiye’s history and four main topics determined the fate of the elections: refugees, the economy, rising nationalism, and the Kurdish question. The author focuses on serious differences of opinion between the ruling and opposition blocs on the solution to these problems. According to Beriş, the 2023 elections will show whether the approaches of the ruling or opposition wing are in line with the expectations of Turkish society. In our next research article, Ravza Altuntaş Çakır aims to investigate the relationship between ethnic Muslim minority identity and transnational Muslim solidarity, with emphasis on HÜDA-PAR, the most organized political Islamic organization and the second largest political party in Southeast Türkiye. In her paper, Çakır examines how the concept of ummah motivates the party’s domestic/ideological, national and transnational political discourses and initiatives, and also deals with the uncertainties that a mostly abstract and idealist ummahist approach to modern politics brings in the face of Kurdish nationalism, regional realpolitik, and democratic pluralism. As mentioned previously, refugees are another important issue for the forthcoming elections. In that respect, the article by Hatice Karahan and Öznur Gülen Ertosun examines the various dynamics that Syrian women under temporary protection face in the labor market in Türkiye. Technology has become a driving force in the global affairs and Türkiye has been taking all the necessary steps to take advantage of new developments. Within this line of thought, Serdal Temel in his commentary argues that Türkiye, an emerging economy, has been attempting to improve its socioeconomic strength through the promotion of research and development (R&D), innovation, and technological development activities. The author underlines that since the 2000s, the government has implemented support programs focused on developing the innovation capacity of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and universities, and emphasizes that these programs are diversified as support for ecosystem improvements as well as support for patenting, commercialization and entrepreneurship. In another article, Nurettin Akçay and Guo Changgang, discuss China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Türkiye’s Middle Corridor (MC) projects, which have a common goal of connecting Europe and Asia, as well as facilitating commercial, economic, political and socio-cultural interactions between the two continents. In this commentary, which aims to examine the history, objectives and stages of Türkiye’s MC, Akçay and Changgang harmonizes the BRI with the MC and examines the inherent risks and challenges of integration as well as opportunities for the region. Our final commentary by Şafak Oğuz, analyzes the possible consequences of the F-35 fighter crisis between the U.S. and Türkiye, particularly in terms of its effect on the tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) deployed in Türkiye as part of NATO’s nuclear sharing program. Three off-topic research articles enrich the scope of our special issue. Eldar Hasanoğlu and Oğuzhan Çağlıyan investigate, with the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, how the Israeli diplomacy initiative took on greater importance in maintaining its presence and reputation internationally. In their article, the authors analyze Israel’s approach to COVID-19 diplomacy, which involved providing medical teams, PPE, and surplus vaccines to approximately 20 countries, and examine the political and strategic calculations behind Israel’s decision to extend assistance to specific countries. Focusing on the religious conflicts in Kashmir, Resul Yalçın and Umair Gul seek to try to contextualize the search for the “secular” while examining the construction of Muslim identity, the institution of martyrdom, and its social basis in Kashmir. They define Kashmir as a festering political problem receiving little global attention. Lastly, Bashkim Rrahmani and Majlinda Belegu focus on the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue. They discuss the important issues linked with the dialogue that is being facilitated and negotiated by the EU, including essential activities, challenges, obstacles, antagonisms, the approach the EU facilitators/mediators undertake, as well as the reaction and the expected results that the parties involved in the process have regarding reaching a final solution to the dispute. As Türkiye is on the eve on one of the most important elections in its history, this issue of Insight Turkey addresses some of the issues that have been dominating the political agenda lately. Through this issue, we hope to provide our readers with a thorough analysis and the necessary foundations for a better understanding of some of the main issues that will influence the outcome of the May 14 elections.
Author: Publisher: SET Vakfı İktisadi İşletmesi ISBN: Category : Antiques & Collectibles Languages : en Pages : 305
Book Description
This issue of Insight Turkey comes with a different format and brings to its readers two different topics that require special attention when we consider the latest regional and global affairs. The planned topic was Central Asia; however, the early presidential and parliamentarian elections in Turkey led us to cover a second topic in the issue. First, the current issue focuses on a forgotten but very important region of Central Asia. The second section of the journal comprises commentaries and articles on the latest elections in Turkey, how to understand them and what could be the future of the presidential system. Central Asia is one of the most geostrategic and penetrated regions in the world. The founding father of geopolitics, the British geographer Sir Halford John Mackinder, considers Central Asia as a part of the “heartland.” The control of Central Asia, a region stretching from the Caspian Sea in the west to China in the east, is a precondition of the world hegemony. Throughout the 20th century, the Central Asian countries were under the rule of the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the republics of Central Asia re-emerged as independent actors of international politics. Later, they were declared as “near abroad” by Russia; that is, they were kept close to Russia through several multilateral platforms. Nowadays, Central Asian countries, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, face many challenges such as underdevelopment, poor governance and corruption, mutual mistrust between neighbors, fear of radicalism, and threats from neighboring global powers. The governments of the regional countries must work together in order to be able to overcome these challenges. They need to increase intra-regional trade and to de-securitize their relations with other countries. Central Asian countries are squeezed between two heavyweight powers, Russia and China. With the revitalization of the historical Silk Road by China, many observers began to discuss the increasing importance and role of the Central Asian countries. Central Asia will be the main ground for intra-East regional and global competition. The mostly Turkic and Muslim countries can play the role of game changers at least, between the two global actors. Turkey, a country which shares the same language, history and culture with the Central Asian countries, is also one of the effective actors in the region. After an unprepared and unsuccessful attempt to forge links, in the wake of their independence in the 1990s, Turkey has improved its relations with the Turkic states and now has multi-dimensional relations (economic, cultural, political, and security) with these countries. The transformation of the Turkish political system into a presidential one, after the April 16, 2017 referendum, was finalized with the June 24, 2018 elections, when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected as the first Turkish president in the context of the new presidential system. Naturally, many questions have risen in terms of the transformation of the new system and its impact on Turkey’s foreign policy. This issue of Insight Turkey aims to discuss this political transformation. Turkey has been governed by a multi-party parliamentarian system for decades. The country has experienced several chaotic periods due to political instabilities, mainly as a result of coalition or weak governments. Since Turkey could not end the bureaucratic (especially military and judiciary) tutelage, it could not consolidate its democracy under the parliamentarian system. Therefore, many politicians such as Necmettin Erbakan and Süleyman Demirel asked for the transformation of the system into a presidential one. At a time when the whole world has been experiencing a transformation, Turkey has also decided to consolidate its political authority; and therefore, it has decided to transform its political system into a unified and strong executive power in order to be able to struggle against emerging threats. Ultimately, as a regional power and global actor, Turkey now has a strong political leadership, who plays an effective role in international politics. In this issue, we bring four manuscripts which analyze in detail the June 2018 elections and the new presidential system in Turkey. On the verge of the reorganization process in Turkey, Zahid Sobacı, Özer Köseoğlu, and Nebi Miş in their article provide a legal and institutional analysis of how the public policy process and the roles and responsibilities of policy actors have changed with the new system. Understanding the actual elections of June 24 is also very important. In the light of this, the detailed election analyses of Ali Çarkoğlu and Kerem Yıldırım provide an exemplary source. Furthermore, Hüseyin Alptekin’s article deals specifically with the patterns of Kurdish votes in 24 eastern Turkish cities and contends that intra-Kurdish and intra-regional differences have prevailed in the June 24 elections. The last piece on the elections is the commentary written by Ali Yaşar Sarıbay which addresses the factors that led to the new system in Turkey through historical and sociological processes. Six other manuscripts bring a general perspective on the regional and global affairs in Central Asia. Experts in this area analyze the Russian-Chinese competition in the region, the responses of the Central Asian states and Turkey’s comeback in Central Asia. Morena Skalamera, focusing on the rivalry between global and regional powers in Central Asia, i.e. Russia, China, the U.S., Turkey, etc., intends to explain the Central Asian governments’ failure to capitalize on these developments. Mariya Omelicheva and Ruoxi Du, on the other hand, shed light on why Russia has abstained from a possible conflict with China when it comes to the Central Asian energy and transportation networks by arguing that Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy has played a crucial role in this regard. This issue places a special emphasis on Kazakhstan, considering that it is one of the most important regional states. In the light of this, the articles of Azhar Serikkaliyeva et al. and Aidar Kurmashev et al. focus on the China-Kazakhstan strategic partnership and Kazakhstan’s example of fighting terrorism respectively. Lastly, as the title of this issue suggests, Turkey is redirecting its attention to Central Asia as a part of its recent foreign policy strategies. In this regards, Bayram Balcı and Thomas Liles provide a brief analysis of Turkey’s relations with Central Asian states in the political, economic, and cultural areas. Furthermore, Eşref Yalınkılıçlı focuses especially on Turkey’s relationship and cooperation with Uzbekistan, which in the new era seems indispensable for the sake of the former’s interests and influences in the region. Three off-topic manuscripts conclude this issue of Insight Turkey. As Trump directs the U.S. towards isolation and continues Obama’s policy of retrenchment in the Middle East, other actors such as the UK will attempt to fill the void. Within this context, Gareth Stansfield, Doug Stokes, and Saul Kelly in their article analyze the UK’s return to the region and its implication for the balance of power in the region. Vladimir Bobrovnikov brings attention to the making of the intolerant discourse on Islam in Soviet and Imperial Russia and the attempts to integrate applied Oriental studies into the general debates on Orientalism. Written by Emrah Kekilli, the last commentary focuses on the ongoing Libya crisis and its forthcoming elections. Placing the main fault upon UAE’s intervention, Kekilli contends that the crisis in Libya reflects the regional interests. With one more year coming to an end, we are pleased to present to our readers another insightful issue which aims to bring attention to the largely ignored region of Central Asia. Furthermore, the latest transformations in Turkey deserve to be analyzed thoroughly and presented to those readers interested in Turkey’s politics. With the trust that you will find this issue illuminating and interesting, we look forward to meeting you in the next year’s issues.
Author: Philipp O. Amour Publisher: Springer Nature ISBN: 3030454657 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 455
Book Description
This book examines the regional order in the Gulf Region and the wider Middle East, focusing on regional rivalries and security alliances. The authors analyze the regional system in terms of its general structure as well as the major inter-state and non-state security alliances. The structure of the regional system in the wider Middle East and the shake-ups it has experienced explain the ongoing regional rivalry and polarization since 2011 in hotspots such as Syria, Yemen, and Libya. As such, the various chapters address regional transition and power dynamics between and among regional great powers and non-state militant actors across the Gulf Region and the wider Middle East in terms of the alliance building, persistence, and disintegration since 2011.
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Author: Nader Entessar
Author: Emad Y. Kaddorah
Author: Michael Stephens
Author: Adnan Özdemi̇r
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Author: Ayşe Avcı
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Author: Philipp O. Amour