Essays on Signaling and Matching PDF Download

Author: Peter A. Coles
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 242

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Author: Eric Samuel Mayefsky
Publisher: Stanford University
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 106

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I explore fundamental behavioral aspects of several market design environments in a variety of projects using both theoretical models and laboratory experiments. I show that human tendencies can drastically shift potential outcomes away from those which would result if individuals were fully 'rational' and unbiased in decision problems similar to those found frequently in the field. I explore two common classes of centralized matching mechanisms--Deferred Acceptance and Priority--which have wildly different success rates in practice despite both being open to manipulation by agents who have incomplete information about the other participants in the match. For this reason, theory predicts both mechanisms in equilibrium will yield match outcomes which are unstable, meaning some agents will desire to renegotiate with one another after receiving their match assignments, and thus reduce participants' confidence in using the match. I provide laboratory evidence that out-of-equilibrium truth telling by agents is substantially more frequent in the Deferred Acceptance environment and thus Deferred Acceptance matches will generally be more stable in practice than matches using a Priority mechanism. This may explain why Deferred Acceptance mechanisms appear to be more viable in the field. I also explore two different models of decentralized two-sided matching environments where establishing scarce signaling methods can improve market outcomes. In a laboratory experiment, I show that allowing potential receiving job offers to send a single signal to their favorite potential employer before job offers are made increases overall match rates in the market, but is potentially damaging to the firms making offers when compared to the market without such a signal. Then, in a theoretical model where pre-offer communication takes the form of an interview process where workers have natural limits on the number of interviews in which they can participate, I show that in many cases firms can benefit themselves and the market as a whole by voluntarily restricting the number of interviews they offer to participate in. While not traditionally thought of as market design problems, voting mechanisms are fundamentally goods allocation problems as well and have many of the same issues as traditional markets do. I explore the effects of voter bias on outcomes in an otherwise standard voting model and find that even slight external pressure on individuals in a committee tasked with coming to a collective decision can destroy the ability of that committee to arrive at the correct result, even when individuals have good information about the best decision to make. Furthermore, the quality of the decision made by such a committee can actually degrade as the committee size increases, in contrast with the canonical Condorcet Jury Theorem which predicts that a committee's ability to choose the right outcome increases quickly as more members are added.

Author: Tobias Langenberg
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540281134
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 124

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Over the last decades, technological progress has brought about a multitude of standardization problems. For instance, compatibility standards ensure the interoperability of goods, which is of decisive importance when users face positive externalities in consumption. Consumers' expectations are key to the problem of whether a new technology will prevail as de-facto standard or not. Early adopters must be confident that the network good will be successful. Thus, it may be worthwhile for firms to influence consumers' expectations. Consisting of three models on various aspects of standardization and expectations, this book aims at deepening our understanding of how standards and expectations interact. The models are applied to problems such as "Inter-Technology vs. Intra-Technology Competition" and "Standardization of Nascent Technologies".

Author: A. Boba
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642653774
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 103

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Lest the reader be discouraged, let us state unequivocally and at the very beginning that this is not, nor will it develop into, a treatise on information or decision or communication theory. It is true that on occasion some ideas or concepts will be borrowed from these areas, and it is also true that on some other occasions we might offer examples of what communication theory, or decision theory, are all about. Nevertheless, this will be done for the primary purpose of showing where and how further exploration of these areas of endeavour might lead to further and better understanding of our problems, and possibly lead the way to sounder planning and more workable solutions. The more sophisticated will find a paucity of illustrations and a minimal mathematical treatment of the subject. This has been done for two specific reasons; the first being that additional graphic representation or mathema tical manipulations would not have contributed materially to a better under standing of the subject, at least in the context in which it is being presented.

Author: John GAMBLE (Fellow of Pembroke College, Cambridge.)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 154

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Author: Hiromi Nosaka
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 140

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Author: Behrang Kamali Shahdadi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 216

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This thesis extends the two-sided matching literature by including an endogenous effort choice after the matching stage. We examine how different matching rules affect incentives to exert effort and the costs paid to induce various effort levels in three settings: a legal system, an education system, and a labor market. In an indigent defense program, the government provides counsel for indigent defendants. After the assignment of an attorney to a defendant, the attorney exerts a costly effort; however, the government only observes a noisy signal of the effort. We model the problem as a one-to-one matching problem with moral hazard. We show that holding the total expenditure for counsel fixed and changing the matching procedure to accommodate defendants' and attorneys' preferences, i.e., switch from random matching to stable matching, defendants become worse off because a stable matching exacerbates the moral hazard problem on the part of counsel. In in the second case we consider a teacher who chooses a costly effort after observing the distribution of students assigned to his/her class. We model the problem as a many-to-one matching with a costly non-contractible effort choice. We show that the effect of policies that affect the student assignment to classes, such as tracking, implementing school choice, and voucher programs, depends on the curvature of teachers' marginal utility of effort. We find conditions under which the argmax of a maximization problem is strictly supermodular or strictly submodular. Subsequently, we characterize conditions under which sorting students based on their academic performances increases (decreases) the total effort of teachers and the average performance of students. In the third setting, we consider a labor market in which each worker chooses an effort after assignment to a firm. The effort choice, labor in this setting, is observable and contractible. We show that the profit maximizing labor maximizes the total surplus of the match. Moreover, the unique matching in any equilibrium maximizes the total surplus; however, this matching may have a lower total output compared with any other matching. Stated differently, eliminating labor market frictions increases the efficiency; however, it may increase or decrease the total output.

Author: Basil R. Loucas
Publisher: Xlibris Corporation
ISBN: 1477137386
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 96

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My purpose in writing my book is to inform individuals interested in becoming lawyers that they must be positively sure that they are ready to enter a very disciplined world, obtain the required educational foundation that one needs to be successful in law school, and look deep within themselves to see if they have the necessary personality to be successful in their legal studies, the proper procedure to follow upon completing their bachelor of arts (BA) degree in applying to law school, and a heads-up approach on how to properly handle the reading comprehension section of the LSAT. Therefore, because I know how difficult the LSAT actually is, I am publishing my version of the reading comprehension section of the LSAT, and I am positive that the individuals who purchase my book and take it to heart and get to the task of teaching themselves the reading comprehension section of the LSAT and study each day will have a better understanding of how to properly approach this section. REMEMBER HARD WORK AND PRACTICE IS THE KEY TO BEING SUCCESSFUL. Very truly yours, Basil R. Loucas Good morning, on April 14, 2014, the e book version of my book LSAT THE LOUCAS WAY was awarded a Bronze Nominee Sticker from the 4th Annual Global E Book Awards 2014 and on August 17, 2014 it was the Bronze Medal Winner of the 2014 Global E Book Awards in the non-fiction Reference category. As I see it, LSAT THE LOUCAS WAY is a unique approach and it far exceeds anything the competition currently has to offer. As a result, it will revolutionize how an individual who wants to be an attorney should approach and complete the reading comprehension section of LSAT.

Author: Gregory M. Lewis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 374

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Author: Andrew Park
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 125

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This thesis consists of three essays studying the theory of bargaining and learning dynamics of matching platforms. The first essay studies the role of optimism in non-cooperative bargaining, while the second essay explores how introducing bargaining incentives affect trust building process in international relations context. The final essay considers learning incentives of matching platforms that utilize their matching technology to exploit or explore the quality of their constituents. The first essay asks a theoretic question: does exaggerated optimism benefit an agent in bargaining? The paper analyzes a two agent non-cooperative bargaining model to study if, and when, one has incentive to over-report his level of optimism. It modifies the complete information Rubinstein bargaining model to let players hold different beliefs about which player makes an offer. Defining optimism over one's perceived recognition probability, I find that an agent always "envies" a more optimistic agent, and has incentive to play optimism as strategic posture to benefit. The second part of the chapter introduces an asymmetry of information to the game, letting an agent be of a "more optimistic" type with some known probability. I find that the less optimistic type 1) pretends to be the more optimistic type---"play optimism"--If his probability of being more optimistic is high enough, 2) reveals his type before the more optimistic type would have settled, and 3) benefits more by playing optimism the higher the probability of extreme optimism is. The second essay studies social encounters that involve both trust building and bargaining. We show that while bargaining interferes with trust building in the sense that fully informative signaling becomes impossible, bargaining alongside trust-building actually improves welfare when initial trust is low. In contrast to the current literature, we show that actors improve welfare by building trust more slowly. Thus, windows of opportunity to build trust must be seized to prevent significant declines in expected welfare. We also characterize the evolution of stakes that lead to the best outcomes. Our analysis explains why trust building is so much more difficult than the current literature implies and illuminates the opportunities that produce the best outcomes between adversaries with something to lose. The third essay studies how platforms can utilize its pooling ability both to generate flow output and to discover good agents at the same time. In a simple model of two types in continuous time, the paper identifies an exploration-exploitation trade-off: by only matching good agents to each other, the platform may maximize flow output while sacrificing discovery of new good agents; on the other hand, by keeping an integrated pool, the platform maximizes learning rate while sacrificing the number of good matches. We find that the optimal matching policy is bang-bang from full integration--until the discovery ratio of good agents hits a certain threshold--to full segmentation thereafter to maximize flow payoffs. We also characterize how the threshold ratio responds to parameters of the model