Author: Toshihiro Matsumura
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
Book Description
Endogenous Timing in Cournot Duopoly
Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Information
Author: Hans-Theo Normann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Decision making
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Decision making
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Book Description
Playing Cournot Although They Shouldn't - Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopolies with Asymmetric Cost
Author: Miguel Alexandre Fonseca
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
In this note, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment in a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric cost. Risk dominance considerations allow to select a unique equilibrium in which the low-cost firm is the Stackelberg leader. The data, however, do not support the theory as simultaneous-move play is modal. Average output choices are in line with the Cournot equilibrium. This suggests that Cournot is a much more robust predictor for competition in markets than theory suggests.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
In this note, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment in a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric cost. Risk dominance considerations allow to select a unique equilibrium in which the low-cost firm is the Stackelberg leader. The data, however, do not support the theory as simultaneous-move play is modal. Average output choices are in line with the Cournot equilibrium. This suggests that Cournot is a much more robust predictor for competition in markets than theory suggests.
Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Games
Author: Jonathan H. Hamilton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Endogenous Timing and Strategic Choice
Author: Victor J. Tremblay
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Cournot establishes a Nash equilibrium to a duopoly game under output competition; Bertrand finds a different Nash equilibrium under price competition. Both treat the strategic choice variable (output versus price) and the timing of play as exogenous. We investigate Cournot-Bertrand models where one firm competes in output and the other competes in price in both static and dynamic settings. We also develop a general model where both the timing of play and the strategic choice variables are endogenous. Consistent with the conduct of Honda and Scion, we show that Cournot-Bertrand behaviour can be a Nash equilibrium outcome.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Cournot establishes a Nash equilibrium to a duopoly game under output competition; Bertrand finds a different Nash equilibrium under price competition. Both treat the strategic choice variable (output versus price) and the timing of play as exogenous. We investigate Cournot-Bertrand models where one firm competes in output and the other competes in price in both static and dynamic settings. We also develop a general model where both the timing of play and the strategic choice variables are endogenous. Consistent with the conduct of Honda and Scion, we show that Cournot-Bertrand behaviour can be a Nash equilibrium outcome.
Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Formation
Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplet Informationa
Endogenous R&D Symmetry in Linear Duopoly with One-way Spillovers
Endogenous Timing with Free Entry
Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Endogenous Vertical Differentiation
Author: Lin Liu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We consider a game of endogenous timing with observable delay in a mixed duopoly with endogenous vertical differentiation in the context of sequential quality and price choice. We find that a simultaneous play in the first opportunity at each stage turns out to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We consider a game of endogenous timing with observable delay in a mixed duopoly with endogenous vertical differentiation in the context of sequential quality and price choice. We find that a simultaneous play in the first opportunity at each stage turns out to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly.