Author: Econometric Society. World Congress Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 9780521484596 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 342
Book Description
This book gives the reader a unique survey of advances in economic theory.
Author: Thomas R. Palfrey Publisher: CRC Press ISBN: 1000154645 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 126
Book Description
The implementation problem lies at the heart of a theory of institutions. Simply stated, the aim of implementation theory is to investigate in a rigorous way the relationships between outcomes in a society and how those outcomes arise. The first part of "Bayesian Implementation" presents a basic model of the Bayesian implementation problem and summarizes and explains recent developments in this branch of implementation theory. Substantive problems of interest such as public goods provision, auctions and bargaining are special cases of the model, and these are addressed in subsequent chapters.
Author: R.J. Aumann Publisher: Elsevier ISBN: 9780444894274 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 824
Book Description
This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes
Author: Anol Bhattacherjee Publisher: CreateSpace ISBN: 9781475146127 Category : Science Languages : en Pages : 156
Book Description
This book is designed to introduce doctoral and graduate students to the process of conducting scientific research in the social sciences, business, education, public health, and related disciplines. It is a one-stop, comprehensive, and compact source for foundational concepts in behavioral research, and can serve as a stand-alone text or as a supplement to research readings in any doctoral seminar or research methods class. This book is currently used as a research text at universities on six continents and will shortly be available in nine different languages.
Author: Nicolás Riquelme Publisher: ISBN: Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations Languages : en Pages : 149
Book Description
"This dissertation is a collection of three papers studying both theoretical and applied aspects of mechanism design. In Chapter 1, we study competing auctions where each seller has private information about the quality of his object and chooses the reserve price of a second-price auction. Buyers observe the reserve prices and decide which auction to participate in. For a class of primitives, we show that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists for any finite market. In any such PBE, higher quality is signaled through higher reserve price at the expense of trade opportunities. But there might be bunching regions causing inefficiencies. In fact, in the large-market limit characterized by a directed search model, the interaction of adverse selection and search frictions entail distortion at the bottom: when either the buyer-seller ratio is sufficiently large or a regularity condition is met, there is no separating PBE in which the lowest-quality seller sets reserve price equal to his opportunity cost. This finding carries over to large finite markets and is consistent with observed behavior in auctions for used cars in UK (Choi, Nesheim and Rasul, 2016). In Chapter 2, we study games where a group of privately informed principals design mechanisms to a common agent. The agent has private information (exogenous) and, after observing principals' mechanisms, may have information (endogenous) about feasible allocations and private information from each principal. Thus, each principal may be interested in designing a mechanism to screen all this information, for which a potentially complicated message space to convey this information might be needed. In this project, we provide sufficient conditions on the agent's payoff such that any equilibrium in this setup has an output-equivalent equilibrium using only mechanisms with simple message spaces (direct mechanisms). Depending on the conditions, we propose two different notions of direct mechanisms and discuss their applicability with some examples. In Chapter 3, we study the design of horizontal merger regulation in a Cournot competition setting, where firms are privately informed about production technology. More specifically, a consumer-surplus-maximizer regulator designs a mechanism which determines whether the merger is blocked or accepted, and sets structural remedies (divestitures). This problem does not have the usual quasi-linear structure commonly assumed in the mechanism design literature. We first characterize incentive-compatible mechanisms and then find the optimal one. The complete information case is also presented as a benchmark. Asymmetric information induces important distortions in regulatory decisions. First, every rejected merge would improve consumer surplus. Second, every merge that decreases consumer surplus would be approved. Lastly, every merge rightly approved would be asked fewer divestitures than the optimal one (under-fixing effect). These results seem consistent with recent empirical evidence on the ineffectiveness of the merger regulation"--Pages vii-viii.
Author: Jean-Jacques Laffont Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing ISBN: Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 726
Book Description
The economics of asymmetric information has been the most important new tool of economic analysis and has proved powerful in explaining many aspects of the functioning of the economy. This anthology brings together every major paper in the field.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 56
Book Description
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists is the premier public resource on scientific and technological developments that impact global security. Founded by Manhattan Project Scientists, the Bulletin's iconic "Doomsday Clock" stimulates solutions for a safer world.
Author: Econometric Society. World Congress
Author: Thomas R. Palfrey
Author: R.J. Aumann
Author: Dimitrios Kostamis
Author: Anol Bhattacherjee
Author: Nicolás Riquelme
Author: Jean-Jacques Laffont
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Author: 
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