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Author: Publisher: ISBN: 9789178955251 Category : Economics Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This thesis uses field experiments, lab experiments, and theory to study questions that are relevant to the fields of education and behavioral economics.??The first paper, Threshold Incentives and Academic Performance, begins with the observation that students often face incentives to reach performance thresholds. To study how these incentives affect their performance, Erik Wengström and I conduct a field experiment in which we incentivize students with €300 to reach a certain GPA. We find that, when the incentives are in place, only students just below the threshold improve their performance. However, when we remove the incentives, incentivized students enroll in fewer courses and pass fewer courses. The reason is that treated students who fail to reach the threshold lose confidence in their academic ability. Our results suggest that the current threshold incentives that are in place in education might reduce the performance of students who fail to reach them.??The second paper, Helping Behavior and Group Size, studies people's helping behavior when they are in groups with others. A large literature in psychology shows that people are less likely to help others when they are in a group than when they are alone, a phenomenon called the Bystander Effect. This paper studies whether people are less likely to help in groups because they hope that others help instead. In an experiment where a person in need loses money over time until one bystander pays a cost to help her, I find evidence supporting this hypothesis.??The third paper, The Group Bystander Effect, investigates whether groups of one person or several people are more likely to implement a morally desirable outcome (such as, for example, helping a person in need). I formulate and test a model in which a moral outcome is implemented as long as at least one agent takes a costly action. I show that 1) if most people are moral, the moral outcome is more likely to be implemented by one person alone, whereas 2) if most people are immoral, the moral outcome is more likely to be implemented by a group. I discuss that this simple rule may be applied to better design organizations and institutions.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: 9789178955251 Category : Economics Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This thesis uses field experiments, lab experiments, and theory to study questions that are relevant to the fields of education and behavioral economics.??The first paper, Threshold Incentives and Academic Performance, begins with the observation that students often face incentives to reach performance thresholds. To study how these incentives affect their performance, Erik Wengström and I conduct a field experiment in which we incentivize students with €300 to reach a certain GPA. We find that, when the incentives are in place, only students just below the threshold improve their performance. However, when we remove the incentives, incentivized students enroll in fewer courses and pass fewer courses. The reason is that treated students who fail to reach the threshold lose confidence in their academic ability. Our results suggest that the current threshold incentives that are in place in education might reduce the performance of students who fail to reach them.??The second paper, Helping Behavior and Group Size, studies people's helping behavior when they are in groups with others. A large literature in psychology shows that people are less likely to help others when they are in a group than when they are alone, a phenomenon called the Bystander Effect. This paper studies whether people are less likely to help in groups because they hope that others help instead. In an experiment where a person in need loses money over time until one bystander pays a cost to help her, I find evidence supporting this hypothesis.??The third paper, The Group Bystander Effect, investigates whether groups of one person or several people are more likely to implement a morally desirable outcome (such as, for example, helping a person in need). I formulate and test a model in which a moral outcome is implemented as long as at least one agent takes a costly action. I show that 1) if most people are moral, the moral outcome is more likely to be implemented by one person alone, whereas 2) if most people are immoral, the moral outcome is more likely to be implemented by a group. I discuss that this simple rule may be applied to better design organizations and institutions.
Author: Ruth W. Grant Publisher: Princeton University Press ISBN: 0691151601 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 222
Book Description
The legitimate and illegitimate use of incentives in society today Incentives can be found everywhere—in schools, businesses, factories, and government—influencing people's choices about almost everything, from financial decisions and tobacco use to exercise and child rearing. So long as people have a choice, incentives seem innocuous. But Strings Attached demonstrates that when incentives are viewed as a kind of power rather than as a form of exchange, many ethical questions arise: How do incentives affect character and institutional culture? Can incentives be manipulative or exploitative, even if people are free to refuse them? What are the responsibilities of the powerful in using incentives? Ruth Grant shows that, like all other forms of power, incentives can be subject to abuse, and she identifies their legitimate and illegitimate uses. Grant offers a history of the growth of incentives in early twentieth-century America, identifies standards for judging incentives, and examines incentives in four areas—plea bargaining, recruiting medical research subjects, International Monetary Fund loan conditions, and motivating students. In every case, the analysis of incentives in terms of power yields strikingly different and more complex judgments than an analysis that views incentives as trades, in which the desired behavior is freely exchanged for the incentives offered. Challenging the role and function of incentives in a democracy, Strings Attached questions whether the penchant for constant incentivizing undermines active, autonomous citizenship. Readers of this book are sure to view the ethics of incentives in a new light.
Author: Stefano Fiorin Publisher: ISBN: Category : Business ethics Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
I show that offering monetary rewards to whistleblowers can backfire as a moral aversion to being paid for harming others can reverse the effect of financial incentives. I run a field experiment with employees of the Afghan Ministry of Education, who are asked to confidentially report on their colleagues’ attendance. I use a two-by-two design, randomizing whether or not reporting absence carries a monetary incentive as well as the perceived consequentiality of the reports. In the consequential treatment arm, where employees are given examples of the penalties that might be imposed on absentees, 15% of participants choose to denounce their peers when reports are not incentivized. In this consequential group, rewards backfire: only 10% of employees report when denunciations are incentivized. In the non-consequential group, where participants are guaranteed that their reports will not be forwarded to the government, only 6% of employees denounce absence without rewards. However, when moral concerns of harming others are limited through the guarantee of non-consequentiality, rewards do not backfire: the incentivized reporting rate is 12%.
Author: James M. Briesmeister Publisher: John Wiley & Sons ISBN: 0470140399 Category : Psychology Languages : en Pages : 578
Book Description
A guide to the latest tools for teaching effective and positive parenting skills In the last three decades, parent training has established itself as an empirically sound, highly successful, and cost-effective intervention strategy for both pre-venting and treating behavior disorders in children. Handbook of Parent Training, Third Edition offers a unique opportunity to learn about the latest research findings and clinical developments in parent training from leading innovators in the field. Featuring new chapters, this thoroughly revised and updated edition covers issues that have emerged in recent years. Readers will find the latest information on such topics as: * Behavioral family intervention for childhood anxiety * Working with parents of aggressive school-age children * Preventive parent training techniques that support low-income, ethnic minority parents of preschoolers * Treating autism and Asperger's Syndrome * Parenting and learning tools including role playing and modeling positive and effective parenting styles Offering practical advice and guidance for parent training, each chapter author begins by identifying a specific problem and then describes the best approach to identifying, assessing, and treating the problem. In every instance, descriptions of therapeutic techniques are multimodal and integrate theory, research, implementation strategies, and extensive case material. Handbook of Parent Training, Third Edition is a valuable professional resource for child psychologists, school psychologists, and all mental health professionals with an interest in parent skills training.
Author: Samuel Bowles Publisher: Yale University Press ISBN: 0300221088 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 283
Book Description
Should the idea of economic man—the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus—determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding “no.” Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may “crowd out” ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends.
Author: Carolyn M. Warner Publisher: Princeton University Press ISBN: 1400823684 Category : Political Science Languages : en Pages : 266
Book Description
Following World War II, the Catholic Church in Europe faced the challenge of establishing political influence with newly emerging democratic governments. The Church became, as Carolyn Warner pointedly argues, an interest group like any other, seeking to attain and solidify its influence by forming alliances with political parties. The author analyzes the Church's differing strategies in Italy, France, and Germany using microeconomic theories of the firm and historical institutionalism. She demonstrates how only a strategic perspective can explain the choice and longevity of the alliances in each case. In so doing, the author challenges earlier work that ignores the costs to interest groups and parties of sustaining or breaking their reciprocal links. Confessions of an Interest Group challenges the view of the Catholic Church as solely a moral force whose interests are seamlessly represented by the Christian Democratic parties. Blending theory, cultural narrative, and archival research, Warner demonstrates that the French Church's superficial and brief connection with a political party was directly related to its loss of political influence during the War. The Italian Church's power, on the other hand, remained stable through the War, so the Church and the Christian Democrats more easily found multiple grounds for long-term cooperation. The German Church chose yet another path, reluctantly aligning itself with a new Catholic-Protestant party. This book is an important work that expands the growing literature on the economics of religion, interest group behavior, and the politics of the Catholic Church.
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Author: Ruth W. Grant
Author: Homer Ross Greene
Author: Stefano Fiorin
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Author: James M. Briesmeister
Author: Samuel Bowles
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Author: Carolyn M. Warner