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Author: William J. Mayew Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This paper considers the potential for public information disclosures to complement the existing private information of financial analysts. In such a setting, analysts allowed to participate during earnings conference calls by asking questions receive public signals that can facilitate the generation of new and valuable private information for the asking analyst. Realizing these public signals are valuable for the asking analyst, managers can use their discretion to discriminate among analysts by granting more participation to more favorable analysts. I use post Regulation FD conference call transcripts to document that the probability of an analyst asking a question during an earnings conference call is increasing in the favorableness of the analyst's outstanding stock recommendation. I also find that downgrades are associated with decreases in access to management during the conference call relative to other recommendation change activity. Analyst prestige moderates these effects. Favorable and prestigious analysts have higher participation probabilities than favorable and unprestigous analysts. Further, downgrades result in participation decreases only for unprestigous analysts. These findings are consistent with practitioner and regulatory concerns that managers discriminate among analysts by allowing more management access to more favorable analysts.
Author: William J. Mayew Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
This paper considers the potential for public information disclosures to complement the existing private information of financial analysts. In such a setting, analysts allowed to participate during earnings conference calls by asking questions receive public signals that can facilitate the generation of new and valuable private information for the asking analyst. Realizing these public signals are valuable for the asking analyst, managers can use their discretion to discriminate among analysts by granting more participation to more favorable analysts. I use post Regulation FD conference call transcripts to document that the probability of an analyst asking a question during an earnings conference call is increasing in the favorableness of the analyst's outstanding stock recommendation. I also find that downgrades are associated with decreases in access to management during the conference call relative to other recommendation change activity. Analyst prestige moderates these effects. Favorable and prestigious analysts have higher participation probabilities than favorable and unprestigous analysts. Further, downgrades result in participation decreases only for unprestigous analysts. These findings are consistent with practitioner and regulatory concerns that managers discriminate among analysts by allowing more management access to more favorable analysts.
Author: Jonathan A. Milian Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Through the textual analysis of a large sample of earnings conference calls, the authors find that analysts praise management on over half of earnings conference calls by saying complimentary phrases such as “congratulations on the great quarter.” The results show that analysts' complimentary phrases reflect the nature of the information released at the earnings announcement. The authors find that the amount of praise by analysts on an earnings conference call is strongly associated with the earnings surprise and to a greater extent the earnings announcement stock return. They also find that there is value to investors in tracking analysts' flattery of management during earnings conference calls, as it predicts abnormal stock returns over the following quarter. The findings, which are incremental to prior research on the tone of earnings conference calls, highlight a previously ignored aspect of analyst feedback.
Author: Jason V. Chen Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 48
Book Description
Prior research finds that intraday stock prices move considerably during the discussion period of earnings conference calls. In this study, we explore what features of the manager-analyst dialogue during the discussion drive these price movements. We textually analyze the tone of managers and analysts and find that intraday prices react significantly to analyst tone, but not to management tone, for the full duration of the discussion. This effect strengthens when analyst tone is relatively negative. We then present intraday visual evidence that analysts are more neutral than managers over the call and that the tones of both parties drift downward as the call progresses. Overall, our findings illustrate how manager-analyst information exchanges evolve on earnings calls and indicate that analysts are the participants on earnings calls whose comments move stock prices during the discussion.
Author: Michael J. Jung Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
Companies' earnings conference calls are perceived to be venues for sell-side equity analysts to ask management questions. In this study, we examine another important conference call participant -- the buy-side analyst -- that has been under-explored in the literature due to data limitations. Using a large sample of transcripts, we identify 3,834 buy-side analysts from 701 institutional investment firms who participated (i.e., asked a question) in 13,332 conference calls to examine the determinants and implications of their participation. Buy-side analysts are more likely to participate when sell-side analyst coverage is low and dispersion in sell-side earnings forecasts is high, consistent with buy-side analysts participating when a company's information environment is poor. Institutional investors trade more of a company's stock in the quarters in which their buy-side analysts participate in the call. Finally, we find evidence that buy-side analyst participation is associated with company-level absolute changes in future stock price, trading volume, institutional ownership, and short interest.
Author: Marina Druz Publisher: ISBN: Category : Business analysts Languages : en Pages : 6
Book Description
Stock prices react significantly to the tone (negativity of words) managers use on earnings conference calls. This reaction reflects reasonably rational use of information. "Tone surprise" -- the residual when negativity in managerial tone is regressed on the firm's recent economic performance and CEO fixed effects -- predicts future earnings and analyst uncertainty. Prices move more, as hypothesized, in firms where tone surprise predicts more strongly. Experienced analysts respond appropriately in revising their forecasts; inexperienced analysts overreact (underreact) to tone surprises in presentations (answers). Post-call price drift, like post-earnings announcement drift, suggests less-than-full-use of information embedded in managerial tone.
Author: Anne Heinrichs Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 50
Book Description
Using a set of proprietary records, we examine who consumes quarterly earnings conference calls and under which circumstances the calls are consumed. While there is significant interest in calls by institutional investors and sell-side analysts, we find that investors who do not hold a position in the firm are a leading consumer. We show that buy-side non-holders who consume calls are more likely to hold positions in competitors and to purchase the stock in the future. In addition, many investors who hold large positions only consume calls periodically. We also document a benefit of consuming calls by finding that the consumption of calls is associated with more informed trading decisions. Overall, our investigation illuminates the actual consumption of conference calls by different consumers and the potential benefits of consuming additional firm disclosures.
Author: Joshua Ronen Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media ISBN: 0387257713 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 587
Book Description
This book is a study of earnings management, aimed at scholars and professionals in accounting, finance, economics, and law. The authors address research questions including: Why are earnings so important that firms feel compelled to manipulate them? What set of circumstances will induce earnings management? How will the interaction among management, boards of directors, investors, employees, suppliers, customers and regulators affect earnings management? How to design empirical research addressing earnings management? What are the limitations and strengths of current empirical models?
Author: William J. Mayew
Author: William J. Mayew
Author: William James Mayew
Author: Jonathan A. Milian
Author: Jason V. Chen
Author: Michael J. Jung
Author: Erik Michel Roelofsen
Author: Marina Druz
Author: Anne Heinrichs
Author: Jing Ning
Author: Joshua Ronen