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Endogenous Timing in Cournot Duopoly

Endogenous Timing in Cournot Duopoly PDF Author: Toshihiro Matsumura
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26

Book Description


Endogenous Timing in Cournot Duopoly

Endogenous Timing in Cournot Duopoly PDF Author: Toshihiro Matsumura
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26

Book Description


Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Information

Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Information PDF Author: Hans-Theo Normann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Decision making
Languages : en
Pages : 56

Book Description


Playing Cournot Although They Shouldn't - Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopolies with Asymmetric Cost

Playing Cournot Although They Shouldn't - Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopolies with Asymmetric Cost PDF Author: Miguel Alexandre Fonseca
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
In this note, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment in a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric cost. Risk dominance considerations allow to select a unique equilibrium in which the low-cost firm is the Stackelberg leader. The data, however, do not support the theory as simultaneous-move play is modal. Average output choices are in line with the Cournot equilibrium. This suggests that Cournot is a much more robust predictor for competition in markets than theory suggests.

Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Games

Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Games PDF Author: Jonathan H. Hamilton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 32

Book Description


Endogenous Timing and Strategic Choice

Endogenous Timing and Strategic Choice PDF Author: Victor J. Tremblay
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
Cournot establishes a Nash equilibrium to a duopoly game under output competition; Bertrand finds a different Nash equilibrium under price competition. Both treat the strategic choice variable (output versus price) and the timing of play as exogenous. We investigate Cournot-Bertrand models where one firm competes in output and the other competes in price in both static and dynamic settings. We also develop a general model where both the timing of play and the strategic choice variables are endogenous. Consistent with the conduct of Honda and Scion, we show that Cournot-Bertrand behaviour can be a Nash equilibrium outcome.

Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Formation

Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Formation PDF Author: Hans-Theo Normann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36

Book Description


Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplet Informationa

Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplet Informationa PDF Author: Hans-Theo Normann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36

Book Description


Endogenous R&D Symmetry in Linear Duopoly with One-way Spillovers

Endogenous R&D Symmetry in Linear Duopoly with One-way Spillovers PDF Author: Antonio Tesoriere
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31

Book Description


Endogenous Timing with Free Entry

Endogenous Timing with Free Entry PDF Author: Antonio Tesoriere
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 23

Book Description


Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Endogenous Vertical Differentiation

Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Endogenous Vertical Differentiation PDF Author: Lin Liu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
We consider a game of endogenous timing with observable delay in a mixed duopoly with endogenous vertical differentiation in the context of sequential quality and price choice. We find that a simultaneous play in the first opportunity at each stage turns out to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly.