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Author: Lin Liu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We consider a game of endogenous timing with observable delay in a mixed duopoly with endogenous vertical differentiation in the context of sequential quality and price choice. We find that a simultaneous play in the first opportunity at each stage turns out to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly.
Author: Lin Liu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We consider a game of endogenous timing with observable delay in a mixed duopoly with endogenous vertical differentiation in the context of sequential quality and price choice. We find that a simultaneous play in the first opportunity at each stage turns out to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly.
Author: Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed duopoly where firms first strategically choose their capacity levels and then compete at price level. In equilibrium, firms are shown to set prices simultaneously while capacities are chosen sequentially. This result is in contrast to the assumption of simultaneous order of moves for capacities choice made by Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12 (2007), pp. 1-7) in a mixed duopoly. Besides, we find that there are two equilibria: in one of them the public firm is the leader in capacities and, in the other, the follower.
Author: Yuanzhu Lu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We consider a game of endogenous timing of sequential choice of capacity and quantity with observable delay in a mixed duopoly and a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly, we find that a simultaneous play at the capacity stage or at the quantity stage can never be supported as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE); whereas a simultaneous play at each stage turns out to be the unique SPNE in a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly there is multiplicity of equilibria and all SPNEs require sequentiality at the capacity as well as quantity stage.
Author: Toshihiro Matsumura Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We investigate endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly with a negative externality. We find that quantity (price) competition yields a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome under a significant negative externality. These results indicate that mixed duopolies yield the same results as private duopolies under a significant negative externality, which is in sharp contrast to the results in mixed duopolies without a negative externality. Unless the negative externality is insignificant, public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and public leadership is more robust than the private leadership as equilibrium. If optimal environmental tax policy is introduced, however, private leadership yields the greatest welfare and this an equilibrium outcome in the endogenous timing game under quantity competition.
Author: Kangsik Choi Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
A model of endogenous payoff motives and endogenous order of moves is analysed in a mixed duopoly. We find that, when a non-negative price constraint is imposed on public and private firms' quantity choice, both firms always choose to be relative-payoff-maximisers, and both simultaneous move and sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium. In contrast, when non-negative absolute profit constraint is imposed, public and private firms always choose to be absolute-payoff-maximisers, and only sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium.
Author: Rabah Amir Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 34
Book Description
This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private - domestic or foreign - firm competes with a public, welfare maximizing firm. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in sharp contrast to private duopoly games. We provide sufficient conditions for the emergence of public and/or private leadership equilibrium. In all cases, private profits and social welfare are higher than under the corresponding Cournot equilibrium. From a methodological viewpoint we make extensive use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games in order to avoid common extraneous assumptions such as concavity, existence and uniqueness of the different equilibria, whenever possible. Some policy implications are drawn, in particular those relating to the merits of privatization.
Author: Yoshihiro Tomaru Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
This is the first paper to consider the endogenous timing in mixed duopoly with subsidization. Pal (Economics Letters, Vol. 61 (1998), pp. 181-185) shows that private leadership is always an equilibrium outcome in a mixed duopoly without any subsidy. By including the production subsidy, we observe that private leadership may disappear from equilibrium and that Cournot and public leadership become the likely equilibrium outcomes. Furthermore, we find that when firms have identical technologies the first-best allocation can be attained by the same subsidy before and after privatization even though firms' production timings are endogenized. Finally, we examine privatization with lobbying activities and show that such privatization leads to the deterioration of social welfare.
Author: Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
In this paper we analyze whether owners of firms prefer to decide on incentive contracts for their managers sequentially or simultaneously under Bertrand competition. It is shown that, in a private duopoly, if one firm is the leader in incentive contracts the other firm prefers to be the follower and thus in equilibrium firms' owners decide incentive contracts sequentially. However, in a mixed duopoly both the private and the public firm want to be the leader in incentive contracts and thus in equilibrium firms make decisions simultaneously.
Author: Lin Liu
Author: Lin Liu
Author: Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz
Author: Yuanzhu Lu
Author: Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz
Author: Toshihiro Matsumura
Author: Kangsik Choi
Author: Rabah Amir
Author: Yoshihiro Tomaru
Author: Hans-Theo Normann
Author: Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz