Dissertation Abstracts International PDF Download

Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertations, Academic
Languages : en
Pages : 594

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Author: Alexander Victor Hirsch
Publisher: Stanford University
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 122

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This collection of essays studies the preferences of political actors over the policies that their respective political institutions enact; what those preferences consist of, how they change and are changed by their institutional environment, and how to measure them given that institutional environment. Traditionally, scholars of positive political science have assumed that 1) preferences are exogenous and fixed, and 2) policies may be ordered on a single left-right ideological continuum over which preferences are single-peaked. The first essay in this collection takes these assumptions as given. It asks whether the preferences of legislators may be properly estimated from observable votes in Congress if one of a broad class of lawmaking theories known as pivot theories describes the data generating process. In pivot theories the consent of multiple key actors known as pivots are necessary for successful policy change. Clinton (2007) argues that the behavior predicted by pivot theories is such that legislators' underlying preferences should not be recoverable from votes. The contribution of the first essay is to argue and present Monte Carlo evidence that this claim is false for a sensible modification of the theories. The broader implication of this finding is that measures of legislators' policy preferences generated from votes are valid for testing a broad class of Congressional lawmaking theories. The second and third essays in this collection both present theoretical models that push beyond the traditional assumptions on policy preferences. The second essay (co-authored with Kenneth W. Shotts) extends the basic spatial model to capture the notion of good public policy by assuming that policies, in additional to their ideological quality, may have a valence dimension that is endogenously determined by political actors. Using this model we revisit the canonical Congressional committee specialization game proposed by Gilligan and Krehbiel, and demonstrate how modeling committee specialization as the production of policy-specific valence generates results that starkly contrast with widely accepted propositions about legislative organization in the Congressional literature. The third essay departs starkly from the spatial model by assuming that political actors share identical preferences over policy outcomes, and that their differences in realized policy preferences are the consequence of openly differing beliefs about which policies will most effectively achieve shared goals. The essay develops this assumption in the context of a simple delegation game of policy choice and implementation, and shows that when additional learning about policy efficacy is possible policy disagreements driven by openly differing beliefs predict markedly distinct behavior from previously analyzed forms of conflict. In particular, when political actors share power over policy choice and implementation, they have short-term incentives to take actions that they believe will persuade each other that their beliefs are mistaken. One manifestation of this incentive can be the choice by one political actor of a policy he is certain will lead to a negative outcome, in order persuade another actor that an alternative policy is superior.

Author: John A. Hepp
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 108

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Author: Bahrum Lamehdasht
Publisher: Lulu.com
ISBN: 1291879471
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 149

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This book contains essays and revision notes for Microeconomics at the undergraduate level. This book includes the following topics: - Utility Curves; - Perfect Competition vs. Monopoly; - Oligopoly; - Collusion; - Monopolistic Competition; - Price Discrimination; - X-Efficiency; - Why do Firms Exist?; - Negative Externalities; - Positive Externalities; - Public Goods; - Adverse Selection; - General Equilibrium; - Efficiency Wages; - Minimum Wages and Unemployment; - Arrow-Pratt Risk-Aversion

Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertation abstracts
Languages : en
Pages : 776

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Author: Marco Sorge
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Access to Finance
Languages : en
Pages : 43

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This paper provides new theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that the quality of credit information may be a key element in explaining the maturity structure of corporate debt around the world. In markets with poor credit information and hence a high degree of uncertainty about borrower quality, the authors find suboptimal equilibria in which short-term contracts are preferred either as a hedge against uncertainty to limit losses in bad states (in the symmetric information case) or as a screening device to learn about borrower credit quality in the course of a repeated lending relationship (in the asymmetric information case). The results of the model are supported by the econometric analysis of panel data from both industrial and developing economies. The authors find that countries with better quality of credit information (for example, as a result of improvements in credit reporting systems or accounting standards) are characterized by a higher share of long-term debt as a proportion of total corporate debt ceteris paribus. The findings suggest that promoting institutions and policies to improve the quality of credit information is an important prerequisite for increasing access of firms to long-term finance.

Author: Frank H. Knight
Publisher: Cosimo, Inc.
ISBN: 1602060053
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 401

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A timeless classic of economic theory that remains fascinating and pertinent today, this is Frank Knight's famous explanation of why perfect competition cannot eliminate profits, the important differences between "risk" and "uncertainty," and the vital role of the entrepreneur in profitmaking. Based on Knight's PhD dissertation, this 1921 work, balancing theory with fact to come to stunning insights, is a distinct pleasure to read. FRANK H. KNIGHT (1885-1972) is considered by some the greatest American scholar of economics of the 20th century. An economics professor at the University of Chicago from 1927 until 1955, he was one of the founders of the Chicago school of economics, which influenced Milton Friedman and George Stigler.

Author: Jeffrey J. Reuer
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN: 1849504946
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 520

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Examines the ways in which real options theory can contribute to strategic management. This volume offers conceptual pieces that trace out pathways for the theory to move forward and presents research on the implications of real options for strategic investment, organization, and firm performance.

Author: Gregory M. Lewis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 374

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Author: Alain Verbeke
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN: 1787437191
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 565

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Book Description
The twelfth volume in the Progress in International Business Research series presents extensive accounts of the contemporary scientific debate on how to assess the impacts of distance, both negative and positive ones, on the conduct of international business.