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Author: Jiawei Chen Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
I investigate the effects of switching costs on the market outcome in network industries using a dynamic duopoly model of price competition in the presence of an outside option. I find that the role of switching costs depends on network effects and the outside option. Without a viable outside option, high switching costs can neutralize the tendency towards high market concentration associated with network effects, but with a viable outside option, switching costs increase market concentration. Furthermore, switching costs lower prices if network effects are modest and there exists a viable outside option, but generally raise prices otherwise.
Author: Jiawei Chen Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
I investigate the effects of switching costs on the market outcome in network industries using a dynamic duopoly model of price competition in the presence of an outside option. I find that the role of switching costs depends on network effects and the outside option. Without a viable outside option, high switching costs can neutralize the tendency towards high market concentration associated with network effects, but with a viable outside option, switching costs increase market concentration. Furthermore, switching costs lower prices if network effects are modest and there exists a viable outside option, but generally raise prices otherwise.
Author: Jiawei Chen Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
Motivated by policy makers' recent interest in reducing switching costs in various network industries to increase competition, this paper investigates how switching costs affect market outcome in such industries. The results show that the effects of switching costs on market concentration and prices critically depend on two factors: the strength of network effects and the quality of the outside good. For example, switching costs lower prices if network effects are modest and the outside good is attractive, but raise prices otherwise. Therefore, policy makers need to carefully evaluate those two factors in order to make informed decisions.
Author: Jiawei Chen Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 33
Book Description
This paper investigates firms' decisions to reimburse consumers' switching costs in network industries. Prior literature finds that switching costs incentivize firms to harvest their locked-in consumers rather than price aggressively for market dominance, resulting in a lower market concentration. Using a dynamic duopoly model, we show that this result is reversed if firms have the option to reimburse consumers' switching costs. In that case the larger firm offers a bigger reimbursement to switching consumers than the smaller firm does, as an additional instrument to propel itself to market dominance. Consequently, an increase in switching cost increases market concentration. Compared to the case without reimbursements, allowing firms the option to reimburse results in greater consumer welfare despite having a much higher market concentration. Consumers' benefits from a larger network and switching cost reimbursement outweigh the higher price charged by a dominant firm.
Author: Jiawei Chen Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 24
Book Description
This paper investigates how switching costs affect product compatibility and market dynamics in network industries. A reduction in the switching cost makes the firms' products more attractive relative to the outside good, which diminishes the market expansion benefit of making products compatible. As a result, the larger firm is more likely to veto compatibility in order to maintain its installed base advantage over its rival. Therefore, public policies that reduce switching costs in network industries can change the market outcome from compatible products to incompatible products. In the former, price competition is mild and the market is often fragmented, whereas in the latter, there is fierce price competition when firms are of comparable size and in the long run the market is likely dominated by one firm.
Author: Wei He Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
With the presence of both switching cost and network externality, this paper builds a two-stage model for competition between two platforms. In stage one, an incumbent platform controls the market as a monopolist and sets a price to acquire a user base. In stage two, a new platform enters the market to compete against the incumbent. We consider a non-strategic competitor with a free product in the benchmark model and also extend the model to allow for a strategic competitor. Our main results show: (1) When the switching cost is relatively high and the network externality is relatively low, the first mover adopts a closed strategy by maintaining a high price in stage two and harvesting profits from its original users. (2) When the switching cost is relatively low and the network externality is relatively high, the first mover adopts an open strategy by setting a low price to acquire more users in stage two, and the first-mover advantage based on the presence of switching cost will become ineffective. Our work rationalizes the coexistence of high competition and high concentration in a market with strong network externality, and thus provides a reasonable explanation for the existing paradox: even though the internet industry is much more competitive than traditional industries, the concentration level of internet industry is still higher than that of traditional industries.
Author: Hal R. Varian Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 1139456725 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 114
Book Description
The Economics of Information Technology is a concise and accessible review of some of the important economic factors affecting information technology industries. These industries are characterized by high fixed costs and low marginal costs of production, large switching costs for users, and strong network effects. These factors combine to produce some unique behavior. The book consists of two parts. In the first part, Professor Varian outlines the basic economics of these industries. In the second part, Professors Farrell and Shapiro describe the impact of these factors on competition policy. The clarity of the analysis and exposition makes this an ideal introduction for undergraduate and graduate students in economics, business strategy, law and related areas.
Author: David Gabel Publisher: Springer ISBN: 9781461554844 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 245
Book Description
David Gabel and David F. Weiman The chapters in this volwne address the related problems of regulating and pricing access in network industries. Interconnection between network suppliers raises the important policy questions of how to sustain competition and realize economic efficiency. To foster rivalry in any industry, suppliers must have access to customers. But unlike in other sectors, the very organization of network industries creates major impediments to potential entrants trying to carve out a niche in the market. In traditional sectors such as gas, electric, rail, and telephone services, these barriers take the form of the large private and social costs necessary to duplicate the physical infrastructure of pipelines, wires, or tracks. Few firms can afford to finance such an undertaking, because the level of sunk costs and the very large scale economies make it extremely risky. In other newer sectors, entrants face less tangible but no less pressing constraints. In the microcomputer industry, for example, high switching costs can prevent users from experimenting with alternative, but perhaps more efficient hardware platforms or operating systems. Although gateway technologies can reduce these barriers, the installed base of an incumbent can create powerful bandwagon effects that reinforce its advantage (such as the greater availability of compatible peripherals and software applications). In the era of electronic banking, entrants into the automated teller machine· (A TM) and credit card markets face a similar problem of establishing a ubiquitous presence.
Author: Jens-Uwe Franck Publisher: Centre on Regulation in Europe asbl (CERRE) ISBN: Category : Law Languages : en Pages : 96
Book Description
With the rise of digital platforms and the natural tendency of markets involving platforms to become concentrated, competition authorities and courts are more frequently in a position to investigate and decide merger and abuse cases that involve platforms. This report provides guidance on how to define markets and on how to assess market power when dealing with two-sided platforms. DEFINITION Competition authorities and courts are well advised to uniformly use a multi-markets approach when defining markets in the context of two-sided platforms. The multi-markets approach is the more flexible instrument compared to the competing single-market approach that defines a single market for both sides of a platform, as the former naturally accounts for different substitution possibilities by the user groups on the two sides of the platform. While one might think of conditions under which a single-market approach could be feasible, the necessary conditions are so severe that it would only be applicable under rare circumstances. To fully appreciate business activities in platform markets from a competition law point of view, and to do justice to competition law’s purpose, which is to protect consumer welfare, the legal concept of a “market” should not be interpreted as requiring a price to be paid by one party to the other. It is not sufficient to consider the activities on the “unpaid side” of the platform only indirectly by way of including them in the competition law analysis of the “paid side” of the platform. Such an approach would exclude certain activities and ensuing positive or negative effects on consumer welfare altogether from the radar of competition law. Instead, competition practice should recognize straightforwardly that there can be “markets” for products offered free of charge, i.e. without monetary consideration by those who receive the product. ASSESSMENT The application of competition law often requires an assessment of market power. Using market shares as indicators of market power, in addition to all the difficulties in standard markets, raises further issues for two-sided platforms. When calculating revenue shares, the only reasonable option is to use the sum of revenues on all sides of the platform. Then, such shares should not be interpreted as market shares as they are aggregated over two interdependent markets. Large revenue shares appear to be a meaningful indicator of market power if all undertakings under consideration serve the same sides. However, they are often not meaningful if undertakings active in the relevant markets follow different business models. Given potentially strong cross-group external effects, market shares are less apt in the context of two-sided platforms to indicate market power (or the lack of it). Barriers to entry are at the core of persistent market power and, thus, the entrenchment of incumbent platforms. They deserve careful examination by competition authorities. Barriers to entry may arise due to users’ coordination failure in the presence of network effect. On two-sided platforms, users on both sides of the market have to coordinate their expectations. Barriers to entry are more likely to be present if an industry does not attract new users and if it does not undergo major technological change. Switching costs and network effects may go hand in hand: consumer switching costs sometimes depend on the number of platform users and, in this case, barriers to entry from consumer switching costs increase with platform size. Since market power is related to barriers to entry, the absence of entry attempts may be seen as an indication of market power. However, entry threats may arise from firms offering quite different services, as long as they provide a new home for users’ attention and needs.
Author: Jiawei Chen
Author: Jiawei Chen
Author: Jiawei Chen
Author: Jiawei Chen
Author: Jiawei Chen
Author: Irina Suleymanova
Author: Oz Shy
Author: Wei He
Author: Hal R. Varian
Author: David Gabel
Author: Jens-Uwe Franck