Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Capacity Choice PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Capacity Choice PDF full book. Access full book title Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Capacity Choice by Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed duopoly where firms first strategically choose their capacity levels and then compete at price level. In equilibrium, firms are shown to set prices simultaneously while capacities are chosen sequentially. This result is in contrast to the assumption of simultaneous order of moves for capacities choice made by Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12 (2007), pp. 1-7) in a mixed duopoly. Besides, we find that there are two equilibria: in one of them the public firm is the leader in capacities and, in the other, the follower.
Author: Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed duopoly where firms first strategically choose their capacity levels and then compete at price level. In equilibrium, firms are shown to set prices simultaneously while capacities are chosen sequentially. This result is in contrast to the assumption of simultaneous order of moves for capacities choice made by Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12 (2007), pp. 1-7) in a mixed duopoly. Besides, we find that there are two equilibria: in one of them the public firm is the leader in capacities and, in the other, the follower.
Author: Yuanzhu Lu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We consider a game of endogenous timing of sequential choice of capacity and quantity with observable delay in a mixed duopoly and a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly, we find that a simultaneous play at the capacity stage or at the quantity stage can never be supported as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE); whereas a simultaneous play at each stage turns out to be the unique SPNE in a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly there is multiplicity of equilibria and all SPNEs require sequentiality at the capacity as well as quantity stage.
Author: Lin Liu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We consider a game of endogenous timing with observable delay in a mixed duopoly with endogenous vertical differentiation in the context of sequential quality and price choice. We find that a simultaneous play in the first opportunity at each stage turns out to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly.
Author: Kangsik Choi Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
A model of endogenous payoff motives and endogenous order of moves is analysed in a mixed duopoly. We find that, when a non-negative price constraint is imposed on public and private firms' quantity choice, both firms always choose to be relative-payoff-maximisers, and both simultaneous move and sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium. In contrast, when non-negative absolute profit constraint is imposed, public and private firms always choose to be absolute-payoff-maximisers, and only sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium.
Author: Toshihiro Matsumura Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We investigate endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly with a negative externality. We find that quantity (price) competition yields a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome under a significant negative externality. These results indicate that mixed duopolies yield the same results as private duopolies under a significant negative externality, which is in sharp contrast to the results in mixed duopolies without a negative externality. Unless the negative externality is insignificant, public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and public leadership is more robust than the private leadership as equilibrium. If optimal environmental tax policy is introduced, however, private leadership yields the greatest welfare and this an equilibrium outcome in the endogenous timing game under quantity competition.
Author: Rabah Amir Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 34
Book Description
This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private - domestic or foreign - firm competes with a public, welfare maximizing firm. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in sharp contrast to private duopoly games. We provide sufficient conditions for the emergence of public and/or private leadership equilibrium. In all cases, private profits and social welfare are higher than under the corresponding Cournot equilibrium. From a methodological viewpoint we make extensive use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games in order to avoid common extraneous assumptions such as concavity, existence and uniqueness of the different equilibria, whenever possible. Some policy implications are drawn, in particular those relating to the merits of privatization.
Author: Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages :
Book Description
The endogenous choice of timing is discussed in a vertically differentiated duopoly where quality improvement requires a fixed convex cost. The timing decision concerns the quality stage. Using an extended game with observable delay, it is shown that only simultaneous equilibria can arise. This puts into question the ability of Stackelberg games to describe the entry process.
Author: Yuanzhu Lu Publisher: ISBN: Category : Languages : en Pages : 0
Book Description
We analyze the capacity choice of firms under demand uncertainty in a mixed duopoly market consisting of one private firm and one public firm. We define a two-stage game where firms choose capacity in the first stage without knowing which state of Nature is going to be realized, and output in the second stage knowing which state is realized. We address the question of maintaining over and under capacity in the equilibrium as a strategic device; and show that both symmetric and asymmetric outcomes can be realized.
Author: Kazuhiro Ohnishi Publisher: Bentham Science Publishers ISBN: 1681080389 Category : Business & Economics Languages : en Pages : 263
Book Description
This eBook presents recent case studies on firms and their strategy employed in specific scenarios and industries. Readers will find, in this volume, an analysis of oligopolistic industries done by using various economic models. These models attempt to explain changes to the competitive environment owing to strategic firm behavior, that is, on the assumption that firms are able to compete effectively and advantageously against rivals through applying strategic initiatives. This eBook investigates the behavior of profit-maximizing firms as well as labor-managed, state-owned and joint-stock firms. Fifteen chapters present empirical or theoretical findings, and develop the economic analysis of firm behavior.
Author: Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz
Author: Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz
Author: Yuanzhu Lu
Author: Lin Liu
Author: Kangsik Choi
Author: Toshihiro Matsumura
Author: Rabah Amir
Author: 
Author: Yuanzhu Lu
Author: Kazuhiro Ohnishi
Author: Hans-Theo Normann