Author: Hsin-Yu TsengPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Health insurance
Languages : en
Pages : 262
Book Description
Three Essays on Empirical Applications of Contract Theory
Author: Hsin-Yu TsengPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Health insurance
Languages : en
Pages : 262
Book Description
Essays on Empirical Contract Theory
Author: Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision
Author: Eva I. Hoppe-FischerPublisher: Springer
ISBN: 3658241330
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 211
Book Description
Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.
The Theory of Contract Law
Author: Peter BensonPublisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521640385
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 365
Book Description
Essays addressing a variety of issues in the theory and practice of contract law.
Changing Concepts of Contract
Author: David CampbellPublisher: Springer
ISBN: 1137269278
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 258
Book Description
Changing Concepts of Contract is a prestigious collection of essays that re-examines the remarkable contributions of Ian Macneil to the study of contract law and contracting behaviour. Ian Macneil, who taught at Cornell University, the University of Virginia and, latterly, at Northwestern University, was the principal architect of relational contract theory, an approach that sought to direct attention to the context in which contracts are made. In this collection, nine leading UK contract law scholars re-consider Macneil's work and examine his theories in light of new social and technological circumstances. In doing so, they reveal relational contract theory to be a pertinent and insightful framework for the study and practice of the subject, one that presents a powerful challenge to the limits of orthodox contract law scholarship. In tandem with his academic life, Ian Macneil was also the 46th Chief of the Clan Macneil. Included in this volume is a Preface by his son Rory Macneil, the 47th Chief, who reflects on the influences on his father's thinking of those experiences outside academia. The collection also includes a Foreword by Stewart Macaulay, Malcolm Pitman Sharp Hilldale Professor Emeritus at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and an Introduction by Jay M Feinman, Distinguished Professor of Law at Rutgers School of Law.
Essays on Contract Theory Applied to International Finance
Author: Philippe AuffretPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 256
Book Description
A Theory of Contract Law
Author: Peter A. AlcesPublisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199707596
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 348
Book Description
In the past few decades, scholars have offered positive, normative, and most recently, interpretive theories of contract law. These theories have proceeded primarily (indeed, necessarily) from deontological and consequentialist premises. In A Theory of Contract Law: Empirical Insights and Moral Psychology, Professor Peter A. Alces confronts the leading interpretive theories of contract and demonstrates their doctrinal failures. Professor Alces presents the leading canonical cases that inform the extant theories of Contract law in both their historical and transactional contexts and argues that moral psychology provides a better explanation for the contract doctrine than do alternative comprehensive interpretive approaches.
Essays on Contract Theory
Author: Jeongsun YunContract Theory in Historical Context
Author: Deborah BaumgoldPublisher: BRILL
ISBN: 9004184252
Category : Literary Collections
Languages : en
Pages : 209
Book Description
These essays carefully show that classic social-contract theory was an ancien regime genre. Far more than is commonly realized, the local horizon was built into Hobbes s and Locke s theories and the genre drew on the absolutism of Bodin and Grotius.
Essays on Trading and Contract Theory
Author: Linlin YePublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 167
Book Description
This dissertation provides a study of optimal trading and contracting decisions, and their impacts on modern market structures. The dissertation is composed of three chapters. Chapter 1 investigates the impact of dark pools on the informational efficiency of prices (price discovery). Traders trade an asset in either an exchange or a dark pool, with informed traders having heterogeneous private signals whose distribution is determined by an information precision level. We find that dark pools have an amplification effect on price discovery. That is, when information precision is high, adding a dark pool enhances price discovery, whereas when information precision is low, adding a dark pool impairs price discovery. The main force behind this result is a sorting effect: in equilibrium, traders with strong signals trade in exchanges, traders with modest signals trade in dark pools, and traders with weak signals do not trade. These results produce novel empirical predictions regarding dark pools that reconcile the empirical evidence. The results also provide regulatory suggestions on enhancing the informational efficiency of pricing in equity markets and in emerging markets. Chapter 2 provides a framework to study information diffusion and interaction between a centralized and a bilateral market. In the model, traders trade to hedge their positions with some agents possessing private information. All agents can trade in the bilateral market before trading with a monopolistic market maker in a centralized market. We show that an active bilateral market functions as a channel to disseminate information. Moreover, information diffusion depends on the centralized market liquidity: both overly liquid and overly illiquid centralized markets discourage bilateral trading, and only reasonable centralized market liquidity activates bilateral trading and hence information diffusion. We also find that information diffusion is conducted in an asymmetric way. Which type of news spreads faster depends on the conjecture of the uninformed traders. Lastly, when prices in the centralized market contain information, it may ``squeeze out" trades and information diffusion in the bilateral market. Chapter 3, which is co-authored with Jen-wen Chang, analyzes the optimal screening decision for a monopolistic firm when consumers have time-inconsistent preferences and unobservable multiple degrees of naivet\'e (unawareness of their time-consistency). The firm can contract to screen their degrees of sophistication, subject to profit maximization. We characterize the optimal contracts and show that the firm offers a non-screening contract when consumers have deterministic costs and offers a screening contract when consumers have random costs. We argue that the uncertainty of the consumption costs lowers the firm's screening costs, and a discount per-usage price serves as a commitment device for the more sophisticated types. The results explain the phenomenon of the variation of contracts in sports club memberships, saving plans, and retirement programs.